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There are more than 15 million refugees registered with UNHCR and an unknown unregistered 
number of refugees worldwide. Among these refugees are scholars, academics and adult 
professionals. In 2010 for instance, the largest group in the Iraqi refugee populace in Jordan, was 
adults 18-59 years old. Thirty percent of these adults were university graduates. Yet, according 
to the dominant narrative, refugees are women and children, unskilled and traumatized, terrorists 
and vigilantes, ineligible and queue-jumping or short-term and freeloading. Thus, refugees are 
framed in ways that minimize their capacity and underscore a dependency upon or threat to the 
host state and aid community. Subsequently, compliance tasks have precluded aid for INGOs, 
which in turn, have “responsibilized” refugees through ever-restrictive eligibility criteria and 
rules. Adult education and livelihoods have been limited and some refugees have been denied 
services. As a result, the people with the least resources have been apportioned a 
disproportionate amount of responsibility, for an environment in which either few relevant 
services were provided or no accountability relationship was afforded.  
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INGO-donor networks have published online data to increase accountability, yet it has 
been examined most often quantitatively. Therefore, through network perspectives and the 
conceptual framework of downward accountability, I analyzed program reports from 
humanitarian activities implemented from 2010-2015, for Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan. In 
an open data repository, I reviewed more than 1,800 program profiles and 47 documents were 
selected for content analysis. The analysis suggests emergency education decreased tensions, 
raised awareness about diseases and hygiene, achieved child protection and gender-inclusion 
goals and remediated noncompliance. The information however, was most often in regard to 
local beneficiaries, refugees with the least skills and refugees highly dependent upon 
humanitarian aid. Thus, there was minimal reporting of links between accountability policies, 
outcomes and the livelihoods aspirations of the refugee/scholar/professional.  
Recommendations encompass educational policies and practices such as requalification, 
continuing education, professional development and certification, because they lead to 
sustainable livelihoods. Through comparative qualitative research, this study problematizes 
accountability information in open data and underscores the Iraqi and Syrian crisis as an adult 
education emergency – a circumstance not often associated with refugeehood.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The movement of uprooted people in host communities is a major challenge in the aid arena. In 
fact, “refugee flows- and the civil and ethnic conflicts that cause them- are likely to remain 
among the most severe and intractable problems faced by the international community” 
(Makinson, 1999). In 2009, ten years after the quote above was published, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was caring for at least 42 million people, including 
14 million refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2009a). In addition, in just a few years, the 
number of uprooted people has increased. For instance, UNHCR was caring for over 54 million 
in 2014, close to 58 million in 2015 and is expecting a population of over 60 million uprooted 
people in 2016 (UNHCR, 2015f).  
The movement of refugees especially, may be engendered by social unrest, political 
instability and other destabilizing factors (Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Winthrop, 2009; Kibreab, 
1997).  Thus, they have become a concern for dozens if not hundreds of nations. While these 
nations do not all encounter the same dilemmas, most have permitted international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), non-profit and community-based organizations to help 
manage the flow of goods and services to those in need. This large-scale process requires 
coordination among nations, donors, organizations and aid beneficiaries (Crisp, Garras, 
McAvoy, Schenkenberg, Spiegel & Voon, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2009; Stephenson & Kehler, 
2004; Schweizer, 2004; Woodward, 2001). However, Serrato cautioned, “transparency and 
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quality standards are weak and coordination is difficult to ensure” (2014, p. 4). Moreover, staff 
or supervision may be especially low in aid arenas (Jawahar, Stone & Kisamore, 2007; Salama, 
1999), In fact, there are usually just a handful of staff “driving humanitarian communication 
efforts” and “best practices and lessons learnt are not normally institutionalized, and therefore 
hardly influence their own organizations and/or other humanitarian settings” (Quintanilla, 2012, 
p. 15).  
When lessons learned are not leveraged, actors may not remediate the challenges which 
render aid less accessible. For instance, humanitarian assistance has been focused on camps more 
than urban settings, children more than adults and relief more than recovery (Kapyla & Kennedy, 
2014; Serrato, 2014; Healy & Tiller, 2013; Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010; MSF, 1997). 
Moreover, while valuable information exists in grey literature such as lessons learned, it may be 
difficult to find (Seybolt, 2009; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). For example, Maiers, Reynolds 
& Haselkorn advised, “the typical reality in disaster response is that existing information is either 
outdated, hard to find, scattered among different sources, or unreliable for political or other 
reasons” (2005, p. 89). Wessells (2008) concurred, claiming multiple organizations implemented 
psychological services in Kosovo however, there were separate coordination activities, actors 
were not involved in information sharing and the coordination groups did not know of one 
another’s existence. Additionally, Lumbert, DeBot, Wang, Brekelmans & Yang maintained, 
“academics have generally acknowledged the importance of information-sharing, reflection, and 
documentation of refugee programs, yet there is little evidence that this has made its way into 
practice” (2012, p. 2). This information gap is particularly critical in the area of education. For 
instance, Mark Bray, Director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) contended, 
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knowledge in education - in an emergency context - is not being leveraged. Indeed, he claimed it 
could be lost entirely, because of the “dispersion and disappearance of documents” and “high 
turnover” (Kirk, 2009, p. 7).  
This challenge is particularly evident in the field because the documents are drafted by 
numerous agencies and stakeholders and the guidelines among them can be quite different. The 
length, certification, enrollment requirements, subject and associated curricula can vary widely 
(Talbot, 2013; Kirk, 2009). Subsequently, there has been less analysis of adult education and 
livelihoods activities, particularly in relation to a comparative examination of content. Thus, in 
this study, I conducted a comparative document review of adult education and livelihoods 
activities.    
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study is focused upon the public information about adult education and livelihoods 
programs for refugees in emergencies. Chapter 2 is based upon a literature review and is 
concerned with the following inquiries: the constraints to participation in the generation and 
sharing of information; how information is channeled through emergency education programs; 
how networks and competing interests affect the access to and quality of aid information in adult 
education; and how compliance information limits accountability in emergency education.  
This analysis is centered upon emergency education programs in multiple sectors, 
including livelihoods, hygiene, health, sanitation, child protection, community-based protection 
and gender inclusion. Education is therefore comprised of formal and non-formal interventions 
that provide opportunities for refugees to gain and/or enhance knowledge and skills. This 
composition of education serves as a working operational definition, by encompassing many 
programs in the aid context, with different timelines, curricula, enrollment criteria, pedagogical 
methods and teacher qualifications.  
A main finding in the literature review was the temporary schema in emergency aid, 
which permeated the coordination of adult education and fulfilled the priorities of critics, along 
with political or economic imperatives to decrease threats and costs through compliance. This 
finding is significant for at least two reasons. First, information flows in education and training 
were limited, because they were centered upon short-term activities and legitimacy tasks. 
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Second, recovery for adults could not be achieved in part, because it was deemphasized as a 
temporary problem.  
2.1 WHAT CONSTRAINS PARTICIPATION IN AID INFORMATION? 
Power differentials and irregular funding are particular constraints to participation in the 
generation and sharing of aid information. Power differentials (Herrhausen, 2007) and irregular 
funding (OECD, 2012) are important to underscore, because they narrow opportunities for 
multiple perspectives to influence humanitarian aid and limit comparative, cross-sectoral data 
examinations. As a result, the objective of aid programs and the accountability activities, are 
constructed in an environment that is both asymmetrical and indeterminate. This setting is not 
recovery-oriented. Rather it is a liminal platform for care-seekers with no other alternatives. 
  In this section, I focus upon the power differential between international and local 
organizations and between international organizations and refugees. Next, I describe irregular 
funding and the implications for adult education and livelihoods programs. 
2.1.1 Power differentials 
Though there are many actors in humanitarian aid, the priorities of donors and aid agencies often 
drive activities. National actors are at times subordinated, because human resources may not be 
developed in the bustle to plan and implement a crisis response. Alternatively, local staff with 
relevant skills are given jobs in INGO offices (Audet, 2011; Herrhausen, 2007). This power over 
human resources “often depletes those structures that do exist locally and, in that way, it 
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undermines the building up of sustainable local administrations” (Herrhausen, 2007, p. 16). Field 
expertise is also diminished, because programs are structured autonomously, by staff who make 
assumptions without inputs from those with local or specialized knowledge. For instance, 
information and technology and logistics departments are typically left out of the proposal 
development process (Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005). These departments are usually 
described as ‘overhead’ and the potential of these departments to streamline processes and 
increase efficiency is minimized.  
The need for these departments is usually underscored in rapid onset emergencies, where 
it is more difficult to establish effective modes of communication and conduct the training 
needed to support the utilization of new software or adherence to new communication 
channels/standards. As a result, there are long-term implementation challenges because of 
“inaccurate project budgets and unrealistic expectations” (Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005, 
p. 85). Moreover, the costs associated with purchasing and transporting equipment and time 
required to manage the supply chain are underestimated.  
The diminution of local knowledge is particularly recognizable in the refugee imaginary. 
For instance, refugees do not control their own narrative (Marlowe, 2010). Indeed, refugeehood 
(the circumstance and position associated with a person who is a refugee) is largely framed with 
the information generated and shared by donors and INGOs. By virtue of their authority and 
power over resources, the information they generate and disseminate denotes a power differential 
(Shrestha, 2011). Indeed, Seeley (2010) claimed, “the political priorities of the givers rarely 
coincide with those in the places where the aid dollars land.” For instance, refugees are not 
decision-makers (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). They do not construct identity in aid projects. 
Rather, Zetter claimed, their “stereotyped identities are translated into bureaucratically assumed 
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needs” (1991, p. 39). However, while they position themselves as experts on refugee matters 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), aid actors are “largely ignorant of affected people’s views about 
the assistance being provided” (Hofmann, Roberts, Shoham & Harvey, 2004, p. 32).  
In addition, because assumptions are made, there may be fewer interactions between 
organizations and refugees. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres contended, “refugees should 
participate in the coordination process to the maximum possible extent” (1997, p. 229). 
However, the people most affected by crisis do not usually participate in coordination meetings 
(Stockton, 2002). When meetings are facilitated, “humanitarians provide but do not listen, that 
field staff leading meetings are not senior enough and meetings with providers are unproductive” 
(Serrato, 2014, p. 6).  
Moreover, Martin noted, aid beneficiaries are “least able to influence aid agencies and 
thereby least able to hold them accountable” (2010, p. 6). Therefore, whether as the outcome of 
minimal decision-rights or myopic identity construction, aid participation decreases. 
Consequently, the public may have access to the donor-INGO vantage point and be unaware of 
other perspectives. Untested assumptions may not be problematized and progress in 
accountability may be difficult to recommend and study, because the accessible information in 
relation to accountability accomplishments is obscured. For example, the “most common 
planning tools, reporting formats and information systems do not capture the quality of 
accountability in relationships between NGOs and their constituents, nor do they actively enable 
learning and improvement” (Keystone, 2006, p. 4).  
Accountability to donors (upward accountability) has been an important part of 
information sharing (Rubenstein, 2007), yet accountability to beneficiaries (Keystone, 2006) 
including refugees (downward accountability) has been less prominent. Thus, disentangling 
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decision-rights and downward accountability from donor-INGO reports, could be an important 
focus of aid scholarship. Indeed, resources are needed to examine reports and develop 
recommendations in the humanitarian arena which have implications for accountability and 
emergency education. Support for this endeavor has been insufficient in part, because of 
irregular funding. 
2.1.2 Irregular funding 
Humanitarian support for refugees is often mitigated by bilateral and multilateral trade, armed 
conflict, debt relief and structural adjustment. Therefore, the preferences, alliances and 
grievances among various states and donors directly impact the resources allocated to those in 
need (Winthrop, 2009; Goodwin-Gill, 2008; Schweizer, 2004), which makes aid irregular. In 
addition, structural adjustment in particular, has minimized international support for education in 
many countries to facilitate myriad resource allocations in other sectors (Oketch, McCowan & 
Schendel, 2014; Weidman, 1995). Thus, international aid has been relative to mutualisms, 
inasmuch as it has been to teaching and learning. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) 
surmised, much of humanitarian aid is fragmented and unpredictable. The issue of predictability 
is particularly important to underscore because in this uncertain setting, the value of aid is often 
reduced by 15-20% (OECD, 2012). This environment impacts the information generated and 
shared between and among donors, organizations and researchers. For instance, Makinson (1999) 
argued, “the field of relief and humanitarian assistance remained rather ad hoc in its approach, 
with high staff turnover, almost no professional training, scant attention to research and virtually 
no established research and training institutions that could ameliorate this situation.”  
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Staffing problems in particular, affect the information which can be generated and shared 
between and among agencies. Indeed, the World Health Organization (WHO), International 
Medical Corps (IMC) & United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) claimed information sharing 
was mitigated, in part, because focal points in Jordan could not be reached “even by phone to 
verify information due to their heavy workloads” (2012, p. 7). Indeed, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners maintained, “to date registration capacity 
has not been able to keep pace with needs” and local institutions are also operating well beyond 
their limits (OCHA, 2009, p. 60). In addition, in Jordan and other nations, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded, staff shortages, access to people in need 
and, “the lack of reliable data have challenged State’s efforts to ensure that projects help the 
intended beneficiaries” (2009). The paucity of data is especially concerning, because the 
conditions for refugees from Iraq are poor and education, training and employment opportunities 
in the formal sector are hard to find. Indeed, Marfleet and Chatty maintained, “most have so far 
enjoyed basic physical security but face serious problems in relation to income, employment, 
housing, health and education in the host countries….where they are regarded as temporary 
guests or visitors” (2009, p. 2). 
These formidable conditions in host communities may encourage more demand for 
INGO education and training programs. Thus, there is a need for information about Iraqis’ skills 
and learning aspirations, as well as scholarship which examines how their learning needs are 
addressed in humanitarian aid programs. These endeavors may not have been prioritized because 
of limited resources. For instance, UNHCR claimed funding for education was “narrow” and 
“late” (OCHA, 2011, p.55). 
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The Iraqi refugee crisis is especially significant, because one-third of registered adult 
Iraqi refugees in Jordan, is comprised of university alumni (OCHA, 2010; UNHCR, 2009d). 
UNHCR and its partners also described Iraqi refugees as “highly educated” (OCHA 2011, p. 49; 
OCHA, 2010, p. 38, 45). I did not find precise and disaggregated figures of the Iraqi refugee 
workforce. However, in the 2011 Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees, UNHCR noted 40-
60% of the adult population were working informally and 29% of registered Iraqi refugees had 
work permits (OCHA, 2011, p. 49). There were nearly 31,000 UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees 
in Jordan in 2010 (OHCA, 2011, p. 43) however, UNHCR did not disaggregate the population in 
this report. In the 2010 Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees however, there were nearly 
47,000 registered refugees in Jordan in 2009 and the population data was disaggregated. 
Significantly, more than 60% of this population was between the ages of 18-59 (OCHA, 2010, p. 
38). According to UNHCR, “the majority of the registered caseload (29, 039 individuals) is 
between 18-59 years of age” (OCHA, 2011, p. 38). Indeed, continuing education, professional 
development and certification, are activities relevant to highly educated adults (Talbot, 2013; 
Kirk, 2009). Therefore, the displacement of Iraqi refugees and their subsequent asylum in 
Jordan, was both a tragic circumstance and an adult education emergency. Moreover, Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan comprised the majority of the UNHCR-registered refugee population in 2009 
and 2010 (OCHA, 2011; OCHA, 2010). Thus, the refugee crisis in Jordan was to a large degree, 
fertile ground for adult education and livelihoods programs. 
Donors have been concerned with the mechanisms needed to prevent an inferior form of 
K-12 education in humanitarian aid (DFID, 2014). Therefore, projects have been planned to 
provide a K-12 education that is comparable to the education in host communities. However, the 
premise that adult education and livelihoods training could also be based upon what is customary 
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for citizens, has not received nearly as much demand, because donors and states were 
preoccupied with the costs and threats of refugeehood. Adult refugees were therefore 
underserved. In fact, in another regionally-focused report, UNHCR conceded “there is a 
consensus among stakeholders that the situation of Iraqi refugees in terms of livelihoods has 
reached a crisis point” (OCHA, 2009, p. 73). 
2.1.3 Costs of refugeehood 
Refugeehood is viewed in the context of potential threats and costs, which minimize support for 
aid interventions. For instance, in a seminal study Ward (2014) examined UNHCR urban refugee 
policies to understand the refugee context in Jordan in 2009. Ward maintained donors viewed 
refugeehood in the context of their own security interests. Security interests undergirded the 
policy environment and priority for integration and repatriation, undergirded aid allocations.  
Indeed, through phenomenology, classical budget theory and burden-sharing frameworks, 
Ward (2014) recognized funding as a mechanism to deter irregular movements to the North. 
Thus, once the likelihood of undesired refugee flows decreased, there was a corresponding 
decrease in humanitarian aid. As a result of donor and host priorities, as well as funding 
shortfalls, services were framed as time-limited and temporary. While tensions between UNHCR 
and the host government were challenging, Ward claimed the most significant constraint to 
implementation, was the decrease in donor support. Moreover, UNHCR and its partners could no 
longer operate their own centers and were increasingly reliant upon national organizations and 
agencies to support refugees. However, national agencies did not have the capacity necessary to 
respond to the demand for goods and services, therefore refugees were underserved. Thus, the 
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services refugees seek in the aid arena may not be accessible at the national or INGO level. This 
circumstance has been particularly prohibitive for skilled and refugee adults. 
Through working groups in education for children (Save the Children & UNICEF, 2010; 
UNICEF & Save the Children, 2010), organizations share information and develop mechanisms 
to offset funding declines. However, I could not identify an ‘adult education working group’ for 
refugees in Jordan. Moreover, humanitarian education programs were documented by UNHCR 
and its partners however, this information has been dispersed in multiple disciplines. Indeed, 
education for adults has been conducted in community-based protection, mental health, nutrition, 
water-sanitation-hygiene (WASH) and health focused interventions (OCHA, 2010; OCHA, 
2009). Therefore, the data is scattered and separated from the field of emergency education. 
Adult learners therefore, may encounter funding constraints alongside comparatively less 
coordination.  
It is critical therefore, to examine the channels in which adult education and livelihoods 
information is disseminated and the degree to which it could be studied and leveraged to inform 
best practices. Thus, in the following section, I describe the distinct ways in which information 
about adult education and livelihoods is channeled and the implications for scholarship in 
emergency education. 
2.2 HOW IS INFORMATION CHANNELED? 
Information is channeled through emergency education via networks and competition. Networks 
are important to analyze in part, because they generate and disseminate information (Shiffman, 
Quissell, Schmitz, Pelletier, Smith, Berlan et al., 2015) in which refugeehood is framed. In 
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addition, the positions network members are afforded are significant determinants, shaping the 
policies and preferences which are implemented in the aid arena. Network positions are not 
constructed serendipitously. Rather, they are constructed through competition between and 
among organizations, states, noncitizens and citizens in the workforce (Coston, 1998).  
In INGO programs in particular, information is generated to comply with donor 
requirements (Seybolt, 2009). As a result, INGOs may generate and share more information 
related to donor or host country priorities, than they disclose data which demonstrate how 
refugees’ education and livelihoods priorities informed aid interventions. Resources allocated to 
comply and compete may not be distributed to examine and incorporate lessons learned. 
Therefore, the focus of this section is upon the networks in the humanitarian aid arena and the 
competition which minimizes adult education and livelihoods in emergencies. 
2.2.1 Networks 
The information generated and shared by members of aid networks is especially important to the 
public, because “networks shape how issues are understood” (Shiffman, Quissell, Schmitz, 
Pelletier, Smith, Berlan et al., 2015, p. 7).  
Seybolt (2009) examined aid coordination through the conceptual framework of systemic 
network theory. He viewed the humanitarian community as an adaptive system which consists of 
a set of units that interface to effect specific outcomes. As a type of system, humanitarian actors 
operate as a network, but do so inconsistently because of divergent interests, market-driven 
conflicts and poor information flows.  
In this context, adult refugees are overshadowed by the conflicts between and among 
members and the parameters of disclosure in their information. For instance, Clark-Kazak (2009) 
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examined UNHCR appeals and reports published from 1999-2008. Her examination of 
photographs and texts was conducted through textual analysis and social age analysis. This 
longitudinal review allowed Clark-Kazak to observe how UNHCR socially constructed refugees 
through different life stages. Clark-Kazak determined that adults were most often represented in 
the photographs of UNHCR reports, yet least often represented in the text. Thus, the issues in the 
aid arena may be understood as child protection issues. In the context of education, K-12 issues 
could be subsequently predominate, based upon the text which underscores the needs of refugee 
children.  
The roles within the network are also critical. For instance, roles are so critical to 
program outcomes, they engender inquiries about “whose policy preferences are pursued, 
implemented and delivered on the ground” (Ohanyan, 2009, p. 476). Roles can reflect 
humanitarian, as well as political interests. For example, Souter claimed,  “in practice, of course, 
UNHCR’s work has been inescapably political and durable solutions have been put to the service 
of numerous other political, economic and strategic goals, some of which are incompatible with 
their humanitarian rationale” (2013, p. 172). Indeed, INGOs may struggle to achieve goals and 
maintain neutrality. Thus, the structures suited to NGO autonomy have been an object of 
research in the aid arena. For example, through interviews and document review, Ohanyan 
(2009) examined NGO-donor networks to determine the setting most conducive to the 
preservation of NGO autonomy and the characteristics that made it possible to align policy 
preferences with policy outcomes. Through the network conceptual model, Ohanyan provided a 
typology of network types through which NGO-donor interactions could be viewed. Ohanyan 
concluded that NGOs were, “best situated to further their preferences relative to those of their 
donors in networks in which no single donor is dominant” (2009, p. 477). Moreover, NGOs 
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could preserve their autonomy and decision-making discretion in settings where there were 
multiple and even opposing policy preferences among various donors and constituents. Thus, it 
appeared the diversity of perspectives among network members served to reduce the potential for 
individual donors to exert unilateral control of NGO operations. In this setting, organizations 
were more engaged with beneficiaries and enjoyed a greater degree of grassroots support. 
However, Ohanyan cautioned networks were inherently political and supported policies and 
beneficiary groups based upon a specific set of values. Thus, NGO autonomy or the lack thereof, 
does not alter the potential for aid actors to divide communities and support interventions that 
have unintended consequences. In addition, though there are many variables involved in 
humanitarian outcomes, the ties between aid actors are critical. For instance, Ohanyan posited, 
the “internal institutional composition of NGO-donor policy networks are significant 
determinants in shaping opportunities for NGOs and in giving both NGOs and donors leverage 
over the policy process” (2009, p. 475). Thus, the ties between network members helps shape the 
discretion they can utilize to promote their policy objectives. In the case of adult education and 
livelihoods, these ties are especially significant, because concerns about competition for labor 
inform policy objectives and narrows roles for refugees to protect the local workforce.  
2.2.2 Donor and host country competition 
There are competing international and national policies which reduce opportunities to promote 
self-reliance at the INGO level (Karsetter, 2014; Stevens, 2013; Kumin, 2004; Knudsen, 1991). 
For instance, Hasenfeld and Garrow argued, “local communities compete with each other to 
attract desirable constituents (e.g. business entrepreneurs) and repel undesirable constituents (e.g. 
poor immigrants)” (2012, p. 305). This competition can be viewed in welfare/human services, 
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tax, labor and education, where decision-makers “attempt to gain advantages by using policy-
making discretion” (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012, p. 305).  
In the humanitarian regime, this competition is between host states and donor states. In 
fact, Napier-Moore (2005) argued, host states pressured the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to prevent people from crossing the border or contain people 
who have crossed the border in camps. Indeed, Karsetter cautioned, the refugees’ right to work 
may not be affirmed by host states, as “local policies and practices often ignore the guidelines set 
by [the] international legal framework and make it difficult for refugees to earn income” (2014, 
p. 68). Additionally, MacDougall argued, “…local policies define refugee communities in 
different ways and thus enable different sorts of livelihoods” (2011, p. 38). These definitions 
inform the parameters for income generation and has engendered limitations for refugee 
livelihoods (ILO, 2015). As a result, “the economic needs of refugees have not been addressed in 
any meaningful or explicit fashion” (ILO, 2015, p. 5).  
Policies may also be enacted to restrict refugees’ movements and promote their 
repatriation even when it is not preferred by refugees (Mountz, Coddington, Catania, & Loyd, 
2013). Meanwhile, donor states direct their resources toward interventions that will either 
integrate refugees in the host community or likewise, encourage their repatriation. Thus, host 
states and donor states engage in “active refugee-prevention” and containment policies (Napier-
Moore, 2005, p. 6). Napier-Moore therefore surmised, “no state is necessarily responsible for 
their asylum” (2005, p. 4).  
This competition is especially deleterious, because a main challenge in emergencies is to 
find a livelihood (Karsetter, 2014; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2012; AMES, 2011). Though 
refugees encounter varied life issues, “the biggest problems facing refugees can be decreased 
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through the development of sustainable employment and livelihood opportunities…” (Karsetter, 
2014, p. 74). Therefore, from the view of refugees, education and livelihoods programs are a 
necessity, because they increase employability and access to the marketplace. Indeed, without 
education programs in emergencies, there may be no safe or cost-effective way to address one’s 
economic needs and become self-reliant (HAP International, 2013; Crisp et al., 2013; Talbot, 
2013). Yet, education in emergency settings is often underfunded and much of the literature is 
situated in a K-12 milieu (Talbot, 2013; Winthrop, 2009; Ratcliffe & Macrea, 1999). Indeed, 
Winthrop claimed, “there is a large focus on primary education, especially in refugee contexts” 
and “the educational needs of displaced youth, as well as adults, typically receive less attention” 
(2009, p. 13). Though some education and training opportunities are provided, they are not 
according to the priorities of refugees. For example, Winthrop noted the types of educational 
projects afforded, often have not met “the current or long-term needs of community members, 
especially with regards to the livelihood skills development” (2009, p. 13). Thus, competition in 
the aid arena minimizes the response to needs in adult education.  
While these forms of competition are between and among states, non-citizens and 
citizens, the competitive arena is also prevalent between and among organizations, often between 
staff in headquarters and emergency environments. Thus, the pressures from divergent interests 
in the aid arena are both external and internal to the organizational context. This form of 
competition is described in the following section. 
2.2.3 Competing and divergent interests in organizations 
There are competing positions and divergent interests between and among aid actors in 
organizations. Through the conceptual frameworks of policy coherence and organizational 
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theory, these differences have been conceptualized as a lack of alignment and an inadequate 
network interface. For instance, Herrhausen noted, “field staff often complain the HQ sets 
policies which are ill-suited to the situation on the ground and HQ accuses field staff of failing to 
see the big picture” (2007, p. 37). Additionally, competing interests discourage coordination. For 
example, Gregorian & Olson posited, “everyone is for coordination though no one wants to be 
coordinated by others who do not share their values, principles or operating modes” (2012, p. 4-
3). There are also tensions between military and humanitarian organizations which obscure the 
purposes of workers in the field and complicate the ability of NGOs to appear autonomous in an 
increasingly interrelated aid environment (HAP International, 2013). In fact, Stockton admitted 
coordination can be noted as a “pejorative, referring to a time consuming process of pointless 
meetings and inconsequential discussions” (2002, p. 9). While Medecins Sans Frontieres (1997) 
asserted that coordination is one of the top 10 priorities in the humanitarian response, the NGO 
cautioned it was also one of the priorities most often neglected or inadequately performed. As a 
consequence, Seeley (2010) concluded, “aid seldom does quite what it was intended to do.” 
Seybolt also claimed, the humanitarian assistance system has failed to become a “fully integrated 
network” (2009, p. 1028).  
Competition for donor resources may be a constraint to coordination in aid networks. 
Therefore, I focus upon competition for resources in the next section. 
2.2.4 Competition for donor resources 
Competition in the network is especially important to examine because it underscores multiple 
perspectives in the aid arena, while revealing a vertical interface that causes aid to be less 
accountable. For instance, donors impose conditions upon their funding, which restrict “when, 
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where, and how relief organizations can respond” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1032). The activities 
planned and conducted must uphold these conditions and in some cases, they have “reflected the 
donors’ political interests more often that they reflected the needs on the ground” (Seybolt, 2009, 
p. 1042). In addition, aid organizations are not automatically provided with funding because of 
their mandates (Coston, 1998), good intentions or standards (The Sphere Project, 2014). Indeed, 
donors establish competitive processes and arrangements based upon the thematic and 
geographic areas they endeavor to engage. The control and power over resources is essentialized 
through this authority and support is not guaranteed from one year to the next. Thus, 
organizations engage in perpetual competitions to attract donors and guarantee their 
sustainability (Herrhausen, 2007; Schweizer, 2004; Stockton, 2002). Thus, the information in the 
aid arena is a function of the competition between and among aid actors, inasmuch as it is a 
disclosure about crisis response. As a consequence, the access to and quality of aid information 
relative to beneficiary needs and priorities is minimized.  
Adult education and livelihoods were described as major refugee needs and priorities 
(Karsetter, 2014; Talbot, 2013). Therefore, in the following section, I examine the impact of 
divergent interests and competition in aid networks in the context of adult education and 
livelihoods.   
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2.3 AFFECTS OF NETWORKS AND COMPETING INTERESTS 
 
Figure 2.1: The mitigation of recovery in the aid context 
 
Networks and competing interests effect the access to and quality of information in emergency 
education, by framing refugeehood unfavorably and consequently, minimizing refugee benefits. 
Through time-limited activities in particular, they render aid short-term (Ward, 2014; MSF, 
1997). Moreover, organizations’ priorities and containment policies decrease recovery 
opportunities, as noted in figure 2.1. In addition, by constructing a profile of some refugees as 
noncompliant (Olivius, 2013; Miller, 2004) or tragic (Baker & McEnery, 2005), they diminish 
donor and INGO responsibility for relevant adult education activities, based upon the view of 
refugeehood as temporary, refugee needs as psychosocial and refugee behavior as contrary. This 
view limits scholarship in adult education and subsequently, accountability assessments. It can 
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also be problematized because the information INGOs and donors disclose most often, is relative 
to the refugees who are most compliant.  
In the following sections, I describe time-limited activities and noncompliance. Next, I 
examine the implications for scholarship and adult education in emergencies.   
2.3.1 Time-limited activities 
Refugees’ long-term goals such as permanent housing, adult education and training cannot be 
adequately addressed, since the aid environment in which they are situated is framed as 
temporary and time-limited. For instance, Medecins Sans Frontieres cautioned, “refugees are 
usually seen as temporary visitors to a host country, an attitude which results in a short-term 
planning approach that may be maintained for years after their arrival” (1997, p. 23). 
Presumably, while refugees prepare to return to their home country (repatriation) or 
accept asylum in a third country (resettlement) humanitarian programs are framed as 
mechanisms which allow aid organizations to assist refugees in the interim. (Crisp et al., 2013; 
Audet, 2011; Hathaway, 2007). Yet, less than 1% of refugees are resettled to third-party 
countries (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 2013) and refugees may not repatriate, 
because of instability, security gaps, minimal services and costs of living which are prohibitive 
(MacDougall, 2011; Zetter, 2011; MSF, 1997). In addition, they “may not have the static 
conception of home that many might imagine them to have” (Souter, 2013, p. 176). Thus, 
refugees’ needs in host communities are usually long-term. In contrast, the aid environment has 
been constructed as a setting for short-term interventions.  
In this short-term context, refugees are positioned in the ‘between’ (Lacroix, 2004, p. 
148). This person has but a temporary identity that is accepted grudgingly, to satisfy 
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organizations’ requirements in exchange for the right to move forward. Piacentini acknowledged 
the “temporariness” associated with the refugee label, which denies heterogeneity and 
misrecognizes the priorities, concerns and objectives of refugees, which vary and develop over 
time (2012, p. 16).  
The transitional nature of refugeehood and the way it is understood by the aid 
community, was noted by Baker & McEnery (2005). Through discourse analysis, they examined 
refugee debates and reports in 2003, based upon a set of newspapers and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documents. In UNHCR documents, they concluded 
refugees were often constructed as tragic and temporary. Baker and McEnery also noted 
UNHCR documents contained assumptions about the extent to which refugees and asylum 
seekers were deserving. Refugees were not presented as heroes, fearless sojourners or 
compatriots. They did not construct their own identity and were not regarded as the experts on 
their conditions or entitlements. The tri-fold message of refugees as temporary, tragic and 
undeserving is significant because the public has come to understand refugees as transient more 
than resilient (Baker & McEnery, 2005).   
The tri-fold message has permeated the policy environment, the jurisdiction of refugee 
livelihoods and the distinctions for income-generation. For example, a significant part of the 
refugee community in Jordan includes undergraduate students, whose studies were interrupted 
(Lorisika, Cremonini & Jalani, 2015; UNESCO, 2015; Atherton, 2014). Yet, only a few 
university scholarships have been awarded to refugees and education programs fall far behind 
mental health in terms of funding and implementation (OCHA, 2010; UNHCR’s OSTS & 
DPSM, 2009; UNHCR, 2009b). In addition, aid workers have underscored the presence of many 
Iraqi refugee teachers and experts with strong academic backgrounds and livelihood needs in 
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Jordan (Labi, 2014; American Friends Service Committee, 2008; Duncan, Schiesher & Khalil, 
2007). Non-formal education and training programs were implemented for Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan, however they were often provided for only up to three months, “in case attendees are 
resettled” (Stevens, 2013, p. 27). This short-term programming has been maintained, in contrast 
to research findings which concluded refugees do not intend to return home (UNHCR, 2009c) 
and resettlement options were applicable to the 1% (Bureau of Population, Migration and 
Refugees, 2013). In addition, Marfleet and Chatty surmised, “access to education and healthcare 
varies: in some cases UNHCR, working with local and international NGOs, has assisted with 
provision, but in some states Iraqis are effectively excluded from public services” (2009, p. 18). 
This limitation is especially significant, because it mitigates opportunities for refugees to 
construct a convincing counternarrative. As uninvited, these and other refugee populations are 
economically subordinated, then validate the dominant narrative as costs and inconvenience 
(Chauvin & Garces-Mascarenas, 2014). They are displaced for years (Muggah, 2005) in 
misrecognition (Marlowe, 2010), from which they receive a role or position, politically and 
procedurally constructed for non-citizens (Bauder, 2014; MacDougall, 2011).  
2.3.2 Non-compliance 
The temporary schema decreases the aid to refugees and engenders specific counter-behaviors. 
For instance, refugees may select noncompliance as their primary form of interface in the aid 
community. Indeed, Medecins Sans Frontieres (1997) advised, refugees are known to inflate 
their numbers to gain advantages to larger amounts of goods and supplies. Therefore, though 
organizations value protocol and procedures, refugees may circumvent the rules when they 
embrace a different set of ideals. Moreover, program outcomes can be severely impacted by 
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refugees’ perceived level of inclusion and “if refugees do not participate during the planning and 
implementation stages, assistance programmes may well fail in several ways” (MSF, 1997, p. 
23).  
In fact, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International noted that 
crisis-affected groups complained that their livelihoods, needs and priorities were not fully 
understood or integrated into program planning and service delivery. As a result, feelings of 
disrespect and lost autonomy resulted in “lower levels of participation and support” in aid 
programs (HAP International, 2013, p. 64). In addition, Kibreab (2004) argued, refugees viewed 
humanitarian aid organizations as outsiders with infinite resources who at times, fail to safeguard 
those resources and prevent corruption. Kibreab was perplexed by refugees, who contended they 
received a small proportion of the resources allocated and were obliged to act in deceitful ways 
in order to level the playing field. In order to gain access to food, employment and other 
resources, refugees registered family members as individuals or ‘borrowed’ family members 
from neighbors to increase disbursements. They would also abandon programs when other 
opportunities for advancement were presented. Thus, the circumvention of donor and 
organizations’ rules through ‘number fudging’ and significantly, low retention, have become 
prevalent forms of counter or contrary behavior and noncompliance. These behaviors have 
significant implications for the access to and quality of aid information. 
For example, Miller (2004) maintained refugees were treated with disregard by 
researchers and aid workers and responded in kind. Through “frontstage” and “backstage” 
behaviors refugees determined who to trust, what to say and what to withhold from the ‘other.’ 
Miller maintained that in both interviews and training sessions, refugees were polite and 
superficial because they were apprehensive. When refugees were asked questions, they 
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responded in ways that were expected and did not reveal their deeper feelings. For example, 
refugees provided positive feedback on a training session in public and later, privately revealed 
their disaffection for that same session. He claimed researchers tend to ignore trust and 
relationship building, which they deemed inconsequential. Yet, trust was a precursor to accessing 
the authentic beliefs, concerns and needs of refugees. Thus, when interventions are planned they 
may be based upon a contrived account. Furthermore, without opportunities for inclusion and 
clear social/economic benefits, refugees can view programs as unfair and disengage. 
Refugees therefore limit the access to and quality of aid information, based in part upon 
how they view the aid context. Indeed, Hilhorst & Jansen posited, “the realities and outcomes of 
aid depend on how actors along and around the aid chain –donor representatives, headquarters, 
field staff, aid recipients and surrounding actors – interpret the context, the needs, their own role 
and each other” (2010, p. 1120). As a form of interface, their actions are critical to information 
because they impact if and to what extent educational activities can be reported. In the Iraqi and 
Syrian crisis, compliance and backstage behaviors in adult education have been particularly 
dominant in INGO reports. For instance, in a desk review of various reports (Dineen, 2013), 
there were “numerous” instances where NGO workshops for Syrian women were empty. While 
some organizations suggested transportation and fears about harassment were to blame, others 
argued refugees were not interested and therefore did not participate. Moreover, in a UNHCR 
(2012c) briefing, it was noted that Syrian refugees were reluctant to register and the number of 
registered refugees did not reflect the total refugee population.  
In the Joint Assessment Review of the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan, UNHCR, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) examined 
more than 100 reports published by its agencies and partners in 2012 and 2013 (UNHCR, 
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UNICEF & WFP, 2014). There were “numerous” reports of empty workshops and a reluctance 
to register. In addition, refugees perceived a lack of neutrality in aid and questioned the extent to 
which UNHCR registration was beneficial. In fact, the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies and the Jordanian Red Crescent conceded, “a sizeable proportion of JRC-
registered refugees are not registered with UNHCR, due to their concerns around privacy and 
protection” (2012, p. 5). Indeed, Serrato cautioned, “refugees stated they have experienced 
exploitation and confusion over multiple beneficiary registrations” (2014, p. 4). 
In an analysis of the Syrian refugee situation in Mafraq, Jordan, Mercy Corps noted 
refugees were critical of the aid response and the “overriding perception is that aid is not being 
managed or distributed in a fair manner” (2012, p. 6). Moreover, Syrian refugees “blame corrupt 
practices by local Jordanian organisations for the lack of assistance, claiming that these groups 
steal the money and food that is meant for the refugees” (Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 6).   
In a participatory assessment, UNHCR (2012a) and its partners noted refugees’ mistrust 
and questions about neutrality. There were also arduous logistical matters which made the 
process of registration challenging. However, researchers admitted some refugees were not 
registered because their “needs are not met” and “do not see any use for registration with 
UNHCR” (UNHCR, 2012a, p. 17). Marfleet & Chatty also conceded, “today we find that many 
Iraqi refugees maintain their distance from the UNHCR, for reasons including loss of faith in the 
willingness of politicians and officials to assist them…” (2009, p. 1). Moreover, registration has 
also been challenging for UNHCR and its partners with Iraqi refugees in Syria. It was conceded 
however, that “vocational training for adults and youth,” “distance learning for high school 
graduates” and other needs for aid had not been afforded (Loughry & Duncan, 2008, p. 14). In 
addition, Loughry & Duncan admitted, “few initiatives identify the Iraqi population as 
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resourceful and empower and involve the Iraqi refugee population as active decision makers and 
implementers of services” (2008, p. 2).   
Yet, when refugees interpret the aid context positively, they may attend education and 
livelihoods programs more consistently. For example, in 2010, the Heartland Alliance Refugee 
Health Programs (RHP) conducted an assessment to address pervasive low registration rates and 
disengagement in health and awareness programs with Iraqi refugees (Giese, 2010). The 
researchers acknowledged multiple organizations seemed unable to effectively recruit and retain 
Iraqis even when other refugee groups were engaged. Service providers claimed Iraqis viewed 
particular education programs and workshops unnecessary and redundant. They were concerned 
about Iraqis health status and health education needs. Thus, the purpose of the assessment was to 
identify those methods of outreach which were effective and scalable. The researcher also sought 
to highlight “strengths in the Iraqi refugee community that can be built upon to improve upon 
their health and improve their health knowledge” (Giese, 2010, p. 5).  
Interestingly, one of the barriers to programming was the tendency for organizations to 
deny Iraqis opportunities to “speak to the issues they are experiencing with their health and share 
their own perspectives” (Giese, 2010, p. 19). In terms of best practices, the assessment revealed 
recruitment and retention rates improved when organizations achieved the following: 
incorporated culturally relevant information and activities into their programming; adapted 
programs in accord with refugee feedback; and cultivated strong, ongoing trust relationships. The 
researcher recommended more interactive educational sessions where information flowed from 
refugees as well as personnel, along with increased coordination between service providers and 
Iraqis. These findings are significant in part, because the burden of interface in this case was 
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shared more equally between refugees and the organizations, which decreased the power 
differential.     
While this project was implemented in a resettlement environment, the data suggested a 
relationship between the generation and sharing of information and program outcomes. Thus, the 
extent to which organizations promote and incorporate information from refugees in an 
emergency arena, could be an important focus of study for scholars. However, scholarship in 
emergency arenas has been minimized by constraints for which the aid community has yet to 
resolve. I describe these constraints in the next section.  
2.3.3 Less scholarship and research in adult learning 
In the temporary and competitive aid arena, aid jobs and aid services are short-term. The 
constant fluctuation and the pace of aid is prohibitive. For example, once funding for programs is 
no longer allocated or asylum seekers move elsewhere, aid workers oft move on to the next 
emergency (Jordanian Ministry of Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale Internationale, 
2014; Serrano, 2014; Randel, & German, 2013; Wessells, 2008). Moreover, the issues which get 
prioritized in disasters are not always those which address the social and economic conditions of 
affected populations (Ingram, Franco, Rumbaitis-del Rio & Khazai, 2006). In this fluid context, 
the roles that are afforded refugee adults in INGO programs may not be examined in relation to 
their aspirations. Likewise, the counter-behaviors may not be assessed relative to the power-
differential. There may also be less scholarship in adult learning because the refugees and/or 
staff are not present long enough to generate and disseminate knowledge.  
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual frameworks in refugeehood 
 
For example, the power differential has been a part of the scholarship, especially with 
respect to NGO-refugee relationships, as noted in figure 2.2. Indeed, the uninvited and their 
subordinate and temporary role in the aid sector has been lamented. The positions that INGO 
emergency education programs provide and the relationship between the positions and the 
refugees’ livelihoods aspirations however, is part of the information gap that the turnover and 
pace of aid has helped to maintain. The conceptualization of refugees as tragic and traumatized 
has enhanced this gap, because it justifies a disproportionate allocation of resources to 
psychological activities (Marlowe, 2010), which reduce funding streams for teaching and 
learning. Thus, the limitations of short-term funding and competing interests are extended by a 
trauma narrative.  
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Figure 2.3: The impact of the trauma narrative 
 
As a result, when education and education information are not limited by noncompliance and 
backstage behavior, they can be decreased by a focus upon pathology, as shown in figure 2.3. I 
describe the trauma narrative in the following section. 
2.3.4 Disproportionate resources toward psychosocial activities 
Comparable academic backgrounds and livelihoods aspirations suggest teaching and learning are 
relevant to refugee adults. However, they are deemphasized because it is assumed refugees must 
first be rescued and repaired. Education for adult refugees is consequently, separate from what is 
customary for any other learner. For instance, Talbot (2013) argued the aid community has been 
focused upon Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) goals for 
children. Accreditation and certification have not been prioritized. Thus, refugees are often 
unable to produce a certificate deemed comparable to other applicants or document their 
accomplishments in a way that is meaningful to potential employers or formal educational 
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institutions. Moreover, education and training programs are not sufficiently linked to market 
demands for labor and/or entrepreneurship. Therefore, graduates of various humanitarian 
educational programs are often unable to use the training they received. Programs are therefore 
low in value, with regard to outcomes in self-reliance. These limitations may not be well-known 
because pedagogy is a counterintuitive response to trauma according to the dominant refugee 
narrative.  
Refugeehood has indeed become what Marlowe posited, “a master status that defines a 
person above and beyond any other form of identity” (2010, p. 183). Moreover, refugeehood is 
interpreted according to a deficit model so pervasive, that the “media, politicians, and the general 
public have been saturated by the trauma discourse to the extent that all assume that more or less, 
all refugees are traumatized” (Papadopoulos, 2001, p. 409). This preoccupation has limited 
opportunities for the refugee to be recognized, via achievements s/he shares in common with the 
host community (Jordanian Department of Statistics & ICF International, 2013) and data that 
suggests not all refugees have mental health illnesses (Gammouh, Al-Smadi, Tawalbeh & 
Khoury, 2015; Wessells, 2008). In fact, Pierce and Gibbons cautioned, “it is important for the 
counselor to remain focused on the career rather than the potential trauma” (2012, p. 124). Yet, 
the traumatic characterization of refugeehood is enshrined in public information and discourse 
(Baker & McEnery, 2005). Therefore, Marlowe asserted, “unfortunately, the descriptors of 
poverty, conflict, chronic exposure to violence and destitution often become the public’s explicit 
and tacit understandings of refugee lives” (2010, p. 191). As a result, refugees are not peers. 
They are damaged people.  
For example, extraordinary events and traumatic circumstances are assumed to decrease 
capacity. Thus, decision-rights, patterns of interactions and allocations of information central to 
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network coordination (SAS-065, 2010; Phister Jr., Allen, Barath, Brandenberger, Bruehlmann, 
Burton, et al., 2009; SAS-050, 2006) could be withheld or minimized because their competence 
has been a subject of doubt. Therefore, refugees may not be afforded roles relative to their 
livelihoods aspirations. Indeed, Miller (2004) discovered that refugees were denied access to 
specific training in health, based upon the trainer’s view that they were illiterate and would 
practice certain medical techniques arbitrarily. Moreover, Olivius (2013) learned humanitarian 
organizations actively promoted the selection of women participants in non-formal training 
sessions because they believed women would be more likely than men to fulfill their 
expectations and transmit the knowledge gained and/or supplies distributed to the entire family. 
Framed as an exercise in gender equity, organizations deliberately targeted a disproportionate 
number of women in order to reduce their own levels of frustration, caused by refugee men who 
were presumed to be noncompliant. Men were denied access to aid and depicted as immoral, 
politically motivated and otherwise deviant. Thus, the uninvited may be pathologized - a practice 
which is less recognized - based upon an imaginary that associates refugeehood with 
incompetence. Incompetence in turn, makes refugees undesirable.  
For instance, Hasenfeld & Garrow maintained, discretion is often utilized “to determine 
eligibility for entitled services and to discriminate between desirable and undesirable clients” 
(2012, p. 307). Desirable clients, they argue, are sought after because they require fewer 
resources to process and make it easier for the organization to achieve is outcomes. Aid 
beneficiaries can therefore be misrecognized.  
Misrecognition is particularly significant, because it is embedded into institutional, social 
and political arenas (Schlosberg, 2012; Marlowe, 2010). In the aid context, it is the form of 
information that narrows opportunities to belong because the focus is upon if and when refugees 
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are leaving, the extent they are competent and capacity limitations. Less is known about 
refugees’ livelihoods aspirations or how aid programs are responding to them. Thus, the lack of 
data in relation to their livelihoods goals could be a critical part of policy advocacy and 
scholarship. In addition, the misrecognition of refugees is particularly concerning, because 
accountability to incompetent and undesirable refugees may be practiced differently. In aid 
information for example, the focus of reporting may be on noncompliance and low participation 
may not be identified as area to examine, since the contrary or counter-behavior is a response 
that refugees are considered responsible for. 
2.4 COMPLIANCE INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Compliance information in emergency education may limit accountability in part, because it can 
be utilized uncritically to make refugees responsible. Through the process of labelling and 
responsibilization in particular, refugee counter-behaviors and noncompliance are linked to their 
unmet needs. Therefore, deficits in service delivery may not be identified or corrected in 
instances in which refugees operate contrary to INGO and donor expectations. For instance 
repatriation was a main expectation of donors for Iraqi refugees. However, repatriation hopes 
were criticized by Terrill who claimed, “the United States has been so focused on dealing with 
Iraqi problems within Iraq that it has done very little to help Iraqis outside of their own country” 
(2008, p. 70).  
Labelling is based upon an ontological recognition structure in which beneficiaries in the 
aid arena are classified. The ontological recognition structure is centered upon the subjective 
conceptualization of refugees as legal/illegal, entitled/unentitled, registered/unregistered, 
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eligible/ineligible and compliant/noncompliant. This structure enables a macro perspective or 
administrative vantage point of refugee positionalities and of state or INGO responsibility. The 
classification of beneficiaries is an iterative activity performed by organizations and other actors 
by enlarge, to release or withhold entitlements through beneficiary designations (Zetter, 1991). 
These designations correspond to specific entitlements. In addition, these entitlements at the 
micro level, are the outcomes. They are the aid and services afforded compliant refugees through 
internal labels or typologies (Napier-Moore, 2005). Responsibilization refers to the sustained 
concentration upon the centrality of responsibility for one’s own affairs, alongside a 
contradictory set of communal values in regard to citizenship and belonging (van Houdt & 
Schinkel, 2014). This dichotomy is viewed through structural barriers to services and protection 
from the state, based primarily upon truth claims about the cost or risk that the ‘other,’ for 
example a noncitizen or deviant, may pose to the public. A main outcome of labelling and 
responsibilization is the minimization or denial of public support or resources, through a process 
of misrecognition in which the ‘other’ plays a subordinate role. Compliance is a significant part 
of this process. It is the measurement of belonging or legitimacy in which these resources are 
situated.    
Labelling and responsibilization are not limited to the aid arena or to refugees. Yet, they 
are particularly relevant to refugees because of the way they inform how rules are interpreted and 
enforced and subsequently, how aid actors report services which they do not provide. For 
example, accountability is often assessed through the beneficiary relationship, which limits the 
public’s access to information about persons to whom no relationship is given and connotes a 
low degree of deservingness for persons to whom no services are afforded. In this section, 
labelling is examined in relation to the UNHCR refugee typology, followed by an exemplar, vis 
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a vis the Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan. I then explore the mechanisms in which Iraqi and Syrian 
refugees in Jordan may have been responsibilized. I conclude this section with implications for 
downward accountability.         
2.4.1 Labelling refugees in humanitarian emergencies  
Refugeehood must be structured to facilitate service delivery in the program context. This 
structure is centered around a refugee typology. Napier-Moore maintained, “UNHCR, states, and 
the entire refugee regime, including researchers, have found a convenience in typologising 
refugees” (2005, p. 9). This typology is comprised of myriad designations utilized to label new 
arrivals with an identity “which may or may not be theirs” (Napier-Moore, 2005, p. 9). Labelling 
is a coordinated act, in which refugees play a subsidiary role. For example, new arrivals are 
recognized as refugees by host countries, particularly when they are signatories to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol. Yet, not all nations are 
signatories. Indeed, some of the states with the largest refugee flows, such as Pakistan and 
Jordan, are not signatories to the Convention. Those states that are either lacking resources, are 
against the Convention and its protocol or against integration often permit or designate UNHCR 
and its partner INGOs as responsible for new arrivals (UNHCR, 2012b; GAO, 2009; Goodwin-
Gill, 2008).  
As a part of their compliance procedures, UNHCR and INGOs collect information and 
engage in various status determinations where new arrivals can request protection in the form of 
asylum or refugee designations within the typology. Various procedures are also implemented to 
differentiate those who qualify for services from those who do not. When UNHCR operates to 
establish protection in the absence of state support or an endorsed international convention, new 
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arrivals are viewed as eligible for protection under its Mandate. In this scenario, new arrivals 
who are seeking protection and are awaiting the completion of the claimant process become 
known as “asylum seekers.” Those new arrivals who successfully complete the claims process 
and are granted refugee status may be referred to as “statutory” or “mandate” refugees (Simeon, 
2010). This is in contrast to those new arrivals in host countries that are signatories to the 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol and/or express solidarity with particular refugee groups. In 
this instance, new arrivals are often referred to as “convention refugees.” New arrivals may also 
be recognized as convention refugees by the international community when it determines that the 
criteria set forth in the Convention have been met, regardless of whether the host community has 
done likewise (Goodwin-Gill, 2008). Refugee typologies are therefore a part of the policy 
environment and situate refugees within a spectrum constructed for noncitizens. The refugee is 
affixed to a role in the spectrum based upon additional bureaucratic processes that may be 
prohibitive. 
From the frameworks of organizational theory, constructivism and Weberian approaches, 
Barnett & Finnemore (1999) lamented the categorizations of target groups such as refugees. 
They claimed organizations develop and apply rules and regulations to justify actions which are 
“identity defining, or even life threatening” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 710).   
Through the conceptual framework of labeling, Zetter (1991) examined the labeling 
process which he claimed is largely absent in the literature on policy for refugees. Zetter utilized 
the framework to underscore asymmetrical relationships where organizations designate new 
identities and utilize their power to control access to goods and services. This classification is not 
a passive encounter, rather “to classify is to engage in an act of power” (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999, p. 711).   
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Indeed, from the moment they cross the border new arrivals are subjected to a process 
where their reasons for entry are scrutinized, their credibility is debated and their bodies labeled 
(Keung, 2013; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). MacDougall asserted, “when an individual seeks 
services as a refugee, her identity, personal story, and physical health are all subject to 
interrogation by Western asylum-granting nations, and by intergovernmental agencies” (2011, p. 
38). Moreover, the process of responding to refugee flows requires significant resources, which 
renders their care unappealing. Subsequently, the “political and economic interests of host 
governments anxious to divest themselves of protective responsibilities” informs the response to 
any poor new arrival (Hathaway, 2007, p. 6).   
Political and economic interests may minimize the moral imperative in order to maintain 
a strict migration agenda (Zetter, 2011; Goodwin-Gill, 1999). Therefore, the aid allocated to 
refugees is relative to the political and economic setting inasmuch as it is to the needs of 
beneficiaries. Indeed, labels correspond to entitlements. Entitlements enable refugees to survive 
in host communities and access water, medical care and other public resources. Peers may be 
able to access these resources in a way that is more acceptable to host communities. Yet in some 
cases, refugees and other displaced groups are perceived essentially as queue jumpers, 
freeloaders, germ-carriers, job-stealers, terrorists, irregular/economic/climate migrants and 
squatters (Bauder, 2014; Guild & Moreno-Lax, 2013; NRC, 2012; O’Reilly, 2011; Leenders, 
2010; Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Tober, Taghdisi & Jalali, 2006; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 
2002; Kibreab, 1997; Goodin, 1988). Their use of public resources can be resented (Midgley & 
Eldebo, 2013). In fact, Syrian refugees comprised 10% of the Jordanian population in 2013 and 
according to UNHCR, there has been “increasing tension with host communities over scarce 
resources, such as water” (2013b, p. 5). Indeed, “humanitarian organisations and government 
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need to think how their response and treatment of those in need is inextricably linked to 
community dynamics, and may inadvertently catalyse frictions, escalate tensions and increase 
negative perceptions of assistance” (Guay, 2015, p. 6). It is therefore more difficult to underscore 
the aid that may be owed to refugee adults, because refugees are not labeled as peers and the 
world’s attention is upon the damage they may cause (Leenders, 2010; Kumin, 2004; van 
Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). Therefore, adults may be accepted when it suits the mood of a 
media-tempered public audience (Karunakara, 2015; Hoijer, 2004) and consequently, the 
uninvited have access to “certain kinds of entitlements” (MacDougall, 2011, p. 38). For example, 
UNHCR noted, “a key concern remains maintaining a single approach for all refugees when 
levels of funding and resources, as well as Government policies, tend to result in varying levels 
of access to services for different nationalities” (2013b, p. 5). This narrow access to aid could 
limit accountability to refugees because their needs are juxtaposed with the aid others decide 
they deserve. In addition, differences between the labels accepted by UNHCR and its partners 
and host nations have become more challenging to resolve, as refugee numbers increase and 
refugee situations become protracted. The Jordanian refugee crisis is especially relevant in this 
regard.  
2.4.2 Labelling Iraqis in Jordan 
The post-2007 displacement of Iraqis fostered an estimated two million refugees. Thus, iterative 
dialogue in regard to labelling Iraqi beneficiaries and their entitlements could have significant 
social and economic consequences. Consequently, estimating the population was as crucial as 
determining the best label. However, there were varying and conflicting accounts for the number 
of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, in some cases reaching 450,000 (GAO, 2009; FAFO, 2007). In this 
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setting, informed decision-making was difficult for aid actors because it was impossible to know 
which estimate was correct and because large estimates engendered trepidation for any implied 
state responsibility. Indeed, labelling activities in Jordan were driven by the socio-political 
impact of asylum and the human and material costs associated with the refugee status 
determination. As a result, needs were overshadowed by a contentious process of legitimization 
constructed between the Government and UNHCR. For example, Stevens (2013) conducted 
interviews and a legal analysis to examine the labels associated with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and 
their benefits with respect to rights, services and protection. His research was centered upon the 
conceptual framework of labeling (Zetter, 1991), which was utilized to assess the tensions 
between stakeholders in such fields as education, health, resettlement, repatriation and 
livelihoods.  
Stevens (2013) claimed the situation for Iraqi refugees in Jordan has been particularly 
precarious because Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, its 1967 Protocol and does not have clear national legislation on refugee issues.  
Moreover, Jordan recognizes new arrivals from Iraq as “guests” which in most instances are not 
entitled to work permits and residency. Also recognized as “temporary visitors” and “temporary 
guests,” they are expected to register with UNHCR, which Jordan designated as responsible for 
finding a durable solution within a 6-month timeframe (OCHA, 2009; Marfleet & Chatty, 2009).  
In addition to resource constraints, ongoing conflict in Iraq and family separation made durable 
solutions unattainable for most refugees. Therefore, many refugees remained in Jordan well 
beyond the timeframe indicted on their entry visas. Refugees became known as ‘overstayers’ and 
were constantly worried about being deported. Moreover, UNHCR and Jordan disagreed on what 
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protection meant and how it should be implemented (Stevens, 2013). For example, tensions over 
how new arrivals from Iraq could be regarded as refugees resulted in multiple policy revisions.  
Jordan maintained a refugee status determination should be conducted for Iraqis on an 
individual basis. Because of limited resources, UNHCR attempted several methods of group 
determinations, such as the “pan-national temporary protection regime” and the application of 
“prima facie” status. Ostensibly, these group determinations gave sweeping recognition to the 
community of Iraqis who arrived in Jordan. Group determinations had the advantage of non- 
Figure 2.4: Refugee recognition structures 
 
refoulement, less resource requirements and greater access to services. Yet, there was opposition 
and criticism for any group determination procedure, which was deemed as in violation of 
agreements with Jordan and appearing to offer Iraqis something which was less temporary and 
conditional than what was intended.  It was later agreed that UNHCR would provide registered  
Iraqis with an asylum seeker certificate and conduct individual refugee status determinations, yet 
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there were constant revisions in the way UNHCR chose to do so. There were also constant 
revisions regarding visa and passport requirements for Iraqis to enter the country and access 
public schools. Therefore, there were ongoing policy iterations on both sides. UNHCR and its 
partners continuously referred to new arrivals from Iraq as refugees in their reports and appeals, 
while Jordan broadly referred to Iraqis as guests or Arab brother or sister (Stevens, 2013; 
Ashbaugh, 2010; GAO, 2009). Thus, through ontological recognition structures and iterative 
refugee typologies, Iraqis were labelled and given access to humanitarian aid. With labels such 
as guest, temporary visitor, Arab brother or sister, asylum seeker, person of concern, and several 
classifications of beneficiaries and refugees, the things organizations did to support trauma 
healing, were linked to the measures they took to classify and count refugees. In the aid 
environment therefore, compliance information can limit accountability to the refugee because 
the education and livelihoods support s/he is provided could be based upon the typology not the 
need. In figure 2.4 above, many of the labels assigned in the recognition of refugees are 
presented. 
2.4.3 Responsibilization 
Responsibilization is a process which could separate refugees from aid through noncompliance 
and subsequent delegitimization. Labels are a main component of this process. In fact, Stevens 
noted, beneficiary labels “have implications for treatment within Jordan, access to rights and to 
services, and options for the future of so many Iraqis” (2013, p. 17). Labels also play “a major 
role in the shifting identities of all Iraqis” (Stevens, 2013, p. 17). Indeed, in a recent United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report focused upon Syrian refugees and other refugee 
groups, researchers noted “refugees must do a verification process every 6 months with UNHCR, 
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and an out of date card will not allow the holder access [to] services” (Dineen, 2013, p. 67). 
Though there could have been child care, transportation, finances and other obstacles which the 
noted in the report, refugees who either did not register initially or return and ‘re-register,’ found 
access to even basic services “would be very limited” (Dineen, 2013, p. 67). This process is 
significant in part, because refugees who return to UNHCR and re-register may be those who 
live in close proximity, have fewer responsibilities and more resources. In this instance, refugees 
with the most profound needs must weigh the perceived benefits of re-registering against the 
costs. Thus, those with the greatest needs may not be among the ‘beneficiaries’ of international 
organizations (Jordanian Ministry of Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale Internationale, 
2014). Yet, NGOs claimed Iraqi refugees in Syria who were not registered, “appear to have 
limited understanding of the role of UNHCR and the benefits that flow from registration, 
including information on services available” (Loughry & Duncan, 2008, p. 6). In this statement, 
there is an implied deficit in knowledge. This argument is a common reaction to undesired 
responses, whereas the failure to traverse the organizations’ legitimacy tasks is attributed to an 
immature rationality (Knudsen, 1991). This knowledge deficit connotes a level of 
irresponsibility, which may cause the public to link low registration to competence rather than 
other causes. The competence complaint is important to underscore because it illustrates a 
political environment and procedures that are subjective in their interpretation and application 
(Stevens, 2013; Simeon, 2010). The subjective allocation of resources and responsibilities have 
had significant implications in the aid arena. Indeed, Seybolt posited, “when the next 
humanitarian crises occurs, we should be surprised if many people do not suffer and die, instead 
of wondering why the pattern of displacement and death is so often repeated” (2009, p. 1037).  
 43 
To ensure aid to those in need, the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) recommended, “registration and outreach efforts should be better used to identify 
vulnerable cases that need special assistance. In addition, the needs of those that remain 
unregistered should be addressed” (2012, p. 4). Healy and Tiller lamented however, “only a 
handful of humanitarian organisations are willing to do such work” (2013, p. 24). Thus, 
registration decreases may not be problematized.  
In sum, because refugees are held responsible, their failure to comply with the 
registration process delegitimizes access to services, since they are not recognized as aid 
beneficiaries. 
2.4.4 Responsibilizing refugees in reports 
Population information in INGO reports is comprised in part, of data in regard to registered 
refugees. The access to and quality of this information is limited therefore, by the extent to which 
INGOs retain refugee beneficiaries. For instance, in the Iraq and the region: 2009 Consolidated 
Appeal, there were slightly more than 54,000 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan in 
2008. According to this Appeal, registration was challenging in part, because the refugee 
population was scattered and transient. The report acknowledged many refugees in Jordan were 
not registered and plans were underway to conduct more outreach to encourage registration 
(OCHA, 2009).  
According to the Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees 2010, the number of 
refugees registered with UNHCR had decreased to approximately 46, 700 in 2009 (OCHA, 
2010). While UNHCR claimed it successfully resettled more than 4,600 refugees and repatriated 
204 refugees, 5,700 refugee files were deactivated because refugees were out of contact with the 
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agency and its partners through October of that year (OCHA, 2010, p. 38, 39). According to the 
Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered Iraqis (UNHCR, 2011), a grand total of 13,598 
refugees were deactivated in 2009. There were 500-900 new arrivals per month however, the 
total number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR decreased significantly in one year 
(OCHA, 2010). 
In the Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees 2010, UNHCR and its partners posited, 
“the overall number of Iraqis is expected to decrease slightly in 2010, mainly due to 
resettlement…” (OCHA, 2010, p. 54). However, by December 2010, only 31,476 Iraqi refugees 
were registered with UNHCR, a loss of more than 20, 000 refugees (UNHCR, 2011). This 
decrease was explained as the result of refugees who were resettled and again, deactivated 
(OCHA, 2011). Yet, the deactivated totals were especially high. For instance, totals for Iraqi 
refugee resettlement and repatriation were 3,444 and 107, respectively, while 11,334 refugees 
were deactivated in 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). This deactivation of thousands of refugees in Jordan 
was not problematized in part, because of assumptions. Indeed organizations posited, “we also 
agreed with the RRP [Regional Response Plan] assumption that the most vulnerable Iraqi 
children are registered with UNHCR” (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2010). Thus, 
organizations linked vulnerability to registration data. For example, UNICEF maintained, “the 
majority of vulnerable Iraqis in Jordan are registered with UNHCR and total some 30,700 as of 
August 2010” (2011, p. 1). Thus, organizations implied refugees who were not registered were 
for the most part, less vulnerable. Put another way, organizations assumed that the majority of 
unregistered refugees were less vulnerable than the majority of registered refugees. Unregistered 
and deactivated refugees were largely excluded from strategic policy documents and though 
noted in meetings, (Save the Children & UNICEF, 2010) they were still held responsible. 
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UNHCR and its partners implemented their programs and requested support from donor agencies 
based predominantly upon refugees who were registered or anticipated in the upcoming year 
(OCHA, 2010; OCHA 2011).   
2.4.5 Responsibilization and downward accountability 
Education, training and livelihoods are critical to recovery. Yet, accountability is measured in 
compliance. It is not measured in recovery. According to Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) 
organizations must strive for legitimacy through transactions based upon resources and/or 
information. In the aid architecture these transactions are usually framed as transparency and 
accountability initiatives which require organizations to legitimize themselves through 
compliance. Compliance is usually managed through numerical, financial and operational 
procedures that are easy to measure. Long-term improvements and impact are more difficult to 
quantify and are often overshadowed in performance measurements (OCHA, 2013). Thus, 
organizations can be legitimized without ever fostering a sustainable recovery for the people on 
the ground. Yet, since legitimization by donors is necessary for survival, organizations have 
focused less upon other matters, such as accountability to refugees and affected groups.  
Regulatory compliance requirements however, may not guarantee accountability to 
refugees. For instance, the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is a tool to examine and rank 
good donor practices and promote greater transparency, effectiveness and accountability 
(DARA, 2010). The United States (US) is the leading bilateral donor both globally and in Jordan, 
where a large population of Iraqis have sought refuge (IATI, 2011b; OCHA, 2010; Sharp, 2010), 
yet according to the HRI, it was “only ranked 19th, indicating it needs to do much more to apply 
humanitarian principles and good practice in its humanitarian aid” (DARA, 2010, p. 1). 
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Moreover, the US received one its lowest scores for accountability to beneficiaries (DARA, 
2011, p.227, 230).  
Significantly, beneficiaries may not interpret donor legitimization as a success story. 
Thus, there may be serious contradictions with regard to views of program performance. In fact, 
Zetter surmised, “what has meaning to the refugees cannot be interpreted by the kinds of data 
which focus on programme output and normative policy assumptions” (1991, p. 42, 43).  
Regulatory compliance has also advanced the differences between organizations and 
decreased allegiances to potential partners who do not support the funding process. Indeed, 
humanitarian organizations “compete for resources in a self-interested way, just like other 
organizations” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1033). Vital information may not be shared or publicized 
among agencies (Seybolt, 2009; GAO, 2009; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). As a consequence, 
time and resources are squandered (Wessells, 2008), assessments and strategies are misinformed 
and the interventions that could be most impactful for refugees are not implemented (Maiers, 
Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005).  
Self-interest, competing priorities, minimal coordination and information gaps have 
particular implications for aid allocations. For instance, largely because of these issues, “the aid 
community as a whole fails to invest systematically where aid is expected to have the most 
impact” and those in need may be underserved because “aid allocations are still driven by factors 
other than need and merit” (Rogerson & Steensen, 2009). For instance, the Government 
Accountability Office maintained it was unclear if support would be forthcoming from Iraq and 
might be held “because improving refugee conditions in neighboring countries may discourage 
refugees from returning to Iraq” (2009, p. 4). Indeed, funding for vital services was based in part, 
upon where refugees were relative to where the state determined they should have been - though 
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poor asylum situations do not necessarily engender repatriation (Sa’Da & Bianchi, 2014). Thus, 
there is a compliance orientation and legitimization process that is enshrined in the aid network. 
Aid services are situated in this process. Aid services are accessible most often for those who 
traverse the legitimacy task through compliance with donor-INGO assumptions and preferences, 
upon which they are responsibilized. Therefore, compliance precipitates aid to refugees.  
When the focus of aid is not compliance-centered it is mitigated by national interests. For 
instance, donors and host states support activities that address the priorities of citizens and 
assuage critics who argue that refugees and noncitizens have a negative impact upon their 
communities. Indeed, long queues for entitlements, enclaves and/or diminishing public space 
(Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Tuck, 2011; Mann, 1993) can fuel resentment among locals. Thus, the 
integration of refugees and migrants is contested. Although locals may express concern for 
refugees, the problems of noncitizens may be viewed as comparatively irrelevant in a state with 
its own unmet needs and expenses (Leaning, Spiegel, & Crisp, 2011; Barbou des Places, 2004). 
Therefore, when migrants and refugees are not threats and risks they are constructed as costs 
(Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Hellgren, 2012; Zetter, 2011). Indeed, Medecins Sans Frontieres 
advised, “the refugee image has evolved” (1997, p. 19). Notwithstanding the valor associated 
with refugeehood decades ago, refugees are now “undesirable” (MSF, 1997, p. 19, 265) and 
“uninvited guests” (MSF, 1997, p. 265). Thus, refugees are constructed according to a deficit 
model of intervention (Souter, 2011; van Gorp, 2005), where considerable attention is given to 
the ways in which they are different and inconvenient. For many, refugees are essentially, 
defective goods in public spaces. When belonging is afforded, they are situated in a larger group 
of deviants and care-seeking invalids known to Provan and Milward (2001) as public problems. 
As the problem du jure, the standard set for refugees is lowered (Tuck, 2011; Park, 2008).  
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In sum, people who cause problems do not drive aid in emergencies. Therefore, aid is 
often a product of the compliance-centered policy environment and level of inconvenience 
refugees cause donor and host states. Ostensibly, if the needs and perspectives of refugees do not 
drive humanitarian assistance, then accountability is upward. This short-term, compliance-
centered environment and the construction of refugees based upon a deficit model are main 
findings in the literature review. These findings are particularly significant because they contrast 
the accountability commitments INGOs and donors have made (INEE, 2014; The Sphere Project, 
2014; HAP International, 2013) to operate in settings where beneficiaries have substantive 
opportunities to influence aid.  
In the following section, I utilize the conceptual framework of downward accountability 
and network perspectives to inform a qualitative method of research. Indeed, I describe the 
processes in which I examine adult education and livelihoods activities which were disclosed by 
a donor-INGO network. The method I utilize is especially important because access to aid 
services and compliance activities are main focal points and have implications for downward 
accountability.  
 49 
3.0  METHODOLOGY 
In this section I present the means by which I endeavor to examine information about refugee 
adults in the public domain and subsequently, advance the knowledge in refugee and migration 
studies and particularly, education in emergencies. I begin with a focus upon the refugee crisis in 
Jordan.  
The refugee crisis in Jordan includes a large community of Iraqi and Syrian refugees. In 
2010, Iraqi refugees were among the top five largest refugee groups registered with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Jordan served as a main transit and 
asylum location for approximately 25% or 450,000-500,000 of the larger population of close to 
two million refugees (Stevens, 2013; UNHCR, 2010a). Though this total has decreased, there 
remains a large community of registered and unregistered Iraqis settled in Jordan (UNHCR, 
2016; UNHCR, 2015b; Stevens, 2013).  
As a result of recent instability the refugee population has increased and also includes a 
Syrian population. This population represented the largest refugee group registered with UNHCR 
in 2016, at close to five million worldwide (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, Jordan is host to more 
than 700,000, or approximately 15% of the registered Syrian refugee population and many more 
which have not registered with UNHCR (UNHCR, 2016; Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation, 2015). Thus, this large-scale crisis is relevant to studies 
of public information about refugees. 
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Situated within this crisis, I developed research questions and a qualitative method of 
research upon which this study is centered. The research questions were informed by the 
literature review and are posed in order to close a gap in public information in relation to the 
education of refugee adults. The qualitative method of research for this study is content analysis, 
which I selected because it is an important tool for researchers assessing public records (Berg, 
2008). Thus, this chapter is centered upon the questions that directed a study of public 
information relative to the Jordanian refugee crisis and the processes upon which public 
information was examined. These processes included a view of refugees as peers in education in 
emergencies and leveraged the conceptual frameworks of network perspectives and downward 
accountability, through the phases of content analysis. I also review the domain in which 
documents were gathered and the strengths and limitations therein.     
3.1 THE JORDANIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 
The local conditions in Jordan are not static (Ward, 2012). Iraqis continue to seek asylum in 
Jordan and have been surpassed in number by a growing Syrian refugee community. While there 
are many possible periods in which the data about the aid to this community could be examined 
in this study, I focused on the timeline from January 2010 to October 2015. This focal point is 
particularly relevant because it coincides with the time period aid actors submitted much of the 
data in the online repository in which documents for this study were collected. 
Remarkably, the Iraqi and Syrian population in 2015 included more than 600,000 
refugees registered with UNHCR and its partner INGOs in Jordan (Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014). Refugees 
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have settled in primarily urban locations and consist of approximately 10% of the Jordanian 
demographic, estimated at 7.5 million (Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, 2015; USAID, 2015c). Academics, scholars and educators are 
included in this figure, along with refugee students separated from tertiary education (Labi, 
2014; American Friends Service Committee, 2008; Duncan, Schiesher & Khalil, 2007). Along 
with other refugee adults they comprise a significant population of skilled and unskilled job 
seekers. Many of these job seekers struggle to find employment or training opportunities in the 
local marketplace and enroll in INGO activities (CARE, 2014). Yet, information about these 
activities is dispersed among myriad agencies and programs are implemented in varied 
disciplines (Kenny, 2015).  
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Figure 3.1: Map of Jordan, Source: the Royal Jordanian Geographic Centre, 2015 
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Lessons learned, based upon assistance to refugee professionals and academics in 
particular, is scattered and hard to find. This information gap complicates assessments of 
accountability for organizations who fund or implement programs for job-seeking adults. An 
examination of the education and livelihoods information is thusly, a part of resolving the 
information gap and enabling a study of accountability to refugee job seekers. 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this study is to examine the access to and quality of information in regard to 
humanitarian adult education and livelihoods programs for refugees in Jordan. First, I will 
examine: If and to what degree donor agencies and INGOs are leveraging their new networks to 
disclose information pertaining to their humanitarian education and livelihoods interventions? 
This inquiry is important because it assesses the data the public can access and the extent to 
which the data informs the public about adult learning and particularly, skilled refugee job 
seekers. Second, I will analyze: If and to what extent the information donor agencies and INGOs 
disclose through their new networks can be utilized to examine downward accountability through 
access, compliance and outcomes in the adult education and livelihoods arena? This analysis is 
critical in part, because the focus is upon education and livelihoods activities in relation to 
refugees’ education and livelihoods aspirations. This focus illuminates the level of alignment 
between humanitarian needs and emergency education opportunities. It is also centered upon the 
view of adult refugees as peers and as such, people who could have access to humanitarian 
education activities which reflect their needs as much as the activities in local or national 
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education institutions reflect the needs of adult learners. I detail this view in the following 
section. 
3.3 ADULT LEARNERS AS PEERS 
The questions which drive this study are based upon the perspective that adult refugees are peers. 
Therefore, refugees should be afforded with the education and livelihoods training customary for 
other adult learners. From this perspective, accountability can be relative to refugees’ education 
and livelihoods aspirations. Thus, the sort of INGO education programs they have access to, the 
degree to which these programs increase their employability or income and the inclusion of their 
academic achievements in reports and open data, are relevant foci of interest. Second, a 
strengths-based model of refugeehood could justify opportunities to exercise a measure of 
control, discretion and ownership over aid services and policies because the refugee is presumed 
as rational as any other decision-maker. Therefore, the services and policies in which refugees 
have been given power, the information they generate and share in relation to these services and 
the degree to which eligibility criteria and rules for services correspond to power they share, are 
relevant because these focal points evidence their position in the aid network. Thus, the research 
questions are undergirded by the depiction of refugees as peers and the comparative analysis of 
their decision rights and educational opportunities, with what is customary for their peers, vis a 
vis other adult learners. 
 This chapter is therefore centered upon the conceptual frameworks and qualitative 
methods which frame the examination of information about adult refugee job seekers, from an 
educational perspective and peer outlook.   
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3.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
Network perspectives are important conceptual frameworks in the aid enterprise because they 
can be leveraged to address coordination problems, especially information dissemination 
between various donor-INGO networks. Networks are “capital structures” which through 
investments, including association and interaction, may minimize economic risk and enhance 
returns (Huggins & Thompson, 2015, p. 104). Indeed, the goal of most studies based upon 
network theory is often to “identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate 
or cooperate” (Enemark, McCubbins & Weller, 2012, p. 1). Network perspectives were integral 
in this study because “coordination problems arise largely from the structure of the humanitarian 
enterprise” (Wessells, 2008, p. 7). In fact, aid actors have at times, tried to “solve the 
coordination problem by introducing ever new coordination structures” (Herrhausen, 2007, p. 
31). Indeed, Herrhausen maintained, “coordination in networks should be further investigated” 
(2007, p. 13).  
Demonstrating coordination depends heavily upon the information generated and shared 
between and among the actors in the network. Moreover, networks are a vital mechanism 
organizations utilize to gain access to knowledge (Huggins & Thompson, 2015). In fact, “a 
primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information” (Enemark, 
McCubbins & Weller, 2012, p. 1). Through network perspectives, I analyzed the online 
information donors and INGOs disclosed. This analysis contributed to the literature by 
augmenting existing knowledge about the structures which facilitated and/or mitigated the 
coordination of adult education and the consequent access to and quality of information 
disclosed in the public domain. 
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Network perspectives were selected over other conceptual frameworks because they help 
researchers to examine the ties between nodes or actors within the network. Actors in networks 
are examined in part, based upon the information they control, direct and/or broker between 
other members of the network and the structure in which these flows are sustained (Burt, 1997; 
Uzzi, 1996). Thus, from a network perspective I analyzed the refugees’ position in the aid 
network, their role in generating and disseminating information and the structures which 
mitigated and/or facilitated the information about their education.  
The connections between and among people in aid could be examined alternatively, with 
frameworks that focus upon organizations and their constituents, such as stakeholder theory or 
refugees and their positions, vis a vis social exchange theory. Stakeholder theory and social 
exchange theory are juxtaposed with network perspectives in the following section. 
3.4.1 Stakeholder theory and social exchange theory 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the relationships between organizations and others in both 
an internal and external arena, including how organizations manage the interests of those who 
are affected by its actions (Cragg, 2002). Stakeholder theory could be especially relevant to 
examinations of NGO activities, since NGOs are active across varied social and public policy 
issues (Utting & Zammit, 2009; Doh & Guay, 2006). However, the decisions and information 
generated by their stakeholders – in this instance refugee beneficiaries - might be less prominent. 
Thus, stakeholder theory may be suited for the analysis of INGO decisions relative to donor or 
refugee interests, however it may be unsuitable to explore the refugees’ decision rights relative to 
donor and INGO rules.  In addition, the information generated and controlled by the actors in the 
organization’s network is not paramount, insomuch as the actors’ priorities have been fulfilled. 
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The positions within the network are therefore, far less malleable in stakeholder theory. For 
example, positions of stakeholders can be categorized based upon their interests in the 
organization, rather than their capacity to connect two or more other actors. Thus, there are less 
opportunities for researchers to categorize and juxtapose different positions, as the positions in 
stakeholder theory have already been determined.  
Social exchange theory is centered upon the investments people make with one another 
and with organizations based primarily upon their estimation of the cost versus the benefits 
(Majiros, 2013). It has been critical to the analysis of retention and employee ties with 
organizations. These ties are evolving and conditional (Holm, Eriksson & Johanson, 1996), 
requiring a constant assessment to maintain the interaction. Therefore, the positions refugees 
maintain with INGOs could be understood as a product of logic and as such, this theory elevates 
the refugee from the trauma narrative and adds complexity to the role of aid recipient.  
This theory can also be an important way to analyze the aid strategies upon which 
refugees have access to specific positions. Since some refugees have been conceptualized as 
undeserving, tragic and temporary, decision-making and educational opportunities were 
minimized, limiting the roles refugees had access to (Olivius, 2013; Marlowe, 2010; Miller, 
2004). However, stakeholder theory is less relevant in an analysis of the generation of 
information by the refugee and the distribution of information between and among refugees and 
INGOs and this task might not be prioritized by position holders in their cost-benefit analysis. 
For instance, refugees may accept/apply for a position with an INGO because it is accompanied 
with subsidies, skills development or recognition, rather than because it involves greater 
influence over aid information flows. Information flows are integral to this research. Thus, the 
theory was not selected. However, the opportunity to exercise a measure of control, discretion or 
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influence over information flows is prevalent in the conceptual framework of downward 
accountability. The roles and constraints in information generation and dissemination illuminated 
through network perspectives, can enhance assessments of downward accountability in the aid 
arena and therefore increase the access to and quality of aid information. I describe the 
conceptual framework of downward accountability in the following section.   
3.4.2 Downward accountability 
Downward accountability has not been authoritatively defined. However, there are organizations 
which have developed networks, frameworks and benchmarks (ALNAP, 2015; INGO 
Accountability Charter, 2015; HAP International 2013, Keystone, 2009), which have been 
leveraged and/or implemented in conjunction with emergency standards (INEE, 2014; The 
Sphere Project, 2014). These frameworks can be utilized to assess accountability in humanitarian 
assistance.   
Downward accountability has been posited as both a process and product based upon 
ensuring beneficiaries are informed of their rights and responsibilities and the responsibilities of 
organizations entrusted with service delivery. It also incorporates maintaining feedback and 
complaints channels without reprisal for complainants; measures to avoid, detect and address 
conflicts of interest and/or misconduct; and a transparent way of disclosing information on the 
objectives and accomplishments of activities (INGO Accountability Charter, 2015; HAP 
International, 2013, Keystone, 2009). 
Downward accountability is also undergirded by the inclusion of beneficiaries’ priorities 
in program development, implementation and evaluation and the opportunity to maintain a 
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degree of control, ownership or discretion over how services are delivered and items distributed 
(Crisp et al., 2013; HAP International, 2013; Keystone, 2006, MSF, 1997). This study 
contributes to the literature in part, by utilizing the conceptual framework of downward 
accountability to assess the extent refugee adults informed program development, 
implementation and evaluation in humanitarian education. In addition, because education and 
livelihoods are high priorities among refugee adults (Karsetter, 2014; Loughry & Duncan, 2008), 
this study contributes to the literature by advancing knowledge about their access to training and 
employment. It is also important because of the way in which it integrates accountability and 
education standards.  
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
This section is focused upon the process upon which data for this study was selected and 
examined. Content analysis is the method of research I selected. Content analysis is first 
presented, followed by the repository in which documents were identified. I then present the 
procedures for content analysis in relation to the selected documents.  
3.5.1 Overview of content analysis 
Content analysis is a part of the document review methodology, which is a systematic 
investigation of documents that involves reading, coding and generating categories to illuminate 
and make sense of phenomena (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). Content analysis has been selected to 
investigate various education and training programs (Halpern, 2008; Chapman & Jester, 2008) 
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and provides the researcher with specific advantages. Indeed, content analysis is a particularly 
relevant method of research, as it allows for many types of documents to be collected and 
examined. For instance, researchers can examine organizations’ reports from interviews, surveys 
and focus group discussions, factsheets, program evaluations, contracts and program procedures. 
The incorporation of a wide, cross-section of materials offers a view into the operational, 
reflective and relational process of disclosure from multiple vantage points.  
This depth of information could be otherwise unattainable, in keeping with the time 
constraints of interviews and surveys. In addition, a number of interviews with both refugees and 
organizations have already been conducted (Stevens, 2013, Ward, 2014; Hutton, 2011; IMC & 
WHO, 2011).  It may also be challenging to locate staff and conduct meetings with informants. 
Therefore, research based upon surveys and interviews could be prohibitive in a fluid 
humanitarian environment. Indeed, staff turnover and human resource limitations have made 
data collection and reporting in the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis more difficult (WHO, IMC & 
UNICEF, 2012; GAO, 2009). Interviews may also be prohibitive because informants may not 
have knowledge about the policies, interventions and impact of other INGOs. For instance, 
regarding Iraqi refugees in Syria, “there is limited information sharing between Church and other 
humanitarian organizations, UNHCR and other relevant UN organizations” (Loughry & Duncan, 
2008, p. 2). Thus, libraries, clearinghouses and other repositories, may offer more information 
from multiple perspectives. The focus of data collection is also upon public information, rather 
than public figures or personnel. Therefore, a systematic review of documents is most relevant 
and subsequently, online data clearinghouses and libraries are vital arenas for document review. 
In particular, the internet is a main platform for donors and INGOs to disseminate and maintain 
varied documents in the public arena. Additionally, donors and organizations have cited the 
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provision of data through the internet, as integral to their accountability and transparency 
endeavors (Publish What You Find, 2011; IATI, 2011a). Thus, content analysis was preferred 
over other methodologies, because it is a method “for assessing events or processes in social 
groups when public records exist” (Berg, 2008, p. 259).  
3.5.2 Repositories of aid information 
Repositories that are centered upon financial, rather than narrative disclosure (for example, FTS, 
2015; ForeignAssistance.gov, 2015), engender quantitative research. In addition, multiple 
networks of INGOs and donors (ACEVO, 2015; Bond, 2015; ICVA, 2015; INEE, 2015; HAP 
International, 2013) foster discourse, information sharing, training and technical assistance. 
Country-wide and comparative analysis of data has been limited however and could not be 
performed through qualitative research relative to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis, via these channels. 
However, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was developed to improve aid 
effectiveness, promote data comparison and increase coordination and accountability through 
disclosure about international development and humanitarian aid programs via the internet 
(UNDP, 2015; IATI, 2011a). 
The IATI is a joint action taken by donor agencies, INGOs and development actors, in 
relation to the commitments of the 2008 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra 
(IATI, 2011a). Thus, more than 350 organizations are connected through a common repository 
(Castell, 2015). The repository includes such clearinghouses as the IATI Datastore and IATI 
Dashboard, which support their endeavors to become more accountable and transparent. In 
addition, IATI data is published to multiple libraries such as Open UNDP, IATI Registry and the 
Open Aid Search (Open Aid Search, 2015; Publish What You Find, 2015; UNDP, 2015). The 
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libraries and portals are accessible through the internet. Thus, there is a low-cost way for the 
public to view information on aid programs and perform a comparative qualitative analysis. 
Moreover, the information includes multi-sector interventions and agreements (Open Aid Search, 
2015; Publish What You Find, 2015; UNDP, 2015; IATI, 2011a) which illuminate the policy 
environment in which emergency aid is situated.  
Files are uploaded by participating agencies on a regular basis in order to provide 
information which is both current and comparable. Comparisons of aid activities can be made 
between agencies and countries. Files contain data related to spending as well as strategy, 
outputs and outcomes. Examples can include, annual reports, lessons learned, impact 
assessments, evaluations and memoranda (IATI, 2011a; IATI, 2011b). 
The Open Aid Search was selected as the arena to view public documents. There are 
currently more than 330,000 distinct entries in the Open Aid Search library. The Open Aid 
Search is a collaboration between an opendata / data visualization company and nonprofit 
organization focused upon open source software (Open Aid Search, 2015). Their aim was to 
establish a data repository which could be utilized by a lay audience, in contrast to the IATI 
Registry and Dashboard, which may be challenging to query for users without an information 
and technology background. The Open Aid Search contains all of the raw data from the IATI 
Registry without any adaptations. The public can view documents in the Open Aid Search 
through its homepage: www.openaidsearch.org. The Open Aid Search is one of the few 
repositories which allows for programs from myriad donor agencies and international 
organizations to be compared through key documents, such as program descriptions, contracts, 
quarterly and summative reports and a number of variables, such as country, region, sector, 
budget and reporting organization - which increases accessibility. In fact, the Open Aid Search 
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publishes IATI data exclusively, including narrative information from humanitarian education 
programs. 
3.5.3 Search method 
The data collected for content analysis consists of documents from the ‘Jordan’ portal in the 
Open Aid Search. The ‘Jordan’ portal was selected over other variables in the menu such as 
region because this study is concerned with humanitarian education programs in Jordan. Indeed, 
searching according to country is also pragmatic for users who may not be aware of every sector 
or grantee and require a complete listing generated by the search engine in order to achieve a 
comprehensive search result. Thus, there were several items the user could select for each entry, 
including description, financial, documents and RSR/Local Projects. The descriptions were very 
brief therefore, the researcher selected the document item, where narrative data was provided 
through summaries, profiles, reports, stories and other documents. I did not find information in 
the RSR/local project item.  
I did not select the budget variable or financial option, in order to collect data which is 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Indeed, the research questions for this study were focused 
upon the narrative information and thus, could not be addressed through a focus upon spending. 
While financial data is integral, the narrative data was most informative in regard to the roles 
refugees were afforded and the structures upon which these roles were sustained. Narrative data 
is also most suitable to assess the activities which were accessible to refugees, relative to their 
training and livelihood aspirations. Financial data can not offer this degree of insight or access to 
aid interventions and the impact they may have had for refugee livelihoods. 
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The review of the documents took place according to a timeline. The timeline for review 
was October 1, 2015 to October 16, 2015. Any information updated in the Open Aid Search 
outside of this timeframe was not a part of the analysis.  
3.5.4 Review of documents 
The online library, www.opeaidsearch.org, contained 1,831 entries within the Jordan portal. The 
researcher reviewed entries one by one, selecting the ‘documents’ item among the list of options. 
The process of document review was centered upon the conceptual framework of downward 
accountability and in particular, access, compliance and outcomes. This review was conducted 
based upon the process of content analysis recommended by Elo & Kyngas (2008) and the 
examination of accountability described by Pallis (2006). In the following sections, I describe the 
data related to these concepts and the phases in which content analysis was accomplished.   
3.5.5 Codes 
The codes selected for this study consisted of access, compliance and outcomes. Access, 
compliance and outcomes are relevant to and structures for which accountability can be 
analyzed.  For instance, Pallis claimed, “the principles of access, outcomes and the ability to 
promote compliance with relevant standards are used as analytical springboards to suggest 
changes which could be made to create greater participatory accountability” (2006, p. 888).  
In this study, access to education is centered upon geographic location, eligibility, 
specialization and certification. These areas are related to access in part, because they can 
evidence where programs were in relation to refugee learners and which groups of refugees 
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benefited from INGO programs. These latter components in particular, can advance the 
knowledge in humanitarian aid by disentangling open data in order to find evidence indicative of 
an accountability relationship in an educational setting. For instance, they are useful to discover 
how refugees may have been informed about education and livelihoods programs, the tracks or 
content areas in which they could develop and enhance skills and the documents provided to 
recognize refugees’ completion of the course.   
 Compliance information is also an important component of the accountability 
relationship, as it relates to the policy preferences which were pursued and the extent to which 
these preferences evidenced refugees’ decision rights. In this study, compliance was examined 
based upon the decisions and discretion in the network, which were leveraged to uphold rules or 
criteria for beneficiaries. Access and compliance are integral focal points that relate to the 
implementation of INGO education programs. However, to view accomplishments relative to 
refugees’ aspirations it is vital to examine program outcomes. Therefore, this study also 
incorporated an analysis of the data in regard to program accreditation and teacher certification. 
Program linkages to jobs and income-generation for refugee graduates were also included in the 
data analysis. With the view of the accountability relationship that these focal points provide, it 
is possible to identify the roles refugees were afforded and the beneficiaries to which the 
program roles were relevant.  
Thus, data was sorted by geography, eligibility, specialization and certification of 
learning attainments, in order to examine the extent to which refugees could access adult 
education and livelihoods relative to their aspirations. Under compliance, the examination 
included the decisions and discretion donors and INGOs utilized to uphold rules and criteria for 
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beneficiaries. Outcome information comprised qualification issues such as teacher certification 
and accreditation as well as job placement / income-generation.  
These structures were related to the research questions because of the way in which they 
could comprise and/or foster accountability to refugees (Pallis, 2006) and because donors and 
organizations have publicly declared accountability and information access, is or will be an 
inextricable component of their international aid projects (UNDP, 2015; HAP International, 
2013; IATI, 2011a; Publish What You Find, 2011). Thus, access, compliance and outcomes are 
relevant structures to examine the information they disclose. Moreover, one’s role in information 
access, generation and dissemination is integral to downward accountability and network 
perspectives – conceptual frameworks for this study. Network perspectives are also useful in an 
examination of IATI information, because they acknowledge the “key reason why firms build or 
enter networks” is to gain better access to knowledge (Huggins & Thompson, 2015, p. 106).  
The analysis leveraged Atlas.ti software, a qualitative research tool which categorizes and 
presents data. Atlas.ti (2016) is especially relevant to this study because it utilizes terms which 
are intuitive to a lay audience, such as “families” and “neighbors,” to help users navigate the 
tools. Atlas.ti was chosen over other software because it is particularly helpful to users without 
prior information technology experience and its terms help users recognize and report 
relationships between data with common meaning. Therefore, documents selected for content 
analysis were read and the relevant content sorted according to access, compliance and 
outcomes, which were codes.  
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3.5.6 Procedures for content analysis 
The content analysis was guided by the work of Elo and Kyngas (2008). Content analysis is a 
research methodology utilized in the assessment of written, verbal and/or visual communication 
materials. It refers to the way in which researchers interpret content “through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 
1278). It is a way to “enhance understanding of data” in part, through new insights and 
representations which can inform action (Elo & Kyngas, 2008, p. 108).  
Elo and Kyngas (2008) posited, content analysis involves three essential steps or phases: 
preparation, organizing and reporting. In the preparation phase the unit of analysis is selected. 
Secondarily, the researcher organizes the data through an inductive or deductive method. Data is 
subsequently reported, via conceptual maps, models or categories. I describe these phases in the 
following sections. 
3.5.7 Preparation phase in content analysis 
I began this study by reading and re-reading the documents. The process of re-reading 
documents was deemed necessary by Elo and Kyngas (2008) in order to immerse myself in the 
information. The process of repeated review ensured familiarization with the material and as a 
consequence, facilitated categorization. An electronic folder was established in Atlas.ti, to 
contain all primary documents. Additionally, I selected each sentence as a unit of analysis, 
fulfilling the preparation phase.  
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3.5.8 Organizing phase in content analysis 
As part of the organization phase in the content analysis I selected a deductive method of 
examination. This method was selected because the study is influenced by the work of Pallis 
(2006). Pallis recommended access, compliance and outcomes as springboards to analyze 
UNHCR’s inclusion strategies with regard to participatory accountability to refugees. Pallis’ 
concepts were related to a camp setting and focused upon refugee status determination. Thus, 
access, compliance and outcomes were selected as codes to deductively test his concepts. 
Through content analysis, I can assess the extent to which they can be applied to an urban 
refugee setting, while situated in the field of education. For instance, Elo and Kyngas 
maintained, deductive analysis is often used to “retest existing data in a new context” and can 
involve the retesting of categories, models and theories (2008, p. 111). The deductive analysis 
was not focused upon implications or latent content. It was centered upon the manifest content, 
via recurrent and/or deliberate positions in the aid environment and concrete details about aid 
interventions.  
The manifest content was coded in relation to access, compliance and outcomes. For 
instance, information relating to geographic location, eligibility criteria, specialization and 
certification of learning attainments for adult students, were coded under ‘access.’ The actions 
taken by organizations to uphold rules and criteria were coded under ‘compliance.’ Information 
related to accreditation, certification processes for teachers, employment and income-generation 
was coded under ‘outcomes.’ The coding process was accomplished by opening the ‘code 
manager’ feature and ‘tagging’ the sentences selected for each code. All of the codes were 
arranged within the Atlas.ti Hermeneutic Unit (HU), which maintains the selections made by the 
researcher.  
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The coding process illuminated several critical roles for beneficiaries, constraints in the 
aid arena and education objectives. I developed categories based upon this information and 
validated the categories through a review of documents by IATI and non-IATI members, which 
were not linked to the selected documents in the Open Aid Search. Categorization is particularly 
relevant to content analysis. For example, the outcome of content analysis is typically, “concepts 
or categories describing the phenomenon” (Elo & Kyngas, 2008, p. 108). Content analysis 
complimented the network conceptual framework because insights from patterns and themes can 
inform a larger phenomena (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For example, network perspectives 
involve an examination of patterns and/or structures “of relations among a set of actors” 
(Casciaro, Barsade, Edmondson, Gibson, Krackhardt & Giuseppe, 2015, p. 1164). In addition, 
Elo and Kyngas claimed the “key feature of all content analysis is that the many words of the 
text are classified into smaller content categories” (2008, p. 109). These categories offer new 
insights based in part, upon patterns and themes in the refugee-donor-INGO accountability 
relationship.   
Thus, through a deductive method, coding, categorization of data and links in the wider 
literature, I completed the organization phase.  
3.5.9 Reporting phase in content analysis 
The third or reporting phase of content analysis involves the reporting of results (Elo & Kyngas, 
2008). In this phase, I presented 5 beneficiary roles, 4 constraints and 3 education objectives. I 
also highlighted their implications for network perspectives and downward accountability. 
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3.6 STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
There are strengths and limitations to data collection through the Open Aid Search. The main 
strengths are in relation to the consistency between the study’s research questions and the IATI’s 
objectives. Indeed, the IATI is centered upon remediating information gaps and increasing the 
accessibility of timely, comparable data (IATI, 2011b). Thus, this examination and comparative 
analysis of IATI data, particularly via access, is both relevant to IATI members and related to the 
gaps they endeavor to close.  
IATI members also represent a large, cross-section of the aid community. Therefore, the 
data in the IATI-related libraries may be more indicative of the activities in the larger aid 
network than the data in other repositories. For instance, there are more than 330,000 program 
entries within the Open Aid Search library. In addition, there are more than 1,800 entries 
accessible through the Jordan portal. Indeed, there is substantive information on humanitarian 
activities for refugees. IATI members are considered the primary audience for this research and 
therefore, an analysis of the content they disclose has both utility and relevance to this group.  
Main limitations are in regard to members’ reports and the differences between them. For 
instance, while there are more than 350 organizations in the IATI, narrative information has not 
been uploaded on all of their humanitarian education programs. In addition, there are INGOs as 
well as local or community based organizations which are not registered with IATI. Donors and 
organizations also provided information which was not standardized. For instance, quarterly 
reports were in varied formats and disclosed in some instances and not others. Thus, the IATI is 
limited by the voluntary orientation of its membership and the standards by which their narrative 
program data is disclosed. 
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Donors and organizations may have also preferred to disclose particular information in 
other arenas, rather than an accessible public domain. Therefore, the Open Aid Search while 
important, is not the only arena where information can be found. Information on specific 
beneficiary communities may also be difficult to disaggregate. For instance, humanitarian 
education data on Iraqi refugees may not be available apart from information which encompasses 
Syrian refugees and other displaced populations. In fact, many humanitarian education programs 
registered diverse groups of refugees into the same beneficiary cohorts, therefore INGO 
programs may not have offered an Iraqi-specific intervention or Syrian-specific activity. Though 
efforts may have been made to localize activities and appeal to cultural minorities or women, 
program reports may not include information in relation to specific subgroups of beneficiaries. 
This particular limitation may be common to any repository and not specific to IATI information 
or the Open Aid Search.   
Other limitations are related to the scope of this inquiry, rather than to the Open Aid 
Search. For instance, the researcher examined documents which detailed activities on or after 
2010 and were written in English. Additionally, the examination was centered upon those 
documents which were focused upon: the Iraqi or Syrian crisis in Jordan; humanitarian 
education, training and/or livelihoods for adults; and provided narrative data related to strategic 
planning, intervention, monitoring or assessment processes. This timeline encompasses the 
period where United Nations agencies and INGOs – as IATI Members - encountered low 
registration and retention rates in Jordan alongside a dramatic increase in the refugee population. 
Thus, the research will not reflect the accomplishments in humanitarian education which 
occurred prior to 2010. However, this study will support the examination of key IATI members’ 
endeavors in accountability alongside key challenges.  
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This research does not incorporate the education programs which were implemented 
primarily to enhance Jordan’s education sector because they were not specific to the refugee 
situation (i.e. Jordan Competitiveness Program, 2015; SIYAHA, 2015; Matar, Sitabkhan & 
Brombacher, 2013) and/or benefited refugee children apart from the disclosure of adult learning 
(USAID, 2015b; Development Coordination Unit, 2013). Indeed, the focus of this study is upon 
education and livelihood programs implemented by INGOs for adult learners, in response to the 
Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis. Programs which registered refugee adults or Jordanian adults 
specifically to increase their capacity to support refugees, were examined. Yet, programs 
unrelated to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis and programs where no clear benefit to refugees was 
disclosed were not examined.  
The study does not incorporate documents from the Government of Jordan because 
Jordan was not included in the list of countries which published to the IATI at the time data was 
gathered and therefore, may not be held to the level of accountability in its aid information as 
members. In addition, local organizations, including government institutions, may be focused 
mainly upon their non-refugee constituents. In particular, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Thus, the Government does 
not have the level of commitment to this international framework as many of the IATI members, 
including to refugee livelihoods that the framework recommends. It is also important to note that 
Jordan and other host countries hold training programs, tertiary education and livelihoods 
activities at the national level that are often inaccessible to non-citizens. Indeed, residency and 
work permits may be prohibited and adult education can be far away, high-priced or 
accompanied with strict eligibility requirements (UNESCO, 2015; Stevens, 2013; CARE, 2014; 
Kirk, 2009). Thus, it is imperative to promote, implement and scale adult education and 
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livelihood training at the INGO level, because this may be the area where the largest total 
percentage of refugee adults can be enrolled. However, the Jordanian perspective may be 
understated in this study as a result of its lack of representation in the IATI. The primary 
audience however, is IATI members. This research is also qualitative and centered upon social 
processes therefore, documents which were focused upon procurement were not examined. 
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4.0  DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION 
This section is centered upon the process by which documents in the Open Aid Search were 
selected for content analysis and the findings which this process engendered. These findings 
relate to the first research question: If and to what degree donor agencies and INGOs are 
leveraging their new networks to disclose information pertaining to their humanitarian education 
programs?  The main findings presented in this chapter are in relation to the degree of education 
and livelihoods data in selected documents, the extent to which the data addresses IATI goals 
and the policy environment in which adult education was enacted. This environment was 
disclosed by INGOs and donors, vis a vis the roles they afforded refugees and the constraints 
they encountered, thereby advancing the knowledge in the aid network about adult education and 
livelihoods for Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan.  
First, I define areas in which information gaps in adult education and livelihoods 
minimize access to IATI data. Next, I focus upon the documents in relation to the number, aid 
actor and format. The information INGOs and donors disclosed relative to the codes of access, 
compliance and outcomes is then detailed, through a description of the content and the roles and 
constraints in this open data. 
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4.1 INFORMATION GAP IN THE ONLINE REPOSITORY 
Files in the Open Aid Search library which are related to the Iraqi and Syrian displacement are 
accessible and attached to specific organizations. However, I did not find reports which 
encompasses a comparative and/or content analysis of the narrative information. Therefore, there 
is an information gap concerning the access to and quality of narrative information in 
humanitarian education for adult refugees. For instance, when the user selects the Jordan portal, 
no integrated and country level reports or studies on adult education and livelihoods for Iraqi and 
Syrian refugees were included in the list of data entries. Moreover, the entries in the portal 
encompass humanitarian and development interventions, which add complexity to queries that 
are directed toward one or the other. Subsequently, the user could not acquire data on the 
humanitarian education and livelihoods interventions for adult refugees in Jordan in one file. 
Thus, while the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) has been lauded for its capacity 
to deliver current information, education data for refugee adults is relatively dispersed across the 
Jordan portal. In addition, beneficiary data was not often disaggregated, which minimizes studies 
based upon program evaluation, because impact information between programs could not be 
compared. Comparable data is a critical goal of the IATI (IATI, 2011a), thus information about 
program impact should be more accessible.    
Indeed, Simpson and Hancock argued, “even in the most organized context of emergency 
response, computer information systems have a mixed reputation for success” (2009, p. s136). In 
fact, in large scale disasters decision-makers may have data collection instruments and standard 
methodologies, yet “incomplete information” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s136). In addition, 
although computer information systems and decision-support systems (DSS) are an important 
part of decision making in real time, they have been the source of numerical computations and 
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complex forecasting ill-suited to the disaster setting, which is marked by unforeseen events. Its 
utility may also be limited because it does not support the interdisciplinary response to 
communities with needs that span various sectors. As a result, the “quality of data entered into 
emergency management DSS often degrades as the incident grows larger, thwarting the value of 
this technological support” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s134). Thus, in order to “cope with 
the complexities particular to disaster logistics” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s134) the quality 
of and access to real-time information should be improved to a greater extent. In the following 
sections, I assess this multi-sectoral information and the extent to which IATI goals for timely 
and comparable information were upheld in the context of the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis in 
Jordan.   
4.2 NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
The researcher reviewed 1,831 entries. There were entries which did not have content in the 
documents item and other entries which had one or more files. In addition, there were entries 
which were uploaded with many documents.  
English is the language utilized most often by IATI members to share information 
through the IATI platform. The selected documents in this study were focused upon: the Iraqi or 
Syrian crisis in Jordan; humanitarian training, education and/or livelihoods for adults; and 
narrative data related to strategic planning, intervention, monitoring or assessment processes. 
Selected documents were written in English yet, a few documents included English text and text 
in another language. In these instances, only the text in English was analyzed because this study 
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is focused upon the information which INGOs and donors disclosed in English and much of the 
information published to and by the IATI is in English (IATI, 2011a; IATI, 2011b).  
Thus, I opened all files, yet did not take further action with documents that were not 
written in English. However, in most instances, donors and organizations provided files in 
English. Files were either actual attachments which could be read without further action, or links 
to donors and organizations’ online sites away from the repository. When links to external sites 
were provided, the researcher opened the link in a new web browser. When links were program-
specific, the researcher copied the selected content and pasted it into a Microsoft Word (MS 
Word) document. The MS Word document was then uploaded to the Atlas.ti software. When 
links were not program-specific, no further action was initiated and the browser was closed.  
In some instances, particularly with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the links were not connected to actual 
reports or other documents. Thus, program-specific information could not be readily accessed. 
Rather, these links usually directed the user to an external site for the organizations’ main portal, 
with infographics of its activities worldwide or an error occurred. This accessibility challenge 
should be remediated, because access to data is a main IATI goal (IATI, 2011a). However, it did 
not minimize the scope of the study. For instance, UNICEF data could be examined from the 
information disclosed in its partners’ entries. For instance, the Government of Canada and World 
Food Programme (WFP) provided data on activities which were implemented through 
coordination with UNICEF (Government of Canada, 2014b; Government of Canada, 2013b; 
WFP, 2013). This information was utilized in the content analysis. Additionally, information 
from UNDP was utilized to validate the information in selected documents in section 5.3.   
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The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), World Food 
Programme (WFP), Islamic Relief and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were especially 
forthcoming, with files available through the documents item that required no further action or 
external links for the user to follow. In most instances, the files uploaded to the library were in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Word and once accessed, were entered into the 
Atlas.ti software. These files included myriad program strategies, modifications, reports, 
descriptions and profiles, from which information in regard to access, compliance and outcomes 
could be gathered and analyzed. Therefore, while there were many documents in the Open Aid 
Search which were not selected for content analysis, the process of selection would likely be 
similar in other information systems because they often have data that is incomplete (Simpson & 
Hancock, 2009). Thus, I may have gathered as many documents in another information system 
as I gathered in the Open Aid Search. In addition, part of the utility of this study, is that it 
quantifies the amount of adult education and livelihoods data which has been disclosed. 
Therefore, recognizing information gaps in the repository is indeed a critical finding. In fact, by 
quantifying what the public has access to, this study could promote subsequent actions by IATI 
members who may not have recognized the gaps in the adult education and livelihoods 
information in the data they submit. Selecting an alternative information system may have 
minimized this opportunity for lessons learned and improvements in the quality of adult 
education reporting. 
In the following section, I therefore quantify the adult education and livelihoods 
information. In particular, I provide findings in relation to the percentages of access, compliance 
and outcome information coded in Atlas.ti. I also focus upon the categories generated from the 
data these members disclosed and the process upon which the categories were validated. These 
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results are examined within the context of the phases of content analysis, upon which this section 
is outlined. The phases of content analysis are preparing, organizing and reporting.  
4.3 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE 1 
In this section I focus upon the first or preparing phase of content analysis. Thus, the section is 
centered upon the number of documents included in this study and the details each donor 
emphasized. In addition, this section underscores the sort of information users in the Open Aid 
Search have access to and the degree to which the data is indicative of an adult learning 
environment. For instance, donors and INGOs have outlined their program goals and strategies, 
synergies with other organizations and affiliations with working groups and consortiums. Thus, 
the user is informed about the organizations relative to their networks and the methods they 
planned to utilize in support of education and livelihoods. Those users with a particular interest 
in policy and organizational behavior may find these documents especially relevant. However, 
summative information and outcomes were not often reported. Therefore, users with an 
orientation toward program evaluation may find the information incomplete. This information 
gap minimizes evidence of accountability, because the grades, test scores, diplomas and other 
customary education activities were not disclosed. 
I begin this section with a quantitative presentation of the documents and next, focus 
upon the disclosure of education and livelihoods information and its significance for country-
level and comparative analysis.     
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4.3.1 Selected documents by organization  
In the first or preparing phase of content analysis, I gathered the documents for this study. 
Indeed, there were nearly 130 documents which were initially selected, as they contained 
narrative data for humanitarian programs in Jordan from January 1, 2010 to October 16, 2015. 
Next, the documents were systematically reviewed. Roughly 29 documents noted the refugee 
crisis, yet were focused entirely upon development rather than humanitarian assistance. These 
documents outlined programs which targeted Jordanian locals and/or were disclosed without 
benefit to adult refugees and were not a part of the content analysis. Nearly 50 documents were 
centered upon humanitarian assistance for refugees, yet were focused exclusively upon children 
and youth or internal procedures such as financial audits and itemizations. There were also 
documents which were focused upon refugee adults, yet did not disclose narrative data related to 
their education or livelihoods. These documents were not selected for content analysis. Thus, 
forty-seven documents were selected for content analysis and uploaded into the Atlas.ti software. 
These documents are included in the Appendix and Bibliography.  
Twenty documents by the Government of Canada and ten documents from Japan 
Emergency NGO (JEN) were selected for content analysis. In addition, I selected five documents 
each from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Islamic Relief and two documents each 
from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP). Reclaim Childhood, MADRE and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross provided one document each. The donors and INGOs are presented in figure 4.1 below, 
with the respective number of documents selected in this study.  
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Figure 4.1: Number of documents in the content analysis 
 
I focus upon the forms of the documents and the activities these organizations highlighted 
in the following section. The forty-seven documents were gathered from nine total donors and 
international nongovernmental organizations. These documents were focused upon programs 
from the years 2012-2015.   
4.3.2 Format of selected documents 
INGOs and donors disclosed information about their adult education and livelihoods activities 
through many forms. For instance, the documents were comprised of applications, profiles and 
other forms which described their activities. In most instances, the information in these forms 
was strategic and encompassed accountability activities. The diversity of forms in the Open Aid 
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Search is a strength, since access, compliance and outcomes are relevant to various program 
activities and reporting procedures. Yet, there were multiple timelines and data which were 
disclosed in some instances and not others. Thus, the diversity of forms decreases the 
opportunities for program evaluation.  
For instance, the Government of Canada, JEN, NRC and Sida, provided the most 
information in relation to funding, accountability activities and diverse beneficiary groups. Thus, 
the quality of aid information was enriched by these actors.   
The Government of Canada disclosed its activities through program profiles. Canada 
described its strategy and expected outcome for many of its projects, along with its implementing 
partners. Significantly, the profiles often included a wide range of activities across myriad 
sectors. However, several profiles did not disaggregate beneficiaries in its regional programs (for 
example, Government of Canada, 2013b; Government of Canada, 2013h), which makes it hard 
for users to identify the level of participation for beneficiaries in Jordan. When totals for Jordan 
were disclosed, data was not usually disaggregated for refugees and members of the local 
community (for example, Government of Canada, 2015a; Government of Canada, 2014a). In 
addition, in most instances, outcomes were not disclosed by the Government of Canada. 
Therefore, the user is informed about Canada’s endeavors, yet subsequently left unaware of its 
impact in the refugee populace. 
JEN described its activities with success stories and field notes. JEN’s notes and stories 
were most often summative, which illustrated its strategy and accomplishments. In particular, 
JEN included the processes upon which feedback and involvement from its partners and 
beneficiaries were delivered (Nagatsuka, 2014; Hamasaka, 2014a). JEN (Hamasaka, 2014c) also 
presented the challenges to program implementation and the impact of these challenges for both 
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education and health. Yet, JEN did not disclose the frameworks or guidelines for accountability 
upon which it could have relied. In contrast to the WFP (2013; 2012), Islamic Relief (2014b), 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2014), NRC (2014c) and Sida (2014), the information 
JEN disclosed is not situated in the context of a larger accountability mechanism. A comparative 
analysis of accountability policies between JEN and these IATI members is subsequently more 
difficult because the relevant policies were inaccessible through the Open Aid Search.   
Sida is a donor organization and the NRC is its grantee. The information disclosed was in 
regard to their partnership, including the program development and implementation components. 
They disclosed agreements, modifications, memoranda, annual plans and applications. In 
addition, they described myriad constraints and challenges in the aid arena. In particular, they 
situated themselves in a larger network of actors who were committed to accountability and 
transparency (Sida, 2014; NRC, 2014c). The information they provided was diverse and multi-
layered, which engenders a critical analysis of strategy and network roles. However, there was 
limited data in regard to outcomes, which places limitations upon the boundaries of this analysis. 
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Figure 4.2: Positionality of organizations in the data 
 
The Islamic Relief (2015), World Food Programme (WFP) (2012), MADRE (2015), 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) disclosed 
information that to a large extent, related to their history, partnerships with local actors and depth 
in terms of the geographic locations in which they conducted activities. This enriched aid 
information and situated these organizations in the aid network as embedded in the communities 
in which they operated. I present these positions in the aid network in figure 4.2 above.  
In addition, IATI members included information about their capacity building activities 
with local organizations, agencies and practitioners (for example, Islamic Relief, 2014d; 
Government of Canada, 2013e). In particular, the WFP (2013; 2012) described linkages with 
projects implemented by the Government of Jordan, local partners and United Nations agencies. 
Many of these actors are situated alongside refugees in urban and rural locations and could 
leverage newly acquired knowledge and skills to support the ongoing crisis response. Thus, these 
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actions could evidence a trust relationship with local actors and augment aid effectiveness 
through staff development and improved access to services.   
The WFP (2013; 2012) disclosed information through its emergency operations and 
recovery plans. These plans provided a program summary and significantly, a view into the 
accountability relationship it constructed with beneficiaries. Yet, the paucity of outcome data, 
like other IATI members, decreases the capacity for program evaluation.  
Islamic Relief disclosed information through program proposals and quarterly reports. 
The information in these reports was summative and strategic. It allowed a view of the relevant 
education activities through various reporting cycles and in particular, the specific accountability 
achievements (Islamic Relief, 2014d; Islamic Relief, 2013). Islamic Relief disclosed constraints 
to its programs and evidenced a capacity to modify programs based upon lessons learned 
(Islamic Relief, 2015). However, along with MADRE (2015), the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (2014) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) less information was disclosed about adult 
learning, particularly in relation to continuing education which could enhance existing refugee 
skills.  
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Figure 4.3: Forms of documents by organization 
 
Thus, contractual, summative, strategic and cooperative information was disclosed with 
respect to humanitarian education and livelihoods programs. I present these forms of documents 
in figure 4.3 above. These documents were gathered and entered into the Atlas.ti software and re-
read to immerse myself in the data. Next, I selected sentences as the unit of analysis. These 
actions accomplished the first or preparing phase of content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). 
4.4 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE 11 
In the second or organizing phase, I selected a deductive method of analysis, completed the 
coding process and validated the codes in the aid literature (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). In this section, 
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I present the results of the coding process, in regard to the following three codes: access, 
compliance and outcomes. The manifest data in relation to these codes as well as recurrent 
positions on policy issues in the aid arena, led to the development of categories. Therefore, I 
follow the description of the coding process by presenting the categories and the sources upon 
which the categories were validated. 
4.4.1 Coding with qualitative software 
I coded a total of 300 units of analysis through the following codes: access, compliance and 
outcomes. One-hundred eighty (180) units or approximately 60% of the total units coded, were 
in relation to access. The majority of the information in relation to this code was regarding the 
primary objectives and activities donors and INGOs planned and/or implemented for refugee 
adults. This information was relevant to the area of specialization, which was a main point of 
inquiry in the research questions. The information regarding this code also incorporated their 
eligibility criteria and the geographic location in which activities were conducted.  
The Government of Canada (2014h; 2014b), JEN (Hamasaka, 2013c) and Reclaim 
Childhood (2015) provided the most data in relation to teacher/coach education, which 
comprised a substantive part of the data in regard to specialization. The NRC (2015), Islamic 
Relief (2014c) and the WFP (2013; 2012), were particularly explicit in relation to their eligibility 
criteria. Moreover, the Islamic Relief (2014c; 2014b) provided the most disaggregated eligibility 
and geographic information.     
Seventy-two units (72) or approximately 24% of the total units coded, were in relation to 
compliance. The main issues in this information centered upon the food and cash vouchers 
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provided to refugees and other beneficiaries by the Islamic Relief (2014d; 2014b; 2013) and 
WFP (2013; 2012).  
Forty-eight (48) units or approximately 16% percent of the total units coded, were in 
relation to outcomes. Livelihoods and job support were the outcomes INGOs and donors 
disclosed in selected documents. The Government of Canada, WFP (2013), JEN (Hamasaka, 
2015c), MADRE (2015) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) disclosed the majority of information in 
regard to these areas.    
The data generated from these codes was utilized to develop categories based upon 
common meaning, deliberate and recurrent positions and concrete education objectives. The 
categories were then validated. This validation process can be performed in several ways, 
including intercoder/interrater reliability, illustrative quotes from the content, linking the 
researcher’s categories to the wider literature and figures/illustrations (Pfeil & Zaphiris, 2009; 
Elo & Kyngas, 2008). Thus in figure 4.4 below, I illustrate the data from selected documents in 
relation to the three codes. I also present the specific actions accomplished in the validation of 
the categories in the next section.  
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Figure 4.4: Access, compliance and outcome data in selected documents 
4.4.2 Validation of categories 
In the second phase of content analysis, (Elo & Kyngas, 2008) the validation process can 
incorporate quotes to illustrate the categories and citations from the wider literature in which 
these categories are also associated. It can also include intercoder/interrater reliability. The 
presentation of direct quotes is particularly vital because it offers a link between the categories 
and the content in selected documents. I utilized quotes and integrated linkages to the wider 
literature in this phase. However, intercoder and/or interrater reliability involves two or more 
coders and iterative dialogue in order to minimize the inconsistencies between their results. This 
process has been a debatable method of validation. For instance, Elo and Kyngas asserted, 
researchers “interpret the data according to their subjective perspective” (2008, p. 113). In 
addition, it is most vital for addressing issues that are not present in this study, such as large data 
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sets, latent content and complicated coding procedures/protocols, because there is often less 
consistency between the findings of different coders (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman & Pedersen, 
2013; Brank, Fox, Youstin & Boeppler, 2009).  
Processes have been developed to resolve disparate findings between coders and increase 
the credibility of the researcher’s reporting based upon evidence that others recognize the 
categories or themes in the data in similar ways. However, it may be hard to remediate 
unitization problems because these issues comprise the specific sections of text coders consider 
part of the unit of analysis. Thus, just because different coders recognize categories and themes 
in similar ways, does not mean they select or tag similar text. Indeed, coders may include slightly 
less or more text in relation to a specific theme and relevant section to which there is agreement. 
These approximations decrease the consistency between the coders’ results, upon which 
agreement is measured. Intercoder processes such as negotiated agreement, can also be subject to 
a power differential and do not in any way substitute or absolve the investigator from the 
immersion and re-reading of the data, which is needed to validate the codes (Campbell, Quincy, 
Osserman & Pedersen, 2013). Thus, throughout the following sections, I provide citations from 
the content to which data was coded. Yet, intercoder reliability was not chosen to validate study 
findings.  
Alternatively, I examined the reports, research and communication materials of other aid 
stakeholders, which were disclosed to the public through web-based repositories, homepages and 
information-sharing platforms on the internet. These stakeholders included IATI Members not 
linked to the 47 selected documents, in addition to networks of international organizations, 
research centers and scholars, with members not currently registered with the IATI. This process 
ensured I could explore the degree to which study findings could be representative of the larger 
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IATI membership and scholarship in humanitarian aid in the public domain. I also have greater 
access to the potential categories related to access, compliance and outcomes in humanitarian 
adult education, than I would in the case of additional coders. Therefore, through direct citations 
from the data, comparisons of study findings to data from IATI members not linked to the 
selected documents and with data from non-IATI members, I can determine the extent to which 
study findings have been validated with a greater degree of confidence. 
4.4.3 Agencies and donors in the validation process 
There were 39 donor agencies and INGOs which provided reports that confirmed the categories 
of roles, constraints and education objectives. The organizations are listed in figure 4.5 and 4.6, 
below, based upon how they were cited in the reports and their position in the aid network. In 
figure 4.7 and 4.8, the list is centered upon their position in the IATI Registry. For instance, I did 
not find a membership list for IATI members. Yet, the IATI provides a list of organizations 
which have published information in its repository. The list can be viewed through the internet. 
Therefore, organizations which the IATI recognized as publishers in the IATI Registry as of 
April 7, 2016, (via http://iatiregistry.org/publisher) are recognized in figure 4.7 as IATI-
registered. The organizations which the IATI did not list in the Registry, are recognized in figure 
4.7 as unlisted.  
There are instances where a country is listed in the IATI Registry, yet the agency that 
implements its humanitarian programs or produces reports is not listed in the IATI Registry. For 
example, the United States is listed in the IATI Registry. The Department of State, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
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Migration (BPRM) are not listed in the IATI Registry. Therefore, the figures may not reflect the 
entire IATI engagement of the countries upon which the documents in this study were accessed.  
In another example, I validated the data in selected documents via documents from the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and House of Commons, 
International Development Committee. The DFID is listed in the IATI Registry. The House of 
Commons, International Development Committee, is not listed in the IATI Registry. United 
Nations agencies are also implicated. For instance, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are listed in the IATI Registry. However, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is not listed in the IATI Registry. 
Thus, there are cases in which governments and organizations are listed in the IATI Registry 
through some of their departments and not others. Moreover, there are instances in which 
governments and organizations reported to the IATI through some of its offices and not others. 
The IATI Registry could be improved and ostensibly more user-friendly, with the addition of 
these departments. Yet, approximately half of the organizations which disclosed information that 
validated the categories were in the IATI Registry. Therefore, the categories presented are 
relevant to both a large segment of the IATI membership and a substantive sample of the 
network of organizations in the field of humanitarian assistance.  
In addition to these organizations, I utilized approximately 10 reports and studies from 
periodicals and policy institutes. Thus, the categories were validated in the discourse of a wide, 
cross-section of the aid literature.       
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Figure 4.5: Multilateral and donor agencies in validation 
Figure 4.6: International organizations in validation  
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Figure 4.7: Agencies and organizations listed and unlisted in the IATI Registry 
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4.5 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE III 
In the third or reporting phase of content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008), the categories are 
reported. Indeed, I categorized roles, constraints and objectives. The main roles afforded INGO 
beneficiaries were the professional, caregiver, emissary, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. 
Narrow commitments, grey areas, minimum thresholds and access were categorized as primary 
constraints. Durable solutions, caregiving and child protection, social cohesion and conduct, 
were categorized as education objectives. These objectives were implemented through legal 
counseling, mine awareness, teacher education, hygiene education, sport and media, 
microfinance, food aid and repurposing. Thus, there were five beneficiary roles, four constraints 
and three education objectives. These categories may not be all-inclusive, as donors and 
organizations may be organized to address specific issues for which data is not accessible.  
The reporting of these categories is especially significant. First, a main area of focus in 
this study, is in regard to the roles afforded refugees and the structures upon which these roles 
were sustained. Roles are the positions in which INGOs and donors provide access to aid for 
beneficiaries who are registered and eligible. The structures that sustain the roles are comprised 
of the discretion INGOs and donors leverage in information generation and dissemination and 
the resources they distribute including training courses and material aid. Indeed, power-sharing 
discretion in information dissemination and resource allocation could be critical accountability 
achievements. Additionally, the roles refugees are afforded in information dissemination are also 
relevant to a network perspective of the aid arena. In particular, constraints illustrate the degree 
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to which information generation and dissemination could have been minimized. Thus, 
constraints, roles and structures underscore accountability in adult emergency education and 
highlight the access to and quality of open data in INGO-donor networks.  
Another area of focus is in regard to the activities accessible to refugees, relative to their 
training needs and livelihood aspirations. INGOs and donors disclosed information in these 
areas, therefore the Open Aid Search was a useful repository in the analysis of online 
information.  
4.6 BENEFICIARY ROLES 
Access to humanitarian education centered upon five primary beneficiary roles. Persons who 
were registered and/or eligible for participation in the humanitarian programs disclosed by 
donors and organizations, could be conceptualized as the professional, caregiver, emissary, 
industrial and most vulnerable refugee. The roles relative to potential benefits and limitations are 
presented in figure 4.8 below.  
The refugee professional refers to entrepreneurs and persons training to work in a 
business environment (Government of Canada, 2015a; Government of Canada, 2014a). The 
relationships s/he has access to could include teachers and coaches, as well as parents, caregivers 
and school administrators. Additionally, the refugee professional may potentially gather 
resources either from the INGO or his or her investor. The professional could receive guidance 
from the INGO or a mentor and earn income through relations with customers. Thus, 
communication between and among these actors could be directed by the professional inasmuch 
as it can be mediated by the INGO. The professional is distinguished from other roles because of  
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Figure 4.8: Benefits and limitations of refugees' roles 
 
these multifaceted channels of communication and relations. Professionals can leverage this 
position to generate and share information and conceivably, reduce dependency upon the aid of 
INGOs. 
The refugee caregiver role encompasses parents and school staff in the refugee 
community who meet regularly for the purposes of increasing child protection and K-12 
enrollment (Reclaim Childhood, 2015; Islamic Relief, 2015; Government of Canada, 2014e; 
Government of Canada, 2014g; NRC, 2014c). The caregiver may establish a relationship with 
other parents and members of the community however, communication between these actors is 
often directed by the INGO. The skills of the caregiver may not be developed because the 
objective is to address the learning declines of children and youth. If skills are developed, they 
are in relation to the caregiving position more than refugees’ learning and livelihoods aspirations.  
 98 
Refugee emissaries are persons who either obtain volunteer or paid positions with INGOs 
to conduct needs assessments and increase messaging in the field (Nagatsuka, 2014). Refugee 
emissaries are not senior staff members and do not direct communication. They can develop 
skills in relation to the INGO project in order to fulfill a program objective however, skills 
extraneous to this objective may not be developed or applied. The INGO directs their 
communication and like the caregiver, retains control of most resources.  
The industrial role is centered upon participation in sanitation and infrastructure projects. 
Industrials may volunteer or receive a form of remuneration (Hamasaka, 2014d; WFP, 2013). 
They may be hired for jobs including repairs and distributing goods. They may not enjoy as 
much communication as caregivers, emissaries and professionals, because the role necessitates 
physical labor and/or harsh conditions. This role may be prohibitive for those with physical 
limitations and medical needs. INGO support may be given to the industrial refugee for home-
based or other income-generation (Hamasaka, 2015c).  
The most vulnerable refugee refers to the beneficiary often designated by organizations 
as the primary target for humanitarian assistance (NRC, 2015; WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012). The 
most vulnerable refugee is set apart from others, because his/her needs are the most extreme and 
his/her chances for survival without humanitarian aid are the most unlikely. The industrial and 
most vulnerable refugees do not direct communication and may have few relations to leverage. 
The information disclosed in selected documents was to a large degree, focused on the refugee 
caregiver, emissary and most vulnerable refugee. As a consequence, there is greater access to 
data about refugees who have the least control over their aid and yet, are more dependent.  
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These beneficiary roles were promoted in response to cross-cutting development themes 
and objectives for durable solutions. The comparative education activities that correspond to 
these roles are presented in figure 4.9 below.  
Most of these roles were designated either primarily for refugee women or incorporated 
specific mechanisms to increase women’s enrollment and participation. In fact, women’s 
vulnerability was underscored throughout documents in the Open Aid Search review process 
(Droggitis, 2013; Government of Canada, 2013d; Susskind, 2013a; Susskind, 2013b; 
Government of Canada, 2012). Activities explicitly developed for refugee men were rarely 
disclosed. While they were included in beneficiary pools, women and children were prioritized. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Refugee roles in the aid arena 
 
Out of the nine organizations, JEN highlighted both the strategic targeting of and 
contribution from men in its activities. For instance, an awareness campaign to conserve water, 
“targeted males and females from three age groups: adults, teenagers and children” and different 
methods were used to reach each group (Hamasaka, 2015b). In addition, JEN (Hamasaka, 
2014d) facilitated an awareness session for parents and teachers. JEN (Hamasaka, 2014d) 
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maintained, “to our delight, the turnout surpassed our expectations and what’s more, we were 
extremely pleased to see fathers and other members of the community we had not attempted to 
reach directly attending our sessions.” JEN’s capacity to foster participation from men and 
women is significant in part, since organizations such as the WFP characterized refugees as 
“families with children” (2012, p.4).  It also conceded there was a large segment of single men in 
the refugee population. 
The roles also accompany significant accomplishments in downward accountability. For 
example, donors and organizations’ strengths centered upon their capacity to reach beneficiaries 
in camp and noncamp settings (NRC, 2014c), establish multiple communication channels 
(Islamic Relief, 2014b) and target diverse groups (WFP, 2012). However, they often controlled 
the direction, intent and form of information sharing and while feedback was encouraged, 
refugee adults were not noted for their role in program evaluation. Therefore, INGOs and donors 
could do more to evidence their accountability commitments. In addition, progress in these areas 
might be measured through ongoing research.    
4.7 EDUCATION CONSTRAINTS 
Donor agencies and organizations are clearly interdependent and to a large degree, dissatisfied. 
In the Open Aid Search, a rich discussion of program constraints revealed they have 
acknowledged the internal improvements they could make. In addition, it has underscored their 
coordination processes as an interface among stakeholders in a system to which they have 
become resigned. Indeed, donors and organizations recognized the humanitarian context as the 
domain they do not control and the scale for which they are not responsible. As a result, there is 
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a level of support for adult education and training (London 2016 Conference Members, 2015; 
Talbot, 2013; Kirk, 2009) alongside an ontological argument, as to whether adult education is 
appropriate in a humanitarian environment (Sida, 2014). In addition, hesitancy around long-term 
obligations has been noted (Sida, 2015). Emergency education is minimized by the contradiction 
and in many instances, livelihoods has been allocated to local laborers or constructed as gender-
based, by virtue of members’ roles and constraints to access. 
The main constraints in selected documents were categorized as the following: narrow 
commitments, grey areas, minimum thresholds and access limitations. The constraints donors 
and INGOs noted are in regard to the things needed to make programs more effective, 
complimentary and/or coherent and the barriers to their interventions. For instance, in the Open 
Aid Search the Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) in particular, noted the effects of climate upon its 
activities. Indeed, JEN claimed it had to distribute winter clothes and undertake other measures 
to mitigate the effects of cold winters and sandstorms upon the health of refugees (JEN, 2015; 
Hamasaka, 2015a; Hamasaka, 2014b). In addition, snow, wind and rain caused its staff and 
partner organizations to shift and adapt plans and strategies. For example, JEN (Hamasaka, 
2015a) claimed, “the emergency team spent most of the day tying down water tanks that we had 
thought were too heavy to blow away, we had been wrong the wind was strong enough to take 
them.” As a result of relentless snow and unexpected wind, schools were damaged, streets were 
flooded, tents collapsed and the even the “protective tarp and part of the roof blew off” of JEN’s 
office space (Hamasaka, 2015a). JEN maintained staff worked well into the night, “nevertheless 
it wasn’t until almost a week later that all water was removed and the normal routines in the 
camp” could commence (Hamasaka, 2015a).  
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Although JEN (Hamasaka, 2015c) noted, “in order to implement assistance promptly, 
adequately and efficiently based on grasping the needs correctly, it is necessary to cooperate with 
related agencies, such as the Jordanian government, UN and NGOs.” The cooperation indicated 
for adequate and prompt aid in education could not be conducted. Rather, time, human and 
material resources were distributed toward unexpected events. Efficiency was also minimized 
because operations were not initiated until after the damage had already occurred and/or after the 
storm arrived.  
 In this section, I first present the constraints reported in selected documents. Next, I list 
significant processes which were disclosed in selected documents, yet were not acknowledged as 
constraints. I then examine the implications of these constraints for accountability to refugee 
adults and the larger policy environment in adult education and livelihoods. 
4.7.1 Narrow commitments 
Narrow commitments are related to the marginal supply of prompt, adequate, financial and 
regulatory support for adult education and livelihoods. This constraint is especially critical, 
because it decreases access to recovery opportunities for adult refugees in the aid arena. For 
instance, the World Food Programme (WFP) (2012) concluded self-reliance was a challenge 
because of expensive work permits that refugees could not afford. Work permits were not 
generally offered by employers, leaving refugees with few options in the workforce to cover the 
costs of food and other basic needs. Additionally, the WFP conceded funding was an ongoing 
constraint and the response to needs was framed as, “ad hoc, depending on the availability of 
external funding” (WFP, 2012, p.7). The Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (Sida) also conceded, “some of the originally proposed components have been cut 
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entirely and others reduced, due to Sida allocating SEK 2m while the proposal was for 4m” 
(2014, p. 3). Thus, the aid arena may not have had the resources appropriate to a comprehensive 
crisis response because of narrow commitments. This narrow commitment may not be specific to 
a Jordanian context. The wider United Nations (UN) programs worldwide may be affected. For 
example, Muggah noted, “protracted refugee situations within UNHCR is taking shape against a 
backdrop of broad budgetary constraints across the UN, growing donor intolerance of long-term 
refugee situations and a debate over the merits of linking relief and developmental approaches” 
(2005, p. 152). Indeed, Muggah contended, countries were “backing away from their 
responsibilities for refugees at the same time…refugee caseloads were growing” (2005, p. 153). 
However in Jordan, the narrow commitment has been critical in part, because it has implications 
for the largest community of displaced people in the world (Government of Canada, 2015c) – a 
group for which support has declined. For instance, the Department for International 
Development (DFID) (2014) maintained there was a reduction in donor support to refugees in 
Jordan and noted the problem of information deficits about long-term needs.  
Donor funding has also been a constraint in terms of the time in which it was accessible. 
For instance, in selected documents, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2015) concluded 
Sida and DFID provided an expedient reply to rapid response applications. However, their 
response time may have been the exception. In fact, the NRC argued, “very few donors have 
established systematic systems for emergency funds that can be released so promptly after the 
onset of a new disaster” (2015, p. 15). Thus, long waiting periods for program funding inhibits 
the organizations’ capability to reach people in need. This dawdling response time is alarming 
because people who seek help from INGOs may not be supported by community-based 
organizations (CBOs) and government institutions in a way that is comparable. For example, in 
 104 
the wider discourse, organizations claimed, “CBOs, some of which are newly established, have 
been active in providing services to Syrians…however they have limited human resources and 
expertise” (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 7). Limitations in the host country were also 
recognized in selected documents. Indeed, the WFP posited, “the government is not directly 
providing food assistance to the Syrians” beyond a “general subsidy on wheat and bread” (2012, 
p. 6).  
The commitment to education is particularly narrow for refugee adults. For instance, in 
selected documents, the NRC (2013) consistently highlighted education as a right and framed 
refugees as rights holders. Indeed, the NRC maintained, “education is a right” and the “rapid 
provision of access to education is a priority emergency response” (2013, p. 18). Sustainable 
livelihoods were recognized as integral to recovery. Significantly, the NRC (2014c) also 
identified education as a need for both youth and adult refugees. In fact, the NRC maintained, 
“protection in countries of asylum necessitates equitable assistance to meet the specific needs of 
women, girls, boys and men, including in health, education, shelter and other sectors” (2014c, p. 
81). The NRC however, did not target adults in its livelihoods activities in Jordan. Rather, the 
NRC noted, “NRC Jordan supports refugees through an integrated programing approach with 
education and livelihoods opportunities to children and youth” (2015, p. 6).  The NRC also 
maintained the, “main objective is to ensure that children and youth’s right to quality education 
is upheld” (2014a, p. 24). Moreover, the WFP claimed its activities were planned in order to 
“protect livelihoods” (2012, p. 2). However, the WFP did not describe any opportunities for 
refugee adults in Jordan to generate income or work in its 2012 program (WFP, 2012).  
Education in emergencies is especially precarious, because it is associated with a 
development rather than humanitarian context. For example, Sida maintained, “while education 
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can certainly be viewed from a resilience perspective, it could be argued on a case-by-case basis 
that some interventions are development oriented rather than humanitarian assistance” (2014, p. 
4). Thus, funding may be reallocated to other priorities that network members determine are 
most relevant to humanitarian settings. Indeed, this prioritization process could have caused 
revisions in program planning. For example, NRC admitted that it modified its education 
strategy in Jordan. Education was decreased in the modification. The activities the NRC 
subsequently planned, were by enlarge centered upon the information counseling and legal 
assistance (ICLA) program. In fact, the NRC noted, “all education activities were removed from 
the proposal…it is now 100% ICLA” (2014b, p. 1). Sida also confirmed, “all except Jordan have 
education projects in both plans” (2015, p. 3).  
In some instances, programs were also temporary and adult education and income-
generation were framed as time-limited. For example, in its 2013-2015 program for locals, the 
WFP described its response to the “short-term food needs of targeted vulnerable populations” 
(2013, p. 10), while conceding the “socio-economic conditions in poor and food-insecure areas 
are not expected to improve in the short or medium term” (2013, p. 2). In fact, Sida claimed, “it 
is not a primary requirement in humanitarian assistance that the interventions should be sustained 
over time” (2015, p. 19).  
This result is significant because it may evidence that recovery opportunities for adults 
were diminished in part, based upon ideological orientations and ontological presumptions. For 
instance, education for adults may be short-term and underfunded because donors do not believe 
it is necessary or appropriate to continue in a humanitarian setting, since education is framed as a 
development intervention. Significantly, accountability relationships may not be examined in 
relation to refugees’ learning needs and the lack of programming in this sector may not be 
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problematized as an accountability deficit. In this resource-poor context, there may be less 
reporting of academic achievements. Moreover, marginal adult education and livelihoods 
opportunities at the INGO level leave refugees with limited resources. As a result, they may 
traverse grey areas in the host community in order to cover the costs of living. I examine the grey 
area in the next section.  
4.7.2 Grey areas 
The utility of grey areas is based upon the movement of refugees in informal space. This 
movement is a counter-behavior, performed to increase access to paid work and human security. 
For example, in selected documents, the NRC (2014c), WFP (2012) and Islamic Relief (2013) 
claimed there were few work opportunities for refugees in the formal sector. The Islamic Relief 
asserted, “opportunities for paid work are scarce, as the Government has prevented Syrians to 
work” (2013, p. 4). Therefore, refugees often operated in grey areas, accepting low-wage 
positions in places where they were at-risk of exploitation. Indeed, the WFP asserted, “growing 
numbers of Syrian refugees in the border areas are impacting the labour market, where Syrians 
are competing for the limited labour opportunities at lower wages, thus raising already growing 
unemployment rates in border areas” (2013, p. 4).  
Through their entry in the labor market and the unrest resulting from this entry, refugees 
have become a public problem in the aid discourse. Labor competition can minimize wages for 
local people and engender misrecognition of refugees as less vulnerable and/or less desirable 
(IRC, 2015). Because their work is not legal, infrequent, unreliable and at times, not 
remunerated, they are encompassed by an economic and regulatory system which is vague. They 
do not plan or anticipate what the next year will hold. In addition, they relocate habitually and 
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may elude the public, a strategy which decreases their capacity to access aid (IRC, 2015; Ward, 
2014). This life in the shadows, in the grey area, has significant implications for aid programs 
because the information provided by beneficiaries could change rapidly (Kenny, 2015), 
necessitating continuous and costly modifications to activities. 
It is challenging to leave an informal space, because the documents that local institutions, 
employers or education programs require were left behind or compromised in displacement 
(NRC, 2014c; NRC 2014a). Limited savings, income and opportunities in formal sectors has also 
left adult refugees unable to pay rent. In some instances, they could not locate affordable housing 
in close proximity to service providers. Therefore, they live in what is left. Thus, refugees may 
subsist in substandard, over-priced accommodations, with few protections from the elements. 
These dilapidated options can render proper hygiene and health care unfeasible. This 
circumstance increases the risk of disease and risks to the host society (Islamic Relief, 2015; 
Islamic Relief, 2013).  
In addition to urban areas, camps may also be unsanitary. Refugees may not be dedicated 
to upkeep in places that they view as temporary. Conditions can be far below acceptable 
standards. For example, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014c) implemented hygiene education sessions and its 
staff, “asked the community to participate in the campaign ... because some refugees do not view 
the camp as their permanent home, less attention is paid to the environment.”  
Life in the grey area also complicates needs assessments. For instance, refugees who 
elude the public, move often or are unregistered, may not be recognized as beneficiaries of 
organizations or included in data they need in order to activate funding and deliver aid (Ward, 
2014). Indeed, grey areas increase both liminality in the aid environment and the progress that 
could be made in education and livelihoods. Therefore aid may not be released in part, because 
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the life in the grey area inhibits access to the data needed to reach program thresholds. Thus, I 
examine the threshold in the following section. 
4.7.3 Minimum thresholds 
Assistance for refugees may be initiated based upon a threshold, program indicator or 
understanding between donors and organizations. The processes necessary to activate them could 
take months or longer to complete. Access to education and other aid services are minimized in 
the interim. Aid may also be inaccessible, because of the selective allocation of resources to the 
areas in which the threshold, indicator and agreements are situated. For instance, the NRC 
claimed donors, “often prioritises similar areas throughout a year, directing attention to 
populations with the largest numbers of people in need” (2014d, p. 1). This schema is significant 
because it “oftentimes lead to certain areas being neglected, resulting in large gaps between 
needs and actual response” (NRC, 2014d, p. 1).    
In selected documents, the WFP disclosed there were 88,000 refugees in the region who 
were either waiting to be registered and/or had been recognized as vulnerable by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partner organizations (2012, p. 2). 
Interestingly, the WFP (2012, p. 3) also claimed that while there may be unregistered refugees in 
Iraq, the total number of registered refugees was 3,000. Along with UNHCR, the WFP expected 
the refugee population to increase to more than 5,000, which would then “trigger WFP’s support 
with food assistance,” (WFP, 2012, p. 3) per an existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with UNHCR. As a result, the threshold to service delivery was a minimum number. Many 
services were also clustered in urban or the northern areas in Jordan. UNHCR therefore, had to 
facilitate transport to accommodate refugees from remote areas who also needed to register. 
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UNHCR conceded that some services for women and children “in the south of Jordan and in the 
Jordan Valley remained scarce” (2013b, p. 3). 
The number of aid beneficiaries in INGO programs are also important for thresholds. For 
example, refugee adults make up a tiny part of the figures reported on the beneficiary populace 
in livelihoods programs. Low numbers are also reported in education. For example, in the 
UNHCR-Jordan Assistance and Protection 2009 Mid-Year Report (UNHCR, 2009b), it was 
reported that nearly 11,000 registered Iraqi refugees received health and psychosocial support. 
However, only 456 received training and 1,355 received access to education.  Thus, only a 
portion of the refugee population was empowered to pursue the vision of mobility which 
education enables.  
Moreover, there were well over three million Syrian refugees and 100,000 new asylum 
applications from Iraqis in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015d). A large percentage of this population sought 
asylum in Jordan. Significantly, there were more than six hundred thousand registered refugees 
in Jordan in 2014, including 21,499 Iraqis who registered in that year (UNHCR, 2014b). In fact, 
in 2015, Jordan hosted the sixth largest UNHCR-registered refugee population in the world 
(UNHCR, 2015f). Adult education is especially relevant to this group, because refugee adults 
comprised the largest demographic (UNHCR, 2015a; UNHCR, 2015b; UNHCR, UNICEF & 
WFP, 2014). For instance, UNHCR disaggregated the registered Syrian refugee population by 
ages. In 2015, Syrian refugees between ages 18-59 consisted of over 40% of the registered 
population, followed by the second highest group, which were children ages 5-11 at 
approximately 20% (UNHCR, 2015a).  
In selected documents, INGOs included thousands of refugee adults in messaging 
campaigns and legal/durable solutions activities (NRC, 2014c; ICRC, 2014). However, when 
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refugee totals were listed, most livelihoods, coach training and train-the-trainer activities targeted 
less than 100 participants (Hamasaka, 2015c; Reclaim Childhood, 2015; ICRC, 2014). Business 
and life skills training were planned for just 400 refugees (Government of Canada, 2015a; 
Government of Canada, 2014a). Indeed, though the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
claimed, “as more time passes, the Syrian refugees’ need for gainful employment intensifies” 
(2015, p. 4), the support they receive was not in proportion to their needs (Jordanian Ministry of 
Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale International, 2014). Access to education and 
livelihoods is therefore a significant constraint, to which thresholds were considerably high. 
Thresholds, indicators and agreements however, could have been impacted by circumstances that 
INGOs and donors claimed inhibited their capacity to make informed decisions and deliver aid. 
Therefore, I focus upon access in the following section. 
4.7.4 Access 
INGOs and donors disclosed constraints that decreased access to beneficiary populations, 
services and knowledge. The implications of access constraints are especially concerning, 
because they impact resource allocations based upon issues in the local context and host 
population, which INGOs and donors can not control. The needs in this context surpass their 
capacity and response strategies may be outdated by the changes in context, before they can 
make an impact. First I describe the access INGOs and donors were afforded to beneficiary 
populations. Second, I present the services that were mitigated in this environment. Next, I focus 
upon the extent to which knowledge deficits may have limited improvements in service delivery 
and lessons learned. The implications for downward accountability are then presented.  
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4.7.5 Access to beneficiary populations 
The capacity of INGOs to deliver aid was constrained in part, by the access they were afforded to 
the refugee community by the Government of Jordan and the imperative to decrease social 
tensions between refugees and local citizens. For example, the WFP (2012) coordinated its 
efforts with other organizations, via regional strategic frameworks, in-country coordination 
meetings, task forces and inter-agency cooperation with UNHCR, through field, country and 
regional teams. The WFP also planned to participate in “Education and Protection Sector 
working groups” (2012, p. 9). With its partners, the WFP encouraged humanitarian principles 
and supported host country efforts with neutrality. The WFP endeavored to leverage this support 
in order to “build trust and ensure continued access” (2012, p. 19) to refugee communities. 
However, weaknesses in the social protection mechanisms of both host and sending countries 
mitigated the degree to which the WFP could respond. In Jordan, for instance, there were weak 
structures with regard to food security and social supports, livelihoods and self-reliance 
mechanisms in particular. In addition, the host country was also significantly affected by 
decreased trade relations with Syria (NRC, 2015; WFP, 2013) and subsequent price increases for 
commodities. The Government of Jordan could not adjust to the increased demand for services 
from refugees and requested support from the WFP for its citizens who were living along with 
refugees in low-income urban areas (WFP, 2013).  
The WFP (2013; 2012) recognized the risk of insufficient humanitarian support as a 
condition that would drive more Syrian refugees into the informal labor market. It was concerned 
that competition with local citizens for jobs and resentment over humanitarian support, could be 
destabilizing factors. The WFP cautioned, “host communities could perceive that the refugees 
are being favoured with humanitarian assistance” (2012, p. 18). This perception is significant in 
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part, because “these tensions could create animosity, and erupt in violence” and “there is also a 
risk of politicization of the refugee population” (WFP, 2012, p. 18). Thus, the response to the 
refugee situation had to incorporate support to local Jordanians. Indeed, local beneficiaries were 
indicated, in order to “contribute to social cohesion between the two groups” (WFP, 2013, p. 2). 
In fact, in the WFP 2013-2015 Program (WFP, 2013), Jordanians were the primary targets for 
livelihoods activities and food aid. 
Concern about vulnerable Jordanians and local capacities were also cited by the 
Government of Canada. In particular, Canada planned to address natural resource limitations and 
environmental concerns. The Government of Canada (2013e) outlined its strategic plans to 
increase the capacities of local municipalities to provide basic services through the construction 
of or repair to lights, roads or waste management systems. The plan was lauded for its potential 
to improve conditions for 800,000 Jordanians and 300,000 refugees, via increased service 
delivery. This amounted to 2.67 Jordanians for each refugee. Income-generating opportunities 
were anticipated via local projects, however Canada did not disclose if and to what degree these 
projects would include refugees. Indeed, 30% or more of the beneficiaries in international aid 
programs that addressed the refugee influx could have been Jordanian (Islamic Relief, 2013).  
In addition to these selected documents, the evidence of Canada’s efforts to offset the 
impact of the refugee crisis for local workers and entrepreneurs was prevalent in the Open Aid 
Search. For instance, the Government of Canada (2013g) supported a program to mitigate the 
impact of the “Syrian displacement in Jordan” in part through economic and educational 
interventions such as support for small businesses, “vocational education and training” and 
“skills development.” The program was lauded for improving access to income-generating 
opportunities for Jordanians, particularly women, as vulnerable persons living in “displacement-
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affected” populations. In one of its 2015 programs, (Government of Canada, 2015f) 10,000 
vulnerable Jordanians in communities with large refugee populations were also the primary 
target for beneficiaries in a vocational training program. Therefore, aid resources were 
distributed to refugees, yet also targeted a local population that was at times the main 
beneficiary. 
In addition, the demand for large numbers of local citizens in the beneficiary target has 
been recognized by other donor agencies and organizations (Mowjee, Fleming & Toft, 2015; 
World Vision, 2015). For example, in the Regional Analysis of the Syria (RAS) conflict Part B 
Host Countries, organizations lamented the Government of Jordan (GOJ), “informally requires 
NGOs providing assistance to Syrian refugees to also assist vulnerable Jordanians” (Strategic 
Needs Analysis Project, 2015, p. 15). The percentages of local beneficiaries in this report 
coincide with the figures in selected documents provided by the Islamic Relief (2013). For 
instance, “although there appears to be no written record, it is reported that GOJ has in the past 
asked for at least 30% of beneficiaries to be Jordanian” (Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 2015, 
p. 15). Therefore, access to the refugee beneficiary population was mitigated in part, by a 
Jordanian poverty that was arguably just as severe. As a consequence, there could have been a 
reduced amount of slots available for refugees in adult education and livelihoods programs and 
subsequently, less information about their academic achievements in INGO reports.  Moreover, 
the more INGOs allocated resources to local populations, the less they were able to respond to 
the growing refugee influx. In addition, the more INGOs allocated resources toward host 
governments’ prerequisites, the less they were able to assess and enhance the protection space in 
which refugees were situated.  
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Indeed, in the discourse, INGOs claimed people in need can be hard to reach (Belgian 
Development Cooperation, 2015). In Syria and other conflict-areas, refugees and displaced 
persons are in the midst of brutal regimes with few if any savings or resources (Episcopal Relief 
and Development, 2015). These refugees are also settled in host communities (CARE, 2014) 
where in some cases they are exploited or abused. As a result, there may be more requests for 
aid, yet decreased access to services. I describe this constraint in the following section.  
4.7.6 Access to services 
Refugees may experience challenges obtaining services in part, because organizations are not 
capable of responding to unforeseen or increased demand. Indeed, the NRC acknowledged, 
“increased outreach capacity is needed to ensure that all persons of concern have access to 
information and counselling regarding their status and available services” (2014c, p. 81). Sida 
also noted the NRC was not able to keep up with “operational expansion” and as a result, the 
organization may have moved faster than the development of its systems and standards (2015, p. 
14). Sida conceded donors’ orientation toward rapid response and tendency to raise funding 
ceilings also contributed to this expansion. Therefore, in selected documents, organizations 
admitted they were not always able to reach the capacity appropriate for implementing a rapid 
response. For instance, the NRC noted its capacity to address Syrian refugees was constrained by 
the “limited number of staff deployable on short notice, and the constant demand for their 
expertise” (NRC, 2014c, p. 101). Consequently, the development and/or modification of its 
systems were “less observed than initially planned” (NRC, 2014c, p. 101).  
Access to services was also decreased as a result of awaiting Jordan’s approval of project 
activities and enrolling Jordanian beneficiaries. Additional personnel were required to address 
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these challenges and coordinate efforts with school administrators (Islamic Relief, 2014b). The 
Islamic Relief also lamented the disproportionate amount of aid to refugees in camp 
environments although most refugees settled in urban areas (Islamic Relief, 2013).   
In the aid discourse, there are also reports that depict access as a main constraint. For 
instance, the Norwegian Church Aid argued, “whereas international actors lack humanitarian 
access to Syria, the churches have responded to the crisis from day one” (2015, p. 7). In fact, the 
Danish Refugee Council posited, “DRC continues to be one of the only INGO actors with a 
consistent presence in the southern region of Jordan” (2014, p. 12). In addition, the International 
Rescue Committee (2013) underscored the neglect of Syrian refugees in Iraq, particularly in 
urban locations.  
Regulatory and administrative tasks were also recognized as program issues. Indeed, in 
the literature, Coston lamented INGO activities may be minimized by the “restrictive process of 
registration and then to operations within a narrowly defined scope of functions subject to 
permission from the appropriate government ministry” (1998, p. 364.) In fact, organizations 
claimed, “in Jordan government approval of projects is a lengthy process and then will only 
agree to projects working with Syrian refugees if a minimum of 30% of the beneficiaries will be 
Jordanian” (Kenny, 2015, p. 10). Organizations were also concerned about achieving targets 
once programs were approved. For instance, “the churn of people in and out of the camps” was 
prohibitive because the needs, numbers and costs attributed to the intervention change 
relentlessly (Kenny, 2015, p. 6). Additional tasks were needed to enroll Jordanian participants 
and promote refugee livelihoods.  
In this resource-poor environment, data may not be accessible, as staff with multiple 
tasks and competing interests respond to needs with what they have left. Therefore, they 
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conducted activities in settings constrained by limited access to knowledge and/or no way to 
integrate the lessons learned. I describe this constraint in the following section. 
4.7.7 Access to knowledge 
Access to knowledge about refugee needs and locations is necessary to plan and conduct 
activities. Migration and displacement however, is an iterative, ongoing process for refugees that 
can minimize access. For example, knowledge about where refugees are settled when INGOs 
initially survey the community, could be unreliable at the time INGOs open registration for new 
programs. In fact, in selected documents, Islamic Relief noted a program was modified, 
“following a relocation campaign conducted by the Government of Jordan to move Syrian 
refugees to other areas” (2015, p. 7). Thus, constraints to access have necessitated more human 
and material resources, which adds costs to aid programs.  
Limited access to knowledge is also significant to underscore for at least two reasons. 
First, it has limited the quality of internal staff development and communication. Second, limited 
access to knowledge has reduced the evidence available for INGOs to develop interventions. As 
a result, there was less data and limited opportunities for donors and third party monitors to 
assess program strategies and guidelines. Indeed, Sida (2015; 2014) and the NRC (2015; 2014c) 
also expressed a need to ensure clear directions for staff in writing, in terms of exit strategies, do 
no harm principles and political constraints. Sida also cautioned the NRC to clarify its primary 
target beneficiary populations and provide staff with information on the meaning of durable 
solutions in each context. There were also directions, frameworks and institutional standards for 
conflict sensitivity, which Sida noted were not found among NRC manuals and handbooks. In 
one example, Sida cautioned, the “NRC does not yet have an explicit policy regarding how the 
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organisation approaches resilience in its operations” (2014, p. 16). Additionally, the NRC was 
also cited for not disclosing why and how it works with local partners.  
Planning both in the field and at the regional level was also affected by information 
which was either unavailable, unspecified or not shared. For instance, tracking systems were 
upgraded, however disaggregating data was not always possible and double counting could have 
been an issue for refugees who registered for more than one intervention (Sida, 2014). Thus, the 
impact of aid may have been more difficult to assess for specific populations. In addition, the 
response to abused and/or neglected refugees was inhibited by the limited information on 
gender-based violence within the Syrian refugee population (NRC, 2014b).  
Indeed, the aid to refugees in impoverished conditions may have been complicated by 
“gaps around sharing lessons learnt, good practice and coordination of cash based interventions 
at the regional level” (NRC, 2014a, p. 35). In fact, the NRC was dismayed by a competitive and 
politicized humanitarian community, which it argued operated without a strong evidence base. 
The NRC aimed to improve information sharing, complementarity and collaboration in the 
humanitarian community. Therefore, the NRC implemented the Assessment Capacities Project 
(ACAPS) to strengthen coordinated humanitarian needs assessments in all phases of a crisis 
(NORCAP, 2015). According to Sida, “the aim of the ACAPS project is to promote a culture of 
coordinated and integrated information management and analysis” (2015, p. 4).  
ACAPS was lauded for its potential to connect a diverse group of INGOs with myriad 
interests and assessment methods and link them together through a platform for information 
sharing. ACAPS participated in the Strategic Needs Analysis Project (SNAP) to improve 
situational awareness among organizations in the aid arena. Yet, ACAPS was the subject of 
knowledge gaps and dilemmas. For example, Sida noted there was some discussion about if 
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ACAPS should be positioned “with an NGO as is currently the case or whether it should perhaps 
be incorporated with OCHA” as well as how it was linked to SNAP, because there were “no 
SNAP-specific outcomes or outputs in the ACAPS results matrix for 2015” (Sida, 2015, p. 4). 
Gaps in knowledge were also noted in the wider discourse. In fact, the World Health 
Organization (WHO), International Medical Corps (IMC) and United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) noted difficulties in information sharing with organizations in Jordan. For instance, 
data collection activities in mental health coordination were complicated because “some of the 
related information was lost” (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 6). In addition, “data received 
was incomplete and inconsistent in form thereby making analysis of relevant data difficult” 
(WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 6).  
   Moreover, in selected documents, Sida described challenges applying the information 
obtained to aid environments governed by corrupt officials. For example, Sida cautioned, many 
external agencies such as local authorities “that would normally help to prevent and deal with 
corruption are often a huge part of the problem” (2015, p. 18). Sida also admitted, interventions 
are implemented in some of the most “corrupt countries in the world” (2015, p. 18). Moreover, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) also posited countries in transition may be 
powerless, slow and without the influence needed to reach vulnerable people or authority to 
engage in high-level decision-making. Effective civil societies may not be developed and local 
agencies may not have the capacity or technical skills to operate at high levels, particularly in 
rural areas. Strict regulatory environments and variations in rules and requirements may inhibit 
access to beneficiary populations or add logistical requirements which are also prohibitive.  
These constraints counter the misconception that donors and their grantees are the stand-
alone power-wielders in the aid community. Their perceptions are particularly relevant in 
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network literature, which is concerned with the roles and structures involved in the flow of 
information. Roles and constraints are significant in networks, shaping [in]actions and 
subsequently, mitigating the knowledge that is accessible (Uzzi, 1996).  
4.8 UNRECOGNIZED EDUCATION CONSTRAINTS 
The conditionalities outlined in section 4.7 have thus far, been based upon the constraints 
organizations and donors disclosed and the policy environment in which adult education was 
minimized. There were also a number of processes INGOs and donors noted in selected 
documents, albeit not as constraints. For instance, the following measures could have served as 
constraints in adult education and accountability: a potential bias toward children and youth, 
minimal participation in curricula, limited decision-rights and ontological recognition structures.  
Figure 4.10: Recognized and unrecognized constraints 
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Both the recognized and unrecognized constraints are listed in figure 4:10. The unrecognized 
constraints in particular, are important to note because they could have narrowed roles for adult 
refugees in the aid network and framed them as either unskilled or ineligible. Ineligible refugees 
in particular, may be denied an accountability relationship, because they are not recognized in 
donor-organization networks as beneficiaries. I describe the unrecognized constraints and the 
implications these constraints may have had upon downward accountability in the following 
sections.  
4.8.1 Potential bias toward children and youth 
Donors and organizations disclosed various constraints that limited access to beneficiary 
populations, humanitarian services and knowledge. These constraints, however, were not 
connected to a potential bias toward children and youth. Indeed, information in the Open Aid 
Search review was often child-focused and centered in a K-12 arena (for example, Islamic 
Relief, 2014a). In fact, the NRC noted, “young people are naturally the overwhelming majority 
of the education programmes” (2013, p. 36). Thus, the major objectives of and policies for INGO 
activities, openly regarded education and vocational training for youth as “natural,” without 
regard to family sustainability. As a consequence, the aid environment was either an unsuitable 
or ineligible arena for many adult learners. Moreover, donors and organizations disclosed scant 
information in relation to, grades/marks, attendance, test scores and certification for adult 
learners. Therefore, these rudimentary teaching and learning activities customary in education 
for the young were either not disclosed or available for adults. This constraint is especially 
important to underscore, because it positions adult education programs as “unnatural” and 
therefore, counterintuitive. This is disturbing. When programs are presumed to be 
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counterintuitive, refugee adults can not generate and share knowledge or exercise control and 
discretion in an educational setting. I examine this issue in the following section, with a focus 
upon participation in curriculum development.    
4.8.2 Minimal participation in curriculum development 
Participation in the development of curriculum is an important activity for refugees in part, 
because it evidences discretion over aid resources and influence in the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge. It is an accountability activity with few material and financial costs. 
However, INGOs and donors did not disclose this activity in their reports. For instance, JEN 
trained refugees to promote its hygiene messages in the camp and along with public school 
teachers, implement hygiene activities. While there were opportunities to influence the 
classroom activities in K-12 settings, JEN did not disclose refugees’ input into the actual 
curriculum. Rather, JEN (Hamasaka, 2013c) noted, “JEN trained teachers to give hygiene 
lessons to students using materials created by JEN.” Thus, refugees were placed in the role of 
caregiver, where they helped JEN reach its targets. However, they were not brokers.  
Additionally, the Government of Canada, (2014b), NRC (2014c) and Islamic Relief 
(2014d) described “training” activities for teachers. In most cases, however, they did not specify 
or disaggregate the number of refugee teachers in the beneficiary population or their inputs in the 
curriculum development process. Thus, in selected documents, refugees did not exercise much 
control or influence over strategy and resource generation. Indeed, knowledge was disseminated 
vertically from the organization to the refugee, who as a caregiver, transmitted information to the 
wider beneficiary group. However, participation for refugees and internally displaced persons 
can involve the process of curriculum development and issues such as certification and 
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accreditation. For instance, “refugee and IDP teachers and education experts should also be 
included in policy development related to accreditation and certification and have opportunities 
to use existing experience and capacity and develop their own policy materials” (Kirk, 2009, p. 
25). In fact, the capacity of Syrian educators to increase the quality and impact of services has 
been noted (CARE, 2014). However, this role has not been solidified in the refugee vernacular. 
For example, there were no references to ‘adult learners’ and terms such as ‘trainee,’ ‘student’ 
and ‘instructor’ were rarely noted for refugee adults. Thus, refugees were selected for training. 
Refugees however, were not situated in the wider community of academics, practitioners and 
professionals. In the structure of teacher training, refugee adults were not situated as foremost, 
adult learners. In addition, there was scant evidence of the decision-rights either appropriate or 
customary to adult learners in educational settings. 
4.8.3 Limited decision-rights 
Feedback was a regular component of interface, which led to regular enhancements in education 
for children. For instance, crafts, tailoring, electrical repair, welding and recycling courses were 
offered for youth, with subject changes every three months based upon “feedback, assessments 
and lessons learned” (NRC, 2014c, p. 89). Yet, there was scant information in selected 
documents, which evidenced decision-rights for refugee adults in relation to their courses and 
livelihood aspirations. Decision-rights were highlighted multiple times however, in regard to 
food/cash aid. According to the NRC, vouchers helped beneficiaries get the things they needed, 
“on their own terms” (2014a, p. 34). In the WFP program, “vouchers allow freedom of choice for 
the refugees” (2012, p. 16). The WFP also contended, “vouchers, rather than cash, can give 
women and girls a greater role in decisions, since they manage the household food purchases” 
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(2012, p. 16). In addition, Islamic Relief (2015) noted feedback from beneficiaries and focus 
group participants was utilized to modify program activities. In this instance, transportation fees 
were provided in order to help children get to school and a new “E-card payment system” was 
initiated to mitigate previous challenges in K-12 enrollment through rent assistance (Islamic 
Relief, 2015, p. 8).  
Adult refugees were able to exercise a measure of decision-making power however, it 
was not related to their own learning and training needs. Rather, this power was afforded as 
consumption, to support the purchase of basic household items, pay rent and facilitate an 
increase in the enrollment and retention of child learners.  
Indeed, INGOs exerted their power through securitization and correction education. For 
example, precautions were taken “to prevent copying” and “avoid [the] exchange or sale of 
vouchers” (WFP, 2012, p. 16). In addition, “sensitization and information sessions” were 
planned along with written communication products, in order to ensure refugees were aware of 
the foods they could purchase and the WFPs’ viewpoint on their entitlements (WFP, 2012, p. 
16). The WFP did not divulge the reasons why food aid was or could be sold, such as to purchase 
heaters, blankets, medicine or other items, for which the refugee may have no other means to 
acquire (Olivius, 2013; World, Vision, 2013).   
The opportunities given to refugees to make decisions, promoted their role as caregivers, 
yet limited their influence to program implementation – the part of the program that happens 
after major allocation decisions have been made. They were not for instance, taking part in food 
production, food cooperatives and bulk food acquisition. Rather, many of these opportunities 
were given to vulnerable Jordanians, including those in districts where large refugee 
communities were settled (WFP, 2013). Thus, while INGOs highlighted the ways they helped 
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refugees make their own decisions, little power was actually shared within this mechanism. 
Moreover, refugees were recognized as people for whom correction was needed. The structures 
in which recognition was enabled, are therefore critical areas for scholarship, because they 
justify compliance-oriented activities more than they enable accountability commitments. 
4.8.4 Ontological recognition structures 
Children are recognized as students in education in emergencies. The milieu in which they learn 
is a dominant focus of INGO discourse and financial resources. For example, high teacher-
student ratios were problematized by the NRC (2014c). Indeed, the NRC maintained, that 
schools would be reconstructed and/or modified, “in areas with high levels of refugee settlement 
and with a high teacher to student ratios, so that education services may keep pace with the 
increasing number of children” (2014c, p. 84). Yet, INGOs and donors did not disclose 
endeavors to assess or remediate the classes and facilities in which adult learning was situated.  
The milieu in K-12 education was so vital to the NRC that it noted these activities “will 
always be done in conjunction with the education programme” (2014c, p. 84). The child/learner 
role has been essential to this perspective. By contrast, the adult/learner role was deemphasized 
in open data, because aid reporting underscored the ontological frames of legal/illegal, 
registered/unregistered and eligible/ineligible.  
The WFP claimed “Syrian refugees entering illegally are admitted into transit facilities” 
and “have restricted freedom of movement” (2012, p. 3). The WFP also targeted “refugees 
registered by UNHCR and/or identified by their partners” and “refugees awaiting registration 
and identified as vulnerable by agreed partners” (WFP, 2012, p. 11). A number of these refugees 
could be accepted into a subgroup for those persons who were especially vulnerable. For 
 125 
instance, the WFP noted, “UNHCR has an on-going financial assistance programme operating 
through automatic teller machines for Iraqi refugees: this will also target 2,000 of the most 
vulnerable Syrians for their non-food needs” (2012, p. 8). As a result, refugees and most 
vulnerable refugees who were registered by agreed partners were eligible for WFP aid.  
While it may be vital to establish rules and regulations, if recognition by registration is 
the singular method of access for services, refugees will be underserved. For example, the NRC 
conceded, “those that have not yet registered with UNHCR, are awaiting registration or have 
expired registration are at greatest risk of exploitation and major protection issues are 
increasingly coming to light” (2014a, p. 23, 24). Thus, it is important to underscore registration 
as an ontological recognition structure, because it is the “starting point” to access humanitarian 
aid (NRC, 2014c, p. 81). In fact, the WFP conceded “the number of displaced Iraqis who have 
returned to Iraq from Syria is undetermined, and no organization has identified them as in need 
of assistance thus far” (2012, p. 5).  
Although organizations have recognized the vulnerability associated with the 
unregistered positionality, they have not explicitly problematized the requirement and 
prerequisite that refugees register to receive support. There are also contrasting processes of 
eligibility for registered refugees, thus while needs may remain severe, they may be eligible and 
ineligible according to the divergent criteria of myriad agencies. For example, the WFP claimed 
14,000 refugees were noted as eligible for support by UNHCR and 35,000 refugees were eligible 
for support with the Jordan Red Crescent (JRC) and Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization 
(JHCO) (2012, p. 4).  
JHCO performed assessments through “household visits” (WFP, 2012, p. 11). Its 
assessments were utilized to determine if refugees qualified for services based in part, upon 
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family size and income. The WFP, however planned to rely upon a combination of “UNHCR 
guidance,” “market price surveillance,” “household surveys” and “food security monitoring” 
(2012, p. 10). Subsequently, aid was not delivered according to personal need, inasmuch as it 
was released through algorithms that engendered upward accountability. 
Registration and its corresponding eligibility processes may limit downward 
accountability. For example, since organizations are often linked to accountability via their 
beneficiaries, refugees who are ineligible, illegal and/or unregistered, may not have access to a 
formal accountability relationship. They may be separate from the education customary to other 
adult learners because they do not have equal access to livelihoods programs and other services. 
This separation from education is alarming, because of INGO estimates in the wider discourse of 
large unregistered refugee populations. For instance, the Regional Analysis of the Syria (RAS) 
conflict - Part B Host Countries, “studies by multiple humanitarian and UN agencies suggest that 
between 15-30% of the refugees in Jordan may not be fully registered” (Strategic Needs Analysis 
Project, 2015, p. 17).  
In sum, refugee adults may have had less access to education than children and youth 
beneficiaries, because the ontological recognition structures were a constraint to the 
accountability relationship. In addition, the facilities in which adult learners were situated may 
be neglected because the adult/learner role was so widely understated. Significantly, the open 
data focused disproportionately upon registration and eligibility, K-12 retention and cash/food 
aid. Adult refugees therefore, were not positioned as people who could generate or share 
knowledge. Indeed, in most instances, refugees were not framed as people who exercised 
discretion, power and control over their aid in settings where adult education and livelihoods 
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were promoted. The data disclosed in the Open Aid Search therefore, does not support or 
evidence accountability in adult education to the extent it could.  
It is vital for INGOs and donors to assess the constraints to adult education and 
livelihoods. Indeed, Anderson (2004) asserted, “two issues in particular have come to the fore: 
how to ensure a certain level of quality and accountability in emergency education; and how to 
mainstream education as a priority humanitarian response.” 
4.9 NETWORK PERSPECTIVES, ROLES AND CONSTRAINTS 
Network perspectives are particularly important because through information flows, they foster 
an assessment of roles in the aid arena and the extent to which these roles could have minimized 
accountability activities. For instance, the concept of brokerage is a main component in network 
scholarship (Friedman & Podolny, 1992), referring to the individual(s) or organization(s) which 
provides linkages between groups through exchanges and in particular, information sharing. 
Brokers are particularly critical to organizations because they can recognize information gaps 
(Burt, 1997) that modify the structure of group relations. The structure is crucial because it may 
be a “manifestation of and constraint” upon all groups (Friedman & Podolny, 1992, p. 34). When 
the NRC and a consortium of NGOs developed ACAPS (NRC, 2014a; SIDA, 2014), they 
offered needs assessments and curricula to network members which decreased gaps in 
knowledge. Thus, other INGOs and donors benefited from these brokers (Vignola, McDaniels, & 
Scholz, 2013; Burt, 1997) because of the information flows that they directed in the aid arena. 
Yet the network was faced with a livelihoods crisis, cuts in financial support and narrow 
commitments in education for adult refugees in Jordan and no such broker emerged in the 
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selected documents for content analysis. Data remained dispersed, child-focused and 
compliance-centered. As a result, INGO and donor accountability commitments were not 
situated in the context of adult learning. Thus, the constraints described in section 4.7. were 
especially relevant because they either reduced their accountability activities or minimized their 
roles and responsibilities. Indeed, researchers can attend to the “advantages or constraints one 
has because of one’s position within the network” (Casciaro et al., 2015, p. 1165). Additionally, 
there is “extensive and compelling evidence that position within a network affects a person’s 
opportunities and constraints has given rise to investigation of how a person ends up in a given 
position” (Casciaro et al., 2015, p. 1166).  
Examinations of accountability through network perspectives therefore, may be critical to 
developing best practices, because the roles, relationships and interdependencies that constrain 
activity can be disentangled (Galaskiewicz, 2007) – an otherwise challenging task in an analysis 
of dispersed and compliance-oriented information. In the following chapter, I extend the 
examination of beneficiary roles in the aid network, through INGO and donor education 
objectives.  
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5.0  DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
In chapter four, five beneficiary roles were described. These roles included the professional, 
emissary, caregiver, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. In this chapter, I present the main 
objectives for education along with the activities INGOs and donors planned and/or implemented 
to fulfill these objectives. I categorize donors and organizations’ objectives as: education for 
durable solutions, education for caregiving and child protection and education for social 
cohesion and conduct. These objectives were categorized based upon the direct and specific 
details donors and INGOs disclosed in the Open Aid Search, through the codes of access, 
compliance and outcomes.  
Through the categorization of these objectives and a description of the subsequent 
activities, I analyzed refugees’ roles in emergency education - relative to their learning and 
livelihoods priorities. In addition, I examine the platforms in which they could exercise a 
measure of control, influence or discretion. These two focal points are important benchmarks in 
accountability (The Sphere Project, 2014; HAP International, 2013). Thus, in this chapter, I 
present the results of the research, in relation to my second research question: If and to what 
extent the information donor agencies and INGOs disclosed through their new networks can be 
utilized to examine downward accountability through access, compliance and outcomes in 
humanitarian education programs for adult refugees?   
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The results suggest INGOs and donors evidenced their accountability commitments by 
enrolling registered and nonregistered refugees and beneficiaries in camps, urban and rural 
locations (Government of Canada, 2013e; Government of Canada, 2013h; Islamic Relief, 2013; 
WFP, 2013). They also leveraged myriad communication channels (Islamic Relief 2014b). Yet, 
feedback mechanisms and learning activities often evidenced the priorities of the host 
community and donors, more than the aspirations of adult refugee learners and skilled 
professionals. In fact, a main finding in the data, was the tendency for beneficiaries to be 
educated for others and not for themselves, with minimal platforms to exercise control or 
discretion in relation to their own learning needs.  
I include INGO and donor education objectives in figure 5.1 below. In the following 
sections, I present the main programs that were planned or implemented in order to accomplish 
these objectives. Additionally, I will extend the examination of five beneficiary roles, in order to 
assess the level of accountability information in selected documents in relation to the forms of 
interface in which refugees were recognized. 
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Figure 5.1: Organizations and donors’ education objectives 
5.1 EDUCATION FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
Durable solutions can incorporate resettlement, repatriation or integration. Resettlement is an 
opportunity for refugees to move from the country where s/he is seeking protection, onward to a 
different nation. Repatriation is qualified as the return of the refugee from the nation where s/he 
seeks asylum, to his/her country. In addition, integration is characterized by the long-term 
settlement in the nation where the refugee seeks asylum. (Amnesty International, 2012).   
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In selected documents, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2014c) situated 
integration, repatriation and resettlement within the context of refugees’ rights and access to 
legal information. In this context, the NRC described education as “a step to durable solutions” 
and a “long-term investment” (2014c, p. 82). Durable solutions were characterized as a 
challenging process in part, because many refugees were missing documentation and involved in 
tenant disputes. Refugees also lacked information. The NRC attempted to increase awareness of 
durable solutions among the refugee population and “deal with some of the more complex 
procedures required for refugee registration, identification and integration” (NRC, 2014b, p. 4).  
Resettlement in particular, has been a complicated arena and a concern in aid discourse. 
For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained it 
provided for 14.4 million refugees of concern around the world in 2014. However, “less than one 
percent is submitted for resettlement” (UNHCR, 2015c). Indeed, UNHCR submitted a total of 
103,890 resettlement applications in 2014. This total comprised 21,154 Syrian refugees and 
11,778 Iraqi refugees. These applications related to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and 
other nations. Thus, totals decreased when disaggregated according to country. In Jordan, 
UNHCR submitted 7,284 refugees for resettlement in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015d).  
In terms of actual departures, UNHCR reported assisting in the resettlement of 73,008 
refugees in 2014 (UNHCR, 2014a). In addition, 10, 985 Iraqi refugees were included in this total 
(UNHCR, 2015d). Moreover, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) 
estimated “around 10,000 Syrians departed” for resettlement in 2014 (Fischer & Hueck, 2015, p. 
29). Less than half of this total, were comprised of departures from Jordan, though there were 
more than 600,000 registered refugees (Medair, 2015; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014). Thus, 
resettlement departures can be conceptualized as exemplars of the narrow commitment outlined 
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in chapter 4. As so few refugees were able to depart for resettlement, host communities were 
obliged to accommodate more refugees than they may have otherwise and there have been 
arguments for an increased commitment (Baldoumas, Bassoul, Gorevan & Mosse, 2015; 
Hartberg, Bowen & Gorevan, 2015).  
In the context of adult education, marginal support for resettlement amongst donor 
agencies has limited the focus of durable solutions education to integration and repatriation. 
Tyson (2014) was critical of this orientation. Indeed, Tyson claimed refugees in Jordan and other 
host nations would “likely struggle to obtain access to employment, healthcare, housing and 
education” because of strict regulatory environments and natural resource limitations (2014, p. 
23). In Jordan, these limitations are so significant, that “integration will be unavailable as a 
durable solution to the vast majority of Syrian refugees” (Tyson, 2014, p. 24). Tyson also 
claimed the “minimal international response” and economic pressures in countries of asylum, led 
to an endorsement of repatriation (2014, p. 25). However, in selected documents, donors did not 
expect refugees to repatriate. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) maintained 
Syrian refugees would not return “unless the security situation in Syria improves dramatically” 
(2012, p. 6). Thus, through the resistance to resettlement and integration, aid actors lamented the 
incompatibility of humanitarian principles and national policies (Amnesty International, 2015), 
because there were no durable solutions in the context in which Iraqi and Syrian refugees were 
situated. Indeed, refugees could not return home, were vulnerable and uninvited in Jordan and 
had few platforms available to go anywhere else. In this milieu, durable solutions programs 
included mine awareness sessions and the information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) 
program. I describe these programs in the following sections. 
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5.1.1 Mine awareness 
Syrian refugees in particular, were targeted to prevent mine injuries pending a potential return. 
Adult learning therefore, was situated in the context of repatriation. For instance, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) held awareness activities for refugees in 
Mafraq and northern communities centered upon mine awareness as well as the explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014), 
more than 23,000 Syrian refugees participated in mine awareness sessions. In addition, refugees 
were afforded an emissary role, via a 4-day, train-the-trainer course. The course enrolled 15 
refugees, in order to facilitate greater knowledge sharing about mine awareness within the 
community. 
The Government of Canada (2013f) also planned to support an awareness program about 
mines, in conjunction with education and recreation events. Canada planned the campaign in 
order “to protect children.” The importance of mine awareness was underscored in part, (de 
Jong, Moorhouse, Plate, der Haar & Alpenidze, 2015; Australian Agency for International 
Development, 2009) because the effects of mines and ERWs are devastating, particularly for 
civilians. Yet, these activities were held based upon an expectation for repatriation that may not 
be fulfilled for many years. For instance, the Government of Canada (2015a) proclaimed, “the 
humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate as a result of the civil war and intensified 
violence in the country.” The social fabric has also been decimated, as indicated by the large-
scale displacement, civilian death toll, civilian injuries and practice of torture (Oxfam, 2015; 
HelpAge International & Handicap International, 2014), which could dissuade returns in the 
short term. While there has been various trainings for Syrians to rebuild their communities when 
they return (USAID, 2013), it may be years before knowledge about mine awareness and other 
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sectors can be utilized in Syria. Mine awareness activities for Syrian refugees in Jordan 
therefore, may not encompass the information that can help them resolve issues while they are 
settled in the host community.    
5.1.2 Information, counselling and legal assistance  
Information about the regulations in the host community and the frameworks in which protection 
from exploitation and abuse are upheld is often an unmet need. As a result, refugees may traverse 
grey areas where opportunities to access services and resolve issues are minimized.  
The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) targeted refugees in camps and urban 
communities throughout Jordan (NRC, 2014b) particularly, “the most vulnerable refugees in host 
communities” (NRC, 2015, p. 6) for its information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) 
program. The ICLA program was administered in addition to a series of assessments and 
community mobilization efforts (NRC, 2014a; NRC, 2014b).  
The ICLA program targeted from 150 to 1,200 beneficiaries (NRC, 2014c, p. 89) and was 
an important part of the NRC’s accountability evidence. For instance, the NRC claimed, “the 
initial target of the ICLA programme will be refugees residing in the Governorate of Irbid and 
will include a combination of registered and unregistered groups” (2014a, p. 24). Thus, the NRC 
afforded an accountability relationship to refugees who were not recognized as beneficiaries in 
the aid arena. These achievements notwithstanding, ICLA guidelines were also prohibitive. For 
instance, ICLA activities were focused upon dispute resolution in land, housing and property 
matters and support with identity documentation such as marriage certificates and civil 
identification.  International and local frameworks were also illuminated to ensure refugees were 
aware of their rights concerning durable solutions, identity and status. These activities could 
 136 
have encouraged refugees’ integration, as they addressed vital and basic needs for shelter and 
protection. The provision of legal counselling and protection were also noted as critical 
interventions in the wider discourse (Medair, 2015; SDC, 2015). Yet, the NRC did not disclose 
activities centered upon refugees’ right to work and obtain livelihoods in Jordan. Though 
livelihoods could resolve many refugee issues, it was not integrated into durable solutions 
education. Durable solutions education was therefore narrowed and less accountable to refugees. 
Indeed, there was scant evidence that adult refugees exercised control over durable solutions 
education for their livelihoods or leveraged ICLA resources to improve access to work in the 
formal sector. Thus, a main refugee priority was not addressed. In fact, the priorities of 
beneficiaries were not addressed in many contexts. For instance, Provan and Milward cautioned,  
“in the public sector, resources are often scarce, clients have multiple problems, service 
professionals are trained in narrow functional areas, and agencies maintain services that fit 
narrowly specified funding categories” (2001, p. 415). Unmet economic needs in host states 
however, are especially alarming. Indeed, in the wider aid community, donors and organizations 
have underscored the right to work and persistently unmet economic needs as conditions that 
foster human smuggling, early marriage, child labor and school dropouts (KAS, 2015; Mowjee, 
Fleming & Toft, 2015; Save the Children International, 2012). Thus, the vulnerability that results 
from inaccessible livelihoods, along with funding decreases for aid, has raised protection and 
legal concerns (KAS, 2015; Danish Refugee Council, 2014; CARE, 2014).  
The ICLA program was highlighted as a mechanism to provide accurate and reliable 
information, which helped refugees arrive at “well-informed decisions” about durable solutions 
choices (NRC, 2014c, p. 84). Refugees however, were not targeted for what Keystone 
Accountability termed, “the substance of the discussion” (2009, p. 2), in regard to donor and 
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organizations’ durable solutions strategy. For instance, refugees’ decision rights around the 
criteria, mechanisms and thresholds for resettlement, repatriation and integration, were not 
reported. Indeed, refugees were not situated as people with discretion, influence or control – 
critical downward accountability indicators. Rather, in the Open Aid Search, they could learn 
about the policies which others established. 
They were shut out of decision-making with network members. However, lateral 
discussions between and among refugees were promoted. As a result, refugees commiserated 
with one another about going home. For instance, the Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created a magazine for Za’atari camp 
residents. Children and adults submitted nostalgic articles for publication and shared stories. In 
regard to one of the articles, JEN (Nagatsuka, 2014) surmised, “the name of the article is ‘Al 
Tarik’ or ‘The Road’ to symbolize the refugees’ journeys and convey that they will one day 
return to Syria.” Refugees were provided with a mechanism to communicate with one another, 
yet this form of interface was not in relation to policy dialogue. Other lateral communication 
platforms were also afforded refugees, in order to increase child protection in the host 
community. I describe these platforms in the following section. 
5.2 EDUCATION FOR CAREGIVING AND CHILD PROTECTION 
Parents, teachers and coaches were enrolled in training, targeted for awareness campaigns and 
galvanized in committees in order to improve caregiving and increase child protection. These 
objectives were formed to reduce the rates of child labor and early marriage and address 
development goals for K-12 retention. For example, the NRC (2014c) and MADRE (2015) 
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claimed women and girls lived in insecure settings and girls in particular, may have to marry 
early in order to survive as refugees. In this setting, their rights many not be recognized and 
participation in the public sphere may be limited (Reclaim Childhood, 2015).  
Education is also a challenge for unmarried refugee girls. Indeed, these girls may be kept 
at home as a protective response, because parents view their communities as unsafe places. Boys, 
may drop out of school to help the family increase income or because they can not overcome the 
myriad educational delays and barriers which developed in their displacement. There are also 
administrative rules and procedures that restrict enrollment and negative attitudes toward 
refugees that discourage attendance (Islamic Relief, 2014d). Many refugee children also take on 
adult responsibilities or are simply persuaded not to attend public schools. These coping 
mechanisms complicate the efforts of INGOs and donors to uphold international guidelines 
(INEE, 2014) for education. 
Retention has also been a main challenge for schools with refugee students. Steady 
growth in the refugee population, along with infrequent attendance, has cultivated a fluid 
environment in public schools. This challenge has complicated estimations of refugee children 
and planning for remedial programs based upon the total number of dropouts. As a result, there 
are contradictory and/or outdated figures in INGO reports. For instance in selected documents, 
JEN claimed there were 29,000 refugee children in Jordanian schools (Hamasaka, 2013c). The 
NRC asserted, there were more than 730,000 Syrian refugee children out of school in the region 
and “Jordan has managed to enrol 5 per cent of Syrian children into public school” (2014b, p. 3). 
In the aid discourse, however, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) claimed there were 
215,000 Syrian students in Jordan (2015, p. 1) and the “out-of-school number declined with over 
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50% children enrolled in formal education” (2015, p. 5). Thus, more than 100,000 refugee 
children were enrolled in school. 
These achievements notwithstanding, education for refugee children continued to be a 
main challenge. Although the NRC posited, education is the “future security” of the person and 
of the larger society, the INGO also lamented, “education is often seen as a luxury in the time of 
crisis” (2014c, p. 82). Thus, while parents may aspire to educate their children, severe economic 
conditions and poor human security may limit their learning opportunities. It is important to 
underscore this challenge, because the majority of refugees are not expected to resettle or 
repatriate in the short-term. The scale of this education crisis and the prevalence of child labor 
and early marriage are indeed critical issues in the host community INGOs and donors in the aid 
network have organized to resolve (Adams & Starling, 2016; London 2016 Conference 
Members, 2015). 
The child/learner role was therefore affirmed in INGO and donor objectives. In selected 
documents, the pedagogical methods, operational capacity and community supports indicated for 
academic achievement were highly prioritized. For instance, the NRC argued schools were 
overcrowded and, “teachers are not trained in classroom management for such high numbers nor 
are they able to deal with the psycho-social needs of children escaping conflict” (2014a, p. 24). 
Schools also lacked the capacity to address the basic hygiene needs of the local population. The 
addition of Syrian students in public schools, underscored structural deficiencies and added to 
public health concerns. Indeed, JEN (Hamasaka, 2013c) noted, “as schools near the border 
exceed their capacity, JEN has found that the current water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities in 
many of these schools are inadequate.” Thus, the NGO planned hygiene education for refugees 
in schools, camps and in local communities (Hamasaka, 2013a). In fact, refugee children 
 140 
encountered unsanitary settings at home and in school (Hamasaka, 2014b), which alarmed 
donors and INGOs. For instance, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014c) established its education program to 
“decrease illnesses associated with poor hygiene.” In the wider literature, INGOs disclosed 
activities that provided critical health and preventative medical care to refugees with few 
resources in Jordan. These services included primary and secondary care, sanitation and hygiene 
interventions (Kenny, 2015; UNHCR, 2013b; Oxfam, 2013) alongside multilateral efforts to 
address the concerns of donors about communicable disease (CDC, 2015; International 
Development Committee, House of Commons, 2015; Australian Government, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade & AusAid, 2015). The data in selected documents and the wider 
literature therefore confirms this categorization of an INGO-donor education objective.  
In the next sections, I describe the training parents, teachers and coaches were afforded in 
caregiving and child protection. INGO training encompassed hygiene awareness, teacher training 
and sports, equality and media. Thus, these areas of specialization are the activities upon which 
the following sections are presented. 
5.2.1 Hygiene awareness 
INGOs and donors recognized that refugee adults were central to remediating poor hygiene 
conditions in camps, urban areas and public schools (Government of Canada, 2015e). Thus, they 
were beneficiaries in INGO hygiene awareness, education and training programs. However, the 
information generated and disseminated in these programs was controlled by INGOs and donors 
and disproportionately centered upon children and youth. Downward accountability in hygiene 
awareness therefore, was limited for adult refugees. In this section, I describe the hygiene 
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awareness activities and the direction, form and control over information which they afforded 
refugees. 
The Government of Canada disclosed strategies in support of regional training in gender 
based violence (Government of Canada, 2015e) and child protection that targeted 120 men and 
women in Jordan (Government of Canada, 2013a). Canada also integrated safety, protection and 
hygiene messages through promotions, training and interface with “child protection committees” 
(Government of Canada, 2014f; Government of Canada, 2014e; Government of Canada, 2013a). 
Aid was also planned through cash support to 450 refugee parents in order to increase K-12 
enrollment (Government of Canada, 2014e). These activities targeted more than 70,000 refugee 
parents, local citizens, students and community members, including more than 200 teachers. 
Canada however, did not always list totals for refugee adults in teacher training activities or 
disaggregate the refugees in the larger regional and local beneficiary community in which they 
were situated. Canada did not report academic achievements in regard to activities such as the 
teacher and parent training. While the refugee caregiver role was integral to child protection 
objectives, the training which undergirded this role was deemphasized.  
JEN rehabilitated public schools in Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa and established a magazine 
in Za’atari camp (Nagatuska, 2014; Hamasaka, 2013c). The magazine served as a vehicle for 
“communication between districts” in the refugee camp and a mechanism for “Syrian refugees to 
showcase their creativity and unique stories” (Nagatsuka, 2014). By mid-2014, the magazine was 
distributed to 200,000 homes and included messaging on healthy behaviors that JEN promoted 
with partners. Articles were written by children and adult refugees, including the “hygiene 
promoters” (Nagatsuka, 2014). Though Jordanian personnel were charged with performing 
coordination tasks and editing, JEN noted it hoped to offer refugees an opportunity to manage 
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the “magazine on their own,” beginning with training in journalism and other areas (Nagatsuka, 
2014).  
In addition, JEN (JEN, 2015; Hamasaka, 2014d; Hamasaka, 2013d) planned to increase 
awareness and promote healthy behaviors via “hygiene promotion” (Hamasaka, 2014b; 
Hamasaka, 2014a; Hamasaka, 2013b) “hygiene education,” as well as the distribution of supplies 
and the installation of “sustainable water sanitation facilities” (JEN, 2015). Refugee women 
volunteered with the program as “hygiene promoters” and facilitated awareness sessions 
(Hamasaka, 2015b). Moreover, community mobilizers (Hamasaka, 2014a) conducted household 
visits to support JEN’s program goals. JEN also established an emergency hotline, to encourage 
reports of unsanitary or harmful conditions from flooding. 
These programs responded to vital needs in health and hygiene. The magazine and 
hotline especially, were likely important communication channels. However, JEN did not 
disclose efforts to use the hotline for purposes other than the identification of flooded areas. In 
addition, there were no indications that the magazine was leveraged to deliver program 
information from refugees to donors and organizations, vote on various camp issues or 
recommend specific program adjustments. Avenues to exercise a measure of control or 
ownership, were relegated to story-telling, rather than to areas such as coordination and program 
evaluation. It is also important to note refugee hygiene promoters operated in the field. JEN did 
not disclose any opportunities or strategies to target refugees for higher-level positions. Thus, as 
a hygiene promoter and participant in hygiene education, refugee adults were afforded roles as 
caregivers and emissaries. These roles were central to the promotion of behavior change, 
particularly for children and youth. Caregiver and emissary roles however, were situated in a 
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vertical information and communication structure that minimized evidence of downward 
accountability.   
5.2.2 Teacher training 
In order to respond to the increase in the refugee student population, INGOs and donors planned 
to train teachers and school administrators (Hamasaka, 2014a). The training was a vital 
component of their education in emergencies portfolio. However, the certification of this 
professional development and/or continuing education platform, was not disclosed and the 
numbers of beneficiaries who completed the program were not often disaggregated. Scholars 
may deem program evaluation as therefore more complicated, because it is difficult to estimate 
the access provided to refugees or the impact of the training for their employability. The training 
was also framed as a K-12 imperative. This context overshadowed the livelihoods aspirations of 
refugee parents and educators, rather than promote K-12 goals in tandem with adult education 
and livelihoods. In this section, I describe the teacher training platform and its relation to 
refugees’ livelihoods aspirations. 
The NRC aimed to raise the number of “children into local schools” and improve the 
quality of teaching (2014c, p. 83). Its targets for adult education included 900 youth, 20 teachers 
and school managers. JEN (Hamasaka, 2014a; Hamasaka, 2013b; Hamasaka, 2013c) disclosed 
teacher training in relation to its hygiene education portfolio. For instance, JEN claimed its 
hygiene promoters were “active in conducting hygiene education sessions for parents and 
teachers of school children” (Hamasaka, 2014d). There was also frequent collaboration between 
hygiene promoters and K-12 teachers. For example, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014a) asserted, “the 
contents of the student sessions were developed by sharing various education methods between 
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JEN’s hygiene promoters and the teachers.” In addition to training, hygiene promoters 
“organized focus groups with adults” to discuss ways to limit water consumption (Hamasaka, 
2014c). 
The Government of Canada planned to increase “protection for children and caregivers” 
and facilitate “reduced vulnerability” (Government of Canada, 2014b). Activities were supported 
in particular, to “educate and normalize the lives of conflict-affected children and their families” 
(Government of Canada, 2014e; Government of Canada, 2014f). Thus, a 2014 program 
(Government of Canada, 2014b) included the training of 500 teachers in several host countries 
with large Syrian refugee communities. In addition, 10,800 inexperienced teachers in Jordan 
were targeted for pre-service training activities (Government of Canada, 2015d). More than 
1,000 school managers were also targeted, to prepare for roles as teacher mentors and coaches. 
There were also additional efforts to improve hygiene (Government of Canada, 2015c), such as 
“capacity building on hygiene practices for school health committees” as well as children, 
teachers and caregivers. 
The teacher training activities may have provided valuable opportunities for trainees to 
reflect upon and improve their teaching practices. Cooperation between refugee hygiene 
promoters and teachers, likely helped to ensure standard hygiene messages in the camp and 
public schools. The training of school managers along with teachers and parents demonstrated 
donors and organizations’ commitment to improve academic outcomes. Notably, they have 
found ways to promote healthy behaviors in the classroom and in so doing, leverage existing 
resources to improve hygiene standards. However, donors and organizations did not disclose the 
percentage of refugee teachers, supervisors and managers in the targeted K-12 schools. This 
information gap is significant. For instance, if there were no refugees working in public schools, 
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then refugee adults would have participated in these activities as emissaries and caregivers but 
not professionals and academics. In addition, teacher training was explicitly framed as an effort 
to support the retention of refugee children, improvement of hygiene standards and achievement 
of national education reform objectives. The teacher training was not presented as a livelihood 
activity or as a step toward promotion. Teachers were situated as school personnel who required 
donor and organizations’ support to become qualified and professional. Teachers however, may 
not have been provided with the certification that would have framed the training as a 
professional opportunity. As a result, the access to and quality of information is limited because 
refugees adults were presented as people with either no prior professional training or no pathway 
to improve their livelihoods.  
5.2.3 Sports, equality and media 
Sport, physical activity and play were also integrated into the INGO and donor education in 
emergencies portfolio (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). Adults were targeted for training as coaches 
and teachers to leverage sport to promote K-12 education objectives. The coach training was 
situated as a livelihood opportunity, however there was no disclosure of adult academic 
achievements, certificates or retention data for refugee beneficiaries. In this section, I describe 
the teacher and coach training, the livelihoods opportunities it afforded and through comparative 
analysis, examine the implications for downward accountability. 
Islamic Relief met with several organizations to examine the feasibility of incorporating 
sport into its K-12 retention project (Islamic Relief, 2014c). In addition, the Government of 
Canada planned to increase the capacity of Jordan’s education sector and address the 
psychosocial needs of refugee children and youth in part, through sport and recreational activities 
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(Government of Canada, 2014g; Government of Canada, 2014h). Canada planned to increase the 
skills of 1,575 teachers and coaches through “learner-centered and participatory practices” and 
the “sport for development model” (Government of Canada, 2014h). Coaches were also tasked 
with leading life skills and activities that increase youth employability, along with community 
projects (Government of Canada, 2014g).   
The sport for development and related sport models have been a significant part of the aid 
discourse in support of refugee children and youth (Adidas Group, 2015; Dudfield, 2014). Sport 
for development and related sport models utilize play, recreation and sport competition, to 
accomplish development objectives in areas such as education and health (Comic Relief, 2013a; 
Crabbe, 2012). The models have been a part of gender programs, life skills, social cohesion and 
employability activities for refugees (ANERA, 2014; Comic Relief, 2013b). In addition, sports 
have been utilized to promote sustainable development, mine awareness and provide relief aid 
(FIFA, 2015; Warshaw, 2014). In Jordan, refugee youth have enrolled in sport programs in 
Zaatari camp (UNHCR, 2013a). In addition, in 2014, the United Nations started an annual 
observance to solidify sport for development in peacebuilding (German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015).  
Sport was also a gender-based activity in the programs planned by Reclaim Childhood 
(2015). For instance, in selected documents, Reclaim Childhood claimed women are treated like 
“secondary citizens with limited rights” and women and girls are restricted by cultural traditions 
which determine their ‘place’ in the labor market and participation in sport. Thus, a sports 
program was established through after school activities. The program also integrated life skills 
and promoted women’s participation in the public sphere. For instance, Reclaim Childhood 
(2015) maintained, “by participating in RC’s regular basketball and soccer leagues, these girls 
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learn that equality, like sports, should be a right for all.” The project targeted 500 refugee female 
players and 15 female coaches. In addition, coaching was characterized as both a training and a 
livelihoods opportunity. According to Reclaim Childhood (2015), the project would “train and 
hire” women from the community. The project also provided a “stable income and crucial 
employment means for young women as coaches” and a platform for girls to develop “the 
confidence and drive needed to challenge society’s boundaries, shape their own identities and 
achieve their goals” (Reclaim Childhood, 2015).    
Significantly, the training programs supported by Canada and Reclaim Childhood were 
noted as a participatory mechanism (Reclaim Childhood, 2015; Government of Canada, 2014g). 
For instance, the community projects completed by coaches and youth were underscored as 
interventions that would “bring value to local communities and build social capital” 
(Government of Canada, 2014g). Indeed, Reclaim Childhood (2015) also contended, “this 
project’s positive impact is sustained through our strong relationships with participants’ extended 
families, and local investment in everyone - from bus drivers to home cooks.” However, donors 
and organizations did not disclose if any refugees were involved as coaches. For example, 
Reclaim Childhood referred to its participants as “local young women,” which could connote the 
targeting of Jordanians (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). In addition, as in the teacher training 
activities, donors and organizations focused upon learning outcomes for children and youth. 
Though there were adult training sessions in these activities, donors and organizations 
consistently omitted references to their learning outcomes, including retention rates. The quality 
of the training the adult learners received was completely deemphasized as though it was a 
remote, unrelated factor in the subsequent performance of the teacher/coach role.  
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It is also important to question the framing of recreation as a mechanism to change the 
perceived deficiencies in the host community. While the right to play along with access 
limitations in sport and recreation can be highlighted, it can be argued that women should have 
opportunities to work or play because they enjoy doing so. Indeed, women and girls may not be 
involved in sports to redefine cultural norms and no assumptions should be made about their 
political inclinations. There is also an undercurrent of ‘ownership’ that donors and organizations 
endorse selectively. In this context, latitude was provided to challenge other society’s boundaries 
(Reclaim Childhood, 2015), to exchange information laterally (Nagatsuka, 2014) and to 
package/deliver aid supplies (Hamasaka, 2014d). Ownership was far less acceptable, in 
beneficiaries’ [mis]use of food/cash vouchers (WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012). Ownership was not 
reported in curriculum development in the context of adult learning and livelihoods (Hamasaka, 
2013c). It is important to explore this issue. Anfara, Brown, & Mangione advised data analysis 
involves perceptiveness “to subtle undercurrents of social life” (2002, p. 31). I will thusly 
explore the issue of ownership in more detail, through the Islamic Relief K-12 enrollment 
project.  
Islamic Relief implemented its education program in Irbid, engaging both students and 
parents (2014d). Activities were in support of enrollment increases for children and greater 
acceptance of child safety standards in the larger refugee community. Cash assistance and 
awareness activities on child-safety were also either planned or conducted. 
Syrian refugees were given positions in the performance of household assessments 
(Islamic Relief, 2014c). The Islamic Relief posited, members of the refugee community might be 
the most appropriate persons to describe the project to refugee parents and present the most 
compelling argument for their children’s return to school. Thus, these caregivers were necessary 
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because they had access to the community and could discuss education from a culturally 
sensitive perspective (Islamic Relief, 2014d). Islamic Relief also conducted outreach through 
radio programs, which detailed the location, aim and criteria for enrollment.  
The integration of media in its outreach could have improved accountability to 
beneficiaries, because it provided an additional access point to information (UNESCO 2014; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2013). For instance, the wider discourse provides 
examples of other radio programs for refugees that were implemented in Jordan (UNESCO, 
2014; Quintanilla, 2012). In many places, radio has been an important part of making 
information to refugees more accessible (Internews, 2016) and through integrating social media 
and mobile software, donors and organizations could augment outreach and promote greater 
engagement (Hilhorst, 2015; Yesayan, 2014) in their programs and awareness activities. For 
instance, media has been a part of outreach in the area of rights/protection for women and girls 
(Norwegian Church Aid, 2013). Yet, this project’s parameters can also be questioned. For 
instance, its cash assistance for rent was available as a condition, based upon parents’ capacity to 
ensure their children’s attendance (Islamic Relief, 2014b). In addition, the cash payment was 
provided directly to the building owner rather than the refugee. (Islamic Relief, 2013). This 
action was a part of a system of procedures and supervision that the Islamic Relief reported to 
prevent the misuse of its aid (Islamic Relief, 2014c). Subsequently, refugees were given latitude 
to own and transmit the concept of K-12 retention. They were not however, allowed ownership 
over their own aid. Power was subsequently asymmetrical and decision-rights were limited. As a 
consequence, the program was less accountable to beneficiaries. In fact, Hilhorst (2015) posited, 
accountability is more than feedback and transparency. In addition, concern should be given to 
the power differential, which can make aid more or less effective. Thus, while Islamic Relief 
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held meetings to gather feedback and made subsequent modifications in the forms of payment, 
its conditional cash to building owners was upheld (Islamic Relief, 2015). Accountability actions 
could involve greater ownership of food or cash support in part, via unconditional cash programs 
and allocations directly to refugees.  
In Lebanon for instance, the International Rescue Committee implemented a cash 
assistance program for Syrian refugees. In this program, beneficiaries handled aid directly 
through ATM cards. Though there was some spending on unintended items such as meals, 
researchers did not identify any evidence of corruption or malfeasance. Significantly, they 
reported increases in K-12 enrollment and decreased rates of child labor for refugees who 
controlled their own aid (Lehmann & Masterson, 2014). Thus, apprehension around direct 
refugee cash support may be unmerited.    
5.3 EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL COHESION AND CONDUCT 
The WFP estimated Syrian refugees comprised 10% of the Jordanian population. Their presence 
has strained Jordan’s infrastructure and led to tensions with locals over public services, jobs and 
environmental resources. In order to “contribute to social cohesion” (WFP, 2013, p. 2), the WFP 
planned a series of livelihoods activities for vulnerable Jordanians. Food support was also 
intended for refugees, whom the WFP claimed were practicing “negative coping strategies” 
(WFP, 2012, p. 2).  
The Government of Canada (2014d) concurred and planned an “economic development 
and social cohesion” program. The program was implemented in communities where large 
refugee populations had settled and according to Canada, encountered subsequent increases in 
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poverty, unemployment, gender-based violence and labor competition. Therefore, donors and 
organizations endeavored to leverage education platforms, to promote social cohesion and 
positive coping strategies/conduct.  
This objective is a major theme in the wider discourse on Iraqi and Syrian refugees in 
Jordan (Guay, 2015; USAID, 2015a; CARE, 2014; DFID, 2014). For instance, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is developing social cohesion programs across 
several Arab States. UNDP (2014) indicated, “deliberations also underlined the critical role of 
education and the media in fostering social connectedness and countering divisiveness, 
polarization and sectarianism, all of which are symptomatic of uncertainty that prevails at times 
of transition.” Social Cohesion was also a main objective of the Danish Refugee Council’s 
(2015) programs in Jordan, including livelihoods for displacement-affected communities. The 
Department of International Development (DFID) as well as the United States, Department of 
State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) funded these interventions. This 
category was reported in selected documents and aid literature, as an integral objective for IATI 
members and non-members.  
Data in relation to outcomes and impact in this area however, is limited. For instance, 
livelihoods programs were planned (WFP, 2013) yet, they were distributed to locals and 
accessible for small refugee beneficiary cohorts (Hamasaka, 2015c). The density in the 
beneficiary population and the focus on perceived negative behaviors, may have decreased the 
livelihood aid accessible to refugees in need and subsequently, the evidence of downward 
accountability.  
First, I will describe the livelihoods activities planned through microfinance and food aid 
and the implications for downward accountability, via sensitization education and the decision-
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rights refugees were afforded. Next, I will present the repurposing training and conclude the 
chapter by assessing the main achievements in downward accountability and the 
accomplishments INGOs and donors did not disclose. 
5.3.1 Micro-finance and food aid 
The Government of Canada (2014d) planned promote social cohesion through income-
generation. Through cooperation with community-based organizations (CBOs) and through 
community-wide activities, Canada intended to provide vocational training and “micro-credit 
loans.”  It also noted a cash transfer strategy for Jordanian beneficiaries. Canada targeted more 
than 15,000 Syrian and Jordanian beneficiaries. Although Canada promoted interaction on a 
large scale, its beneficiary totals were not disaggregated. The impact of its aid for refugees was 
therefore more difficult to assess.  
The WFP planned food aid to “protect livelihoods and help prevent the depletion of 
assets” for the most vulnerable (WFP, 2012, p. 2). The WFP assistance was focused upon “hot 
meals” and “food vouchers” (2012, p. 10). The WFP planned to provide vouchers to 35,000 
refugees through a rapid emergency operation, then increase support to 70,000 refugees within a 
six month timeframe (WFP, 2012, p. 12). No livelihoods training was reported for adult 
refugees. In order to prevent the sale of vouchers or other forms of noncompliance such as 
exchange, the WFP maintained it would coordinate with partners to, “conduct sensitization and 
information sessions for refugees at the main voucher distribution centres” (2012, p. 16). 
Refugees therefore, had access to correction rather than livelihoods education in this activity. 
The WFP also implemented activities to “enable the host communities to continue to 
support refugees” (2013, p. 2) Activities included food vouchers/cash transfers, “food for assets” 
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and “food assistance for training” (WFP, 2013, p. 10, 11). Training targeted Jordanian 
beneficiaries and in particular, provided a role for industrials and the most vulnerable. Indeed, 
the training was anticipated in the area of forestry, water management and farming. Efforts were 
also planned to introduce “land reclamation,” which through complementarity with ministry-led 
interventions, could promote “kitchen gardening” vegetable, olive and alfalfa farming and 
improve livestock and dairy operations (WFP, 2013, p. 11). Many of these opportunities could be 
seasonal and labor intensive, attracting more males and youth. The WFP therefore, planned to 
enroll women by “including preferential access for vulnerable female-headed households” (2013, 
p. 11). For the “most vulnerable” households in urban areas, a nine-month suite of activities in 
road maintenance and sanitation was planned. The WFP claimed other vocational training 
options could be supported in keeping with “market demand” (2013, p. 11). These activities 
involved urban and rural communities.  
Through the food aid and food training activities, the WFP disclosed several measures 
that could have increased access to aid and accountability for beneficiaries. The WFP’s measures 
however, were limited by a series of corresponding restrictions. For instance, registration for its 
program included beneficiaries from government agencies and NGOs (WFP, 2013). Local 
participants in specific community projects could also be self-targeted. It was critical to include 
self-targeted participants to ensure people in need were not underserved. In addition, the WFP 
provided cash through a platform “made available to beneficiaries without necessarily opening 
an account” (WFP, 2013, p. 17). Yet, the aim of the program was to respond to “short-term food 
needs” (WFP, 2013, p. 10). It was also organized to “generate short-term income” (WFP, 2013, 
p. 11). Moreover, the WFP advised the “daily wage rate will be below the labour market wage” 
and the number of working days for beneficiaries was between only 8 and 90 per year (WFP, 
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2013, p. 13, 15). This limited time period may not have decreased their vulnerability over the 
long-term.  
In addition, participation in evaluation has been noted as a main activity in accountability 
practices with beneficiaries in Jordan (Danish Refugee Council, 2015). However, the WFP 
claimed it will “establish accountability measures through participatory assessments during 
targeting and project implementation” (2013, p. 18). In regard to female beneficiaries, the WFP 
planned to “include them in project implementation to enhance their participation” (2013, p. 16). 
Participation in evaluation however, was planned for “technical experts” or a “self-evaluation” 
with other organizations (WFP, 2013, p. 17, 18). Therefore, program evaluation was not reported 
as a component for which beneficiaries were given access. Best practices and lessons learned 
may have therefore, been limited to the donor perspective. There were also a suite of corrective 
actions that could have minimized decision-rights. For instance, the WFP planned a “close 
consultation” with “community representatives” and “community-based organizations” in order 
to define specific activities for its program (2013, p. 11). Relations with its beneficiaries 
however, were largely centered upon sensitization (WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012).  
For instance, the WFP reported plans to conduct “gender sensitization training” to ensure 
beneficiaries complied with the Project’s gender targets (WFP, 2013, p. 16). The WFP also 
planned to conduct “sensitization of beneficiaries on the importance of spending money on a 
balanced diet” and “sensitisation of the involved communities” pending program challenges in 
targeting and retention (2013, p. 18). A large part of the INGO-beneficiary interface was 
subsequently generated through correction or conduct education. The structure of sensitization 
was also advice-giving - a vertical form of interface. For instance, Friedman & Podolny (1992, p. 
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44) claimed, “trust relations tend to be reciprocal, whereas, advice relations tend to be 
asymmetrical.”  
It is important to examine this setting in part, because it did not account for the process of 
reasoning refugees and other beneficiaries may have completed. For instance, Zaman asserted, 
refugees “interpret, re-interpret, and internalise continually their experiences while 
simultaneously acting on those experiences in order to access material and non-material 
resources” (2012, s126). Therefore, quick one-dimensional constructions of refugees as passive 
and unaware or alternatively, correctable, oversimplifies a complicated response to an extreme 
circumstance.    
5.3.2 Repurposing 
JEN (Hamasaka, 2015c) claimed, Syrian refugee women wanted to use their free time in a 
manner that made them feel “beneficial and useful.” In addition, JEN was disheartened by the 
limited opportunities for refugees to become creative and fulfilled. Thus, JEN initiated a 
recycling program with 30 refugee women. The program was derived from JEN’s observation of 
refugee women, who “know that they are very much productive human beings” (Hamasaka, 
2015c). To address refugees’ need to feel useful, the program promoted resource conservation 
via sewing carpets and bags with old textiles. The women could later use the finished products to 
wear as clothing or decorate their living areas. While JEN noted their interests in selling the 
items, particularly outside the camp, the project was not yet supportive of their need to be self-
reliant. However, while this program was centered upon an industrial role, it may have been 
more accountable to beneficiaries because it placed more emphasis upon the refugees’ need to 
work than their need to be corrected. It was also one of the few activities disclosed in selected 
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documents that was not based upon a perceived deficit. Significantly, JEN (Hamasaka, 2015c) 
recognized the limitations in the refugees’ environment and how the limitations had minimized 
the quality of refugees’ lives. In so doing, refugees were not associated with misconduct or costs 
to others, insomuch as they were linked with an opportunity to activate skills. 
5.4 ACCOUNTABILITY TO REFUGEES 
In response to the research question, there is evidence of accountability in selected documents, 
particularly in regard to access, compliance and outcomes. In the following sections, I examine 
the main downward accountability accomplishments disclosed in selected documents and the 
guidelines in accountability upon which no achievements were disclosed.  
5.4.1 Main accomplishments 
INGOs and donor agencies disclosed information in relation to their accountability efforts. 
Significantly, accountability was often presented as a main objective and there were important 
achievements. Indeed, it is worth noting that donors planned to conduct awareness activities, in 
order to increase access to services for refugees (Government of Canada, 2015g). Donors and 
organizations also cultivated “integrated support networks” among Jordanian and refugee 
populations (Government of Canada, 2015g). In addition, the WFP wanted aid recipients to 
endorse its goals for gender participation. Thus, there was a concerted effort to link beneficiaries 
to service providers and simultaneously, establish an inclusive community.  
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There were also accountability achievements regarding ownership. JEN (Hamasaka, 
2014d) utilized the services of industrial refugees, “Syrian laborers, mostly vulnerable women” 
in Azraq camp, to help prepare packages of winter clothes for residents. In Zaatari camp, JEN 
also helped refugees keep warm in the winter. Indeed, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014a) advised, “several 
meetings with the community groups in each district in the camp were held in order to increase 
the feeling of ownership of the distribution process and take responsibility in building their 
community.”  In addition, “JEN has incorporated refugees in the target area into every step of 
distribution” (Hamasaka, 2014a).  
Other accountability mechanisms included plans for a hotline, suggestion boxes, 
brochures (Hamasaka, 2014a; Islamic Relief, 2013) and radio broadcasts (Islamic Relief, 2014d). 
The Islamic Relief (2013) and WFP also planned to hold community meetings and/or conduct 
participatory assessments. Indeed, the WFP claimed, “particular attention will be paid to ensure 
that women and disadvantaged groups are aware that they are able to share feedback without 
negative consequences” (2013, p. 18).  
Donors and organizations also integrated technology into their interventions. For 
instance, INGOs leveraged technology to modify their cash and/or food vouchers and utilized a 
database to register (Islamic Relief, 2014d; WFP, 2013) and refer refugees for services. These 
actions could have been integral components of accountability because within these platforms, 
refugees could be informed of their rights and responsibilities and the objectives of the aid 
interventions for which they might be eligible. These platforms also facilitated the delivery of 
refugee feedback and complaints.  
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5.4.2 Increasing downward accountability 
While there were accomplishments in downward accountability for which INGOs and donors 
described in detail, there were also areas for which downward accountability activities were not 
disclosed. For instance, donors and INGO were situated within a wide network of actors 
committed to accountability frameworks (for example, NRC, 2014c; Sida 2014). However, they 
rarely described their aid activities in relation to these frameworks in the Open Aid Search (for 
example, The Sphere Project, 2014; INEE, 2014; HAP International, 2013).  
Assessments, surveys, evaluations and feedback mechanisms were noted (Islamic Relief, 
2014d; Hamasaka, 2014a). Actual reports of interviews, feedback from the hotline and radio 
program however, were not included in their documents. Therefore, more outcome information 
is needed to address this gap.  
Moreover, because the objectives for training and livelihoods were centered upon durable 
solutions, caregiving and child protection and social cohesion and conduct, closing the 
information gap in adult education necessitated more information about those activities that 
corresponded to refugees’ education and livelihoods priorities. For instance, an unspecified 
number of refugees were given an opportunity to work for organizations in support of their 
humanitarian programs. There was no evidence however, of external direct-hire opportunities. 
Since many of these programs were short-term, the positions refugees were given in the field, 
would presumably expire along with the program. Other income-generating opportunities may 
have been accessible, yet they were not reported or reported with totals that included refugees 
and beneficiaries in the host community. Thus, while the refugee may have increased his/her 
employability, it is difficult to assess long-term self-reliance because data was either not 
disaggregated or situated within a temporary program.  
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In addition, the roles afforded refugee adults were dissimilar to the roles customary to 
other adult learners. For example, donors and organizations did not disclose activities that 
measured adult learning, tracked matriculation or certified learning achievements. 
Requalification and accreditation data were not reported. The disclosure of this data in the Open 
Aid Search, can be a part of INGO and donor activities to increase the access to and quality of 
aid information. In addition, refugee adults were educated in an aid environment constructed to 
resolve or correct, rather than to enlighten or evolve. Indeed, refugees were not presented as 
people entering humanitarian programs with technical backgrounds. Rather, they were often 
presented as people for whom training was needed either to support vulnerable children or 
decrease tensions with locals. Refugees were also characterized as people who could learn how 
to use aid according to organizations’ expectations and endorse healthy behaviors while durable 
solutions were being identified. As a result, the rationality associated with education (Blaney, 
2002) is far less prominent in these documents and refugees were presented as unskilled labor 
with bad behaviors. Therefore, refugees’ livelihood priorities and training needs were 
deemphasized and as a result, donors and organizations were less accountable. This insight was a 
primary outcome of the content analysis and fills a gap in the literature. 
In the following chapter, I present the main conclusions from this study and incorporate 
the gaps in accountability disclosure listed above, in a description of policy recommendations. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through literature review and content analysis, the data INGOs and donors disclosed evidenced 
a selective form of downward accountability in an extreme and resource-poor operating 
environment. This form of accountability was least relevant to skilled and professional refugees. 
Education was multi-sectoral, accessible in rural and urban areas and in some instances, 
available to both registered and unregistered people in need. However, the international response 
to displacement is the product of wider political and economic state policies. In addition, it is an 
outcome of imperatives centered upon reducing political and economic threats. Coordination was 
minimized in part, because adult refugees were constructed as inconvenient, threats and costs 
and their training and livelihoods needs were overshadowed by other priorities. Emergency 
education and livelihoods were subsequently, limited and counterintuitive. Significantly, the 
traditional evidence of achievement associated with adult learning, such as grades, test scores 
and certification, was not a part of the information in selected documents. Therefore, the 
environment INGOs and donors constructed was not comparable to the setting provided to 
citizens and locals in the host community. Thus, adult refugees are not peers. They are “others.” 
In this chapter, I present the conclusions of these research methods in regard to the codes 
of access, compliance and outcomes. I also underscore gaps in information that were not noted in 
selected documents and offer policy recommendations.  
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6.1 DATA IN RELATION TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this study was to examine access to and quality of information about humanitarian 
education programs for refugees in Jordan. The study was conducted through a content analysis, 
informed by the conceptual framework of downward accountability and via network 
perspectives. This section is centered upon the implications from the content analysis, related to 
access, compliance and outcomes.  
The findings are significant in part for at least two reasons. First, this study focuses upon 
livelihoods activities in multiple sectors and for adult refugees. It encompasses the views and 
reports of donors and INGOs active in an entire country. Second, this study underscores access, 
compliance and outcomes as critical areas of accountability to refugee adults, in a setting that is 
mostly urban and noncamp.  
Access, retention and outcomes such as job placement, are areas where aid scholars have 
problematized a lack of accountability to underrepresented students in educational institutions 
(Oketch, McCowan & Schendel, 2014; Jacob, Lee, Wehreim, Gokbel, Dumba & Lu, 2013). 
Retention rates for post-secondary education, vocational training (Hadfield, 2003; Belbin & 
Belbin, 1972) and resettlement programs (Feuerherm, 2013; Giese, 2010; Halpern, 2008) have 
also been relevant foci of interest, with regard to adult literacy, language acquisition, health and 
health education. Additionally, access to adult education and livelihoods for refugees (Harb & 
Saab, 2014; Dineen, 2013) certification (Kirk, 2009) and accreditation (Talbot, 2013) have been 
noted in aid settings and aid policy dialogue as necessary improvements. Yet, while there is an 
abundance of data about adult learners and adult refugees, this sort of country-wide and 
comparative information is uncommon in the education and aid literature, especially in urban and 
noncamp humanitarian contexts.  
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I describe the results of the content analysis through access, compliance and outcomes in 
the next sections. 
6.1.1 Access 
The majority of the data reported to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) by 
donors and organizations concerned access. The research questions related to access, were 
centered upon geographical location, eligibility, specialization and certification. Donors and 
organizations generally provided details related to geography and specialization. Thus, they 
described the location of activities and the courses that they offered. The data revealed donors 
and organizations operated in the locations where the largest refugee communities were settled. 
Camp and urban refugees were involved in humanitarian education projects, with additional 
projects underway for rural beneficiaries.  
Beneficiaries in INGO programs had access to the role of professional, caregiver, 
emissary, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. The beneficiaries most likely to influence and 
direct communication, as well as achieve self-reliance, were refugee professionals. Refugee 
professionals and academics could interface with a wide range of community members and 
develop skills in relation to his or her livelihoods goals. However, professionals and academics 
may not have received opportunities customarily afforded to other adult learners, such as the 
certification of their learning attainments. Moreover, refugee caregivers and emissaries could 
associate with potential beneficiaries and school staff, however their communications were 
directed by the organization. Their responsibilities were focused upon messaging, assessments 
and behavior change. These roles therefore, were not linked to their learning needs or to their 
educational aspirations. Industrial and most vulnerable refugees may have been prioritized in aid 
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programs and supported with a variety of activities. However, the aid provided was based upon 
their profound vulnerability. Industrials especially, were subject to tasks that necessitated 
physical strength and endurance.   
Donors and organizations reported the most information in relation to the emissary, 
caregiver and most vulnerable refugee. Therefore, as it pertains to Jordan, the Open Aid Search 
provides the most information about refugees who have the least control over their aid and yet 
are more dependent. Additionally, disclosure with respect to eligibility concerned ways to 
identify and screen refugees via systematic assessments (NRC 2014a; NRC 2014b). This data 
also included cross-checking with the other organizations to avoid duplication (WFP, 2013) and 
querying the refugee assistance information system (RAIS) database (Islamic Relief, 2014d). 
Yet, donors and INGOs did not disclose how they may have weighed eligibility factors to enroll 
and prioritize participants.  
There were also serendipitous processes that developed through the exchange of ideas, 
whereby refugees came to be involved in education activities. For instance, the Japan Emergency 
NGO (JEN) (Hamasaka, 2015c) claimed, “we proposed an idea to the women” and later, “the 
group of the women liked the idea” and began working well with each other. Thus, more 
eligibility and certification information is needed, to learn which refugees benefited from adult 
education opportunities and how their learning achievements were documented. 
It is also important to note that aid was not afforded to poor people in general. Rather, aid 
was accessible for refugees who were registered (WFP, 2012) and for specific populations or 
persons who were “conflict-affected” (Government of Canada, 2015c). INGOs may have 
neglected Syrians or Iraqis who departed their countries prior to the recent violence, however can 
not return home. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) (2012) noted Syrian refugees 
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were eligible for aid in part, if they arrived after March 2011. Other INGOs admitted, refugees 
from Syria have to present documentation that their arrival was after January 2012, in order to 
“evidence that they are indeed refugees of the current crisis, and not previous economic 
migrants” (IFRCRC & JRC, 2012, p. 33). Dissimilar criteria may be confusing to refugees who 
were in need, yet not eligible in some instances. Refugees may have also had their own views of 
when the crisis began and could select a timeline prior to the date set by organizations. Indeed, 
refugees may also determine that their needs, rather than iterative dialogue regarding their date 
of arrival, should drive aid allocations. In order to evidence downward accountability, donors 
and organizations could disclose feedback from refugees into the development of eligibility 
criteria. This action is important to avoid the neglect of people in need who may be “convention 
refugees” as noted in chapter 2, yet because of an algorithm, are not recognized by INGOs or 
afforded an accountability relationship. There are also Iraqis who are affected by the crisis, yet 
are not convention refugees. For instance, MacDougall (2011) underscored the vulnerability of 
Iraqi women who were separated and divorced from Jordanian men. These women had been 
residents in Jordan prior to the conflict in Iraq and did not register with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until they separated from their Jordanian caregivers and 
local social support mechanisms. Through field work in Jordan, MacDougall learned that many 
of these women registered with UNHCR in part, because they could not gain Jordanian 
citizenship. Limited resources and violence in Iraq also minimized the options for repatriation. 
They were vulnerable and in crisis however, may not have been eligible for specific services 
because they could not satisfy the multifarious criteria of myriad organizations. Thus, Iraqis may 
be find it hard to access aid in Jordan and challenging to return home – a disabling status in 
which no state or organization is necessarily responsible. Moreover, other refugees were 
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excluded from aid, because they were not compliant. I describe this constraint to access in the 
next section.    
6.1.2 Compliance 
Donors and organizations disclosed their compliance activities through food/cash voucher 
modifications, assessments and stakeholder sessions (Islamic Relief, 2015; WFP, 2013). For 
instance, the WFP (2012) endeavored to discourage the misuse/exchange of vouchers and food 
aid. In regard to food packages, the WFP planned to sensitize beneficiaries (2012) and cooperate 
with other organizations, “thus eliminating duplication and maximizing support for the 
beneficiaries, as well as reducing the probability of having WFP food sold on the market” (2013, 
p. 16). Additionally, the WFP lauded its decision to put “cash into women’s hands” to address 
the risk “that households receiving cash spend it for non-food expenditures” (2013, p.18). Thus, 
females were framed as the most compliant beneficiaries. This action may also evidence what 
Pupavac identified as a “feminized representation,” based upon the view of a woman as an 
“untainted” beneficiary (2008, p. 276). In this case, males who were viewed as less desirable, 
received fewer decision-rights and/or more correction, such as sensitization (WFP, 2013). The 
focus upon conduct and correction could have inhibited their capacity to exercise a measure of 
ownership over aid, subsequently enshrining a power differential in the accountability 
relationship. Additionally, donors and INGOs did not report the outcomes of their sensitization 
activities as more effective than other programs where resources were not allocated to conduct 
education and correction. This lack of comparative information is an important gap because there 
is no evidence that the methods these network members selected, were the most appropriate.  
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6.1.3 Outcomes 
The Government of Canada (2014f) endeavored to increase access “to a protective environment 
and strengthened community-based child protection mechanisms.” The protective environment 
involved remediating child labor and early marriage through K-12 enrollment and teacher 
training, as well as promoting healthy behaviors through hygiene education. It was the purpose 
donors and organizations cited most often in their education and training programs. As a 
consequence, adult refugees were tasked with helping INGOs achieve targets in this area. 
Though they were trained to accomplish program targets, adult education courses were not 
disclosed as accredited or facilitated by teachers whom the refugees could evaluate. Therefore, 
there was substantive information in the Open Aid Search in relation to the codes of access, 
compliance and outcomes. Yet, more information could be disclosed, in order to close critical 
gaps in knowledge about adult refugees in Jordan. 
6.2 DATA GAPS 
Donors and organizations offered limited details about coordination with refugee skilled 
refugees, progress toward targets and outcomes. As a result, the information they disclosed, 
evidences accountability strategies more often than impact and is most relevant to unskilled 
beneficiaries. I present these gaps in the following sections.    
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6.2.1 Coordination with academics 
It is important to note that much of the information upon which donors and organizations relied, 
was taken from their needs assessments – a method they wanted to strengthen (NRC, 2014d). 
This approach can be an important way of recognizing and responding to vulnerability. 
However, assessment tools based upon capacities within the refugee community may not have 
been leveraged. For instance, most program information omitted strategies that built upon the 
prior skills of refugee academics and practitioners. As a result, the public may come to situate 
these learners as unskilled if they depend upon selected documents for their information.  
A counternarrative of refugees as scholars, however has been established. In fact, a part 
of the refugee adult population fleeing violence and instability in Iraq and Syria has been 
characterized as well-educated. They were also regarded by some members of the media as the 
‘middle-class.’ For example, in Fortune Magazine, the Syrian refugee crisis was featured and 
retorted, “among the refugees attempting to get in are the remnants of Syria’s middle class: 
doctors, engineers, and teachers…” (Proctor, 2015). In the Iraqi refugee context, Sassoon (2008) 
maintained Iraq lost many, “professionals, academics, and artists, who are mostly from the 
middle class.” INGOs have also concluded the Iraqi crisis involved a tragic loss of intellectual 
capital. For instance, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) and Oxfam claimed, “the 
brain drain that Iraq is experiencing, is further stretching already inadequate public services, as 
thousands of medical staff, teachers, water engineers, and other professionals are forced to leave 
the country” (Kirkbride, Bailey & Omar, 2007, p. 3, 4). Indeed, Iraqi refugees’ needs often 
match those of people in developed nations, based upon their prior professional experience and 
former standard of living (Leaning, Spiegel & Crisp, 2011). The assistance adult refugees solicit, 
is often in regard to tertiary education, vocational training and requalification. In fact, Uehling 
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noted variance in the advice given to Iraqi and Bhutanese refugees by service providers. Uehling 
remarked, “Bhutanese are instructed on the proper use of a toilet and see demonstrations of 
disposable diapers, Iraqi refugees are briefed on matters like the possibilities for requalification 
in their professional field” (2015, p. 1003). Thus, there is a segment of refugee adults who have 
identified with a professional role. Needs assessments for these practitioners should be centered 
upon what they can do, rather than what they may need. Moreover, needs assessments could 
inform emergency education. For instance, education and livelihoods could be expanded to 
prevent the loss of credentials and specialized knowledge for skilled professionals.   
Assessments centered upon what refugees can do may be an important complimentary 
form of data collection. This orientation has been utilized to a degree, with respect to refugees’ 
leadership skills in camp settings. For instance, JEN (Nagatsuka, 2014) noted the opening of the 
new Azraq camp as an opportunity that could, “help stabilize committees of refugees in charge 
of leading the population so that the Syrian refugees can one day self- manage and achieve self-
reliance” (Nagatsuka, 2014). However, accredited training programs for these leaders were not 
disclosed. In another example, the Government of Canada (2013a) disclosed its anticipated 
outcomes as, “120 women and men trained in community-based child protection mechanisms in 
targeted host community and refugee populations” (Government of Canada, 2013a). However, 
there were no indications social workers and therapists within the refugee community were 
targeted. Thus, resources may have been directed to training refugees with no prior experience. 
In addition, while refugees obtained work with INGOs in assessment (Islamic Relief, 2014d), 
coaching (Reclaim Childhood, 2015) and hygiene promotion (Hamasaka, 2015b), the selection 
process for these positions was not always clear. As refugee emissaries and caregivers, adults 
were often described as people who would be first trained, then participate in the protection and 
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education of children. Thus, in regard to the emissary and caregiver roles, there is a connotation 
that refugees’ capacities were developed through donor-INGO inculcation, as though they had no 
prior related skills.  
Prior skills were disclosed in relation to the industrial refugee role. For example, JEN 
(Hamasaka, 2015c) noted the refugee women in its repurposing activity already knew how to 
braid. Yet, there were some instances where donors and organizations presented refugees as 
without any prior knowledge in the topic whatsoever. Indeed, JEN (Hamasaka, 2015b) 
conducted a hygiene session with refugee women and claimed the topic was, “so popular that 
many more women have asked to volunteer as Community Hygiene Promoters with JEN.” JEN 
(Hamasaka, 2015b) trained new volunteers and noted, “now they know the general topics of how 
to communicate, how diarrhea spreads, and how to hand wash properly.” Thus, by implication, 
JEN trained refugees, whom prior to their enrollment, did not have knowledge on hand washing 
and communicating about hygiene. The researcher does not intend to suggest that the 
accomplishments were not noteworthy or that refugees who do not practice universal precautions 
should not be trained. Rather, it is important to identify and work with the doctors, engineers and 
teachers in the refugee community and provide avenues for continuing education with 
certification. It is also possible that many refugees were knowledgeable about handwashing and 
disease prevention, because it was a widespread practice in their families and workplace prior to 
arriving in Jordan. Thus, it is important not to characterize beneficiaries in ways that deny these 
capacities because the public could develop a narrow view of refugees as uneducated and support 
for requalification and accreditation may be more difficult to garner.  
Massive open online courses (MOOCs) may be particularly useful in this regard 
(McClure, 2013). MOOCs are low cost platforms and support the registration of large student 
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populations simultaneously. MOOCs can be especially relevant to refugees, because they are less 
expensive than an average university education and along with other online learning options, are 
suitable for either standalone or degree programs. INGOs and donors could assess student 
learning and provide certification of their learning attainments through this platform. 
Opportunities such as these, could provide professional development and other forms of training, 
in order to frame refugees as educated people, rather than unskilled.  
In sum, many refugee adults in Jordan are practitioners and academics with prior 
qualifications. The roles they were afforded in humanitarian aid may not have corresponded to 
their qualifications or enhanced them. If capacity-based approaches are not put forth, refugees in 
Jordan could be known as people who have no identifiable strengths. In terms of a gap analysis 
therefore, it is important to note how refugees were not framed and the identities for which the 
data does not support. For instance, in selected documents, refugees were not framed as experts, 
practitioners or scholars. As a lessons learned, programs could target this group and establish 
milestones in which progress could be measured. Significantly, progress toward targets was also 
a main gap in the information in the Open Aid Search. 
6.2.2 Progress toward targets 
INGOs and donors did not report targets to measure the quality of their adult education and 
training activities or situate their downward accountability commitments in an adult education 
domain. Thus, when accountability mechanisms were disclosed, they were upward or unrelated 
to adult learning or academic achievements. This data gap is contrary to the objectives of IATI 
members (IATI, 2011a), which underscores the need for comparable, timely data. As a result, 
refugees’ position as adult learners was overshadowed by their status as aid recipients. For 
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instance, the Government of Canada (2015b) detailed the grant recipient and offered content on 
the objective, beneficiary population, intervention and anticipated impact or outcome of its 
grants. Canada did not disclose information related to actual academic achievements. As a 
consequence, a comparative analysis of grants supported by Canada and other donor agencies, 
could have been conducted based upon strategy and in terms of sector and beneficiary 
(sub)group. A comparative analysis proved difficult at best, concerning issues such as test scores 
and retention. Outcome data was also limited in selected documents from MADRE, Reclaim 
Childhood and the WFP.  
6.2.3 Outcomes 
INGOs and donor agencies disclosed mostly strategic and formative information. Information 
about outcomes was in relation to the beneficiary role for adult refugees, such as the caregiver 
vis a vis job linkages for coaches (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). However, there were no reports of 
accredited adult education and livelihoods programs. Significantly, there were no reports that 
measured INGO activities relative to refugees’ livelihoods interests. This is important, because 
responding to the priorities of beneficiaries is a prominent accountability benchmark (The Sphere 
Project, 2014; Keystone, 2009).  For instance, donors and organizations integrated quotes from 
refugee students in their reports and field notes (Hamasaka, 2014a). For instance, JEN 
(Hamasaka, 2013c) noted, “the response to this program was very positive and JEN was even 
invited back.” However, actual monitoring reports based upon feedback and complaints 
mechanisms were not provided. This information gap keeps the user unaware of the full extent of 
the measures donors and organizations may have taken in order to include beneficiary 
perspectives and feedback into aid programs.  
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Accountability was a responsibility donors and organizations described in their 
procedures and affiliations, as well as feedback/stakeholder meetings (SIDA, 2015, Islamic 
Relief, 2014c). Therefore, accountability may have been enacted through these formalities. 
However, since meetings with refugees took place after most program strategies were planned, 
there were few substantive opportunities for refugees to yield power, influence and discretion in 
the aid arena. Moreover, there were few, if any opportunities for comparisons of achievements 
between prior and current programs, upward and downward accountability, which could have 
allowed the user to view progress over time. In sum, there was general agreement that 
accountability should be happening (NRC 2014c; SIDA 2014), but general neglect with respect 
to evaluating power-sharing opportunities.  
To evidence downward accountability, INGOs and donors should describe their 
achievements, increasing refugees’ participation in planning, implementation and evaluation 
activities. They should also disclose the degree to which these activities were related to refugees’ 
livelihoods aspirations and the level of discretion or control they leveraged. Evaluations of 
downward accountability can be particularly relevant in this regard. It is also noteworthy that 
there was mention of the Arab Spring (NRC, 2014c) broadly, albeit this event was not depicted 
as a mitigating factor in aid programs. There could have been a higher demand for downward 
accountability from refugees in this post-Arab Spring aid arena. This issue was not explored in 
selected documents.  
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6.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
The Open Aid Search is comprised of data published from the IATI, a network of donors and 
INGOs. This network operates to increase accountability and coordination in part, through the 
disclosure of information in the public domain. Therefore, network theories and downward 
accountability are relevant conceptual frameworks, from which the data IATI members disclosed 
can be presented.   
The data in the Open Aid Search can be examined to assess the access to and quality of 
information about adult education and livelihoods for refugees in Jordan. In addition, access, 
compliance and outcomes can be a part of the examination of upward and downward 
accountability in refugee adult education, urban humanitarian contexts and noncamp settings. 
Content analysis can be an integral method in this examination because it is a form of document 
review that enables the information donors and organizations disclosed to be systematically 
investigated. This information should be examined often, including as a part of program 
evaluations, in order to measure progress in the disclosure of adult education and livelihoods 
activities as well as accountability to refugee beneficiaries.  
The data in the Open Aid Search, supports the findings in the wider literature, such as 
Winthrop’s (2009) claim that humanitarian education programs do not reflect refugees’ 
livelihoods aspirations. The data also evidences Seybolt’s (2009) claim that aid may reflect 
donors’ priorities more often than the aspirations and needs of refugees. This linkage is 
especially significant, because it demonstrates an aid relationship in which accountability is 
mostly upward.  
In the context of adult learning and livelihoods for refugees, downward accountability 
was uncommon in the data INGOs and donors disclosed. Indeed, minimal opportunities were 
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disclosed that encouraged refugees to co-construct their education and address their needs. Yet, 
the most sobering link in the literature, is in regard to the framing of refugees as uninvited and 
tragic (Baker & McEnery, 2005) noncitizens, rather than peers. These public problems (Provan 
& Milward, 2001) were a cost to the host community (IRC, 2015) and their issues were 
destabilizing factors. For instance, in most instances, education was enacted to resolve or correct 
an unwanted problem for the donor, INGO and local population. The adult learner role was 
minimized in this setting and subsequently, the position of adults as wage-earners and 
breadwinners for their families was understated in reports. Livelihoods priorities were 
deemphasized and opportunities to exercise control, discretion and ownership were selectively 
enabled. Undesirable refugees were usually excluded from decision-making based upon 
ontological recognition structures such as noncompliance and skilled professionals were not 
acknowledged. Adult refugees, in most instances, were not educated for themselves. They were 
educated for others. Subsequently, donors and organizations coordinated to address correctable 
problems and unskilled refugees.        
6.4 PROGRAM DOCUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study included a review of nearly 2,000 documents in the Open Aid Search and additional 
documents in the wider literature. In the following sections, I examine the ways aid actors may 
increase the access to and quality of information in this repository. First, I describe the actors 
from which more data is needed in the Open Aid Search. Next, I present policy 
recommendations for both the disclosure of accountability and development of strategic policy 
for refugees in Jordan. The information in this section however, is not limited to the Jordanian 
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context. Indeed, it could be relevant to scholars and aid actors who work with refugees and/or 
other people in need in various fields.    
6.4.1 Organizations and donor agencies 
The Jordanian context includes a large percentage of the Iraqi and Syrian refugee community. In 
particular, Syrian refugees comprise the largest beneficiary population registered with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2016). Livelihoods, training and 
job linkages are main priorities to these uprooted people. Yet, there were no narrative program 
documents on humanitarian education and livelihoods for refugee adults in Jordan, from the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States, Department of 
State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) or United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, there was no readily accessible information 
on adult education from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).   
In many instances, the documents selected for content analysis did in fact demonstrate 
partnership with UNHCR and United States grantee organizations. For instance, JEN 
(Hamasaka, 2015b) received materials for its hygiene awareness program from the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). JEN 
(Hamasaka, 2013d) has also “worked together with UNICEF to establish [a] WASH committee 
all over the camp.” In addition, JEN was selected among more than thirty NGOs, to support 
UNHCR in its leadership of and operations in Zaatari camp. Therefore, water-sanitation-and 
hygiene (WASH) activities were underscored as critical service areas and cooperation with 
United Nations agencies was highlighted in JEN accomplishments. Thus, in many instances, the 
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programs reported in selected documents were linked to non-IATI members as well as donors 
and INGOs in the wider field of humanitarian assistance. These linkages by enlarge, however, do 
not inform the user of their downward accountability activities relative to adult refugees’ 
livelihoods aspirations.  
Significantly, documents from the UNHCR (2015c), United States (USAID, 2015a), 
Department for International Development (DFID, 2014), Danish Refugee Council (2015) and 
other donors and INGOs, including networks of INGOs, reported information that coincided with 
the data in the Open Aid Search. Social cohesion and child protection in particular, were main 
education objectives. In addition, concern was given to hygiene, food and cash assistance. These 
documents also evidenced gaps in learning outcomes for adult refugees and recognition for an 
overall need to improve the quality of aid information. Thus, the findings of this study are not 
limited to the data accessible via the Open Aid Search. Indeed, the categories in this study were 
based upon documents from nine donors and INGOs. They were then validated with data from 
thirty-nine organizations and/or networks and more than ten reports and publications, which was 
more than four times the number of agencies from which the data originated. Thus, the 
categories have implications for adult education for refugees in Jordan.  
The results of this study are important to IATI and non-IATI members. However, in order 
to fulfill the IATI’s goals of comparable and timely information (IATI, 2011a), more 
organizations could publish their aid reports in the IATI Registry and organizations that are 
registered, could report more information about adult education and livelihoods and downward 
accountability in an educational setting. The exclusion of these central aid organizations in the 
Open Aid Search minimizes access to aid data and makes it challenging for the public to find 
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information. It also contradicts the accountability commitments that many of these donors and 
INGOs have made.  
In sum, the dominant narrative of refugeehood is based upon the view of refugees as 
threats, costs, inconvenient, tragic and temporary. Most significantly, there is scant evidence in 
the Open Aid Search that can be leveraged as a counternarrative. While aid actors recognize the 
refugee community is comprised of mostly families, including academics and peers, the 
information they report has not represented the family as a unit. Rather, the family was 
deemphasized through compliance information and correction education for deviants and 
undesirable people. Therefore, in the following section, I present policy recommendations which 
are relevant to IATI and non-IATI members and recognize the family as a unit by underscoring 
the needs of adult learners alongside children and youth.  
6.4.2 Policy recommendations 
I am a practitioner/scholar. My background incorporates more than ten years of work with non-
profit organizations, INGOs and research agencies. It is centered upon improving conditions with 
and for people in crisis, including torture and trauma survivors, substance abusers and refugees. I 
have integrated asset and strengths-based concepts into this role, because most of the people in 
need I have seen, were either skilled, well-educated and/or embedded within a strong family or 
support system. In addition, many of the people who were most vulnerable, were those who were 
separated from their support systems and/or learners with unmet educational needs. Therefore, I 
have sought to promote recovery in part, through the provision of relevant educational programs 
in addition to social support.  
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This education and social work perspective can not be ignored as a point of potential bias. 
However, the data included in this study was comprised from multiple sectors and stakeholders 
and therefore, multiple perspectives. As a result, the study is about the intersections between 
education, social work, accountability and coordination. This study also examines accountability 
outcomes, through the manifest data that aid actors reported. Thus, potential biases 
notwithstanding, any recommendations I could develop are therefore centered upon what these 
actors have disclosed.  
In this section, I do not list or itemize tasks for others to perform. Rather, I posit a course 
of action in the aid arena that is centered upon the reporting of downward accountability 
activities in an adult educational setting. First, refugees who are skilled and professional could be 
engaged to provide services for their refugee peers in exchange for livelihoods support and 
tertiary education opportunities. IATI members could also enhance their existing mechanisms to 
increase accountability through adult learning certificates. This action could include professional 
development courses and requalification opportunities. It could also involve distance learning 
platforms such as MOOCs, with feedback mechanisms that invite refugees’ suggestions and 
decision-making, including the evaluation of teachers. To emphasize equality in education, 
courses could include grades, tests, diplomas, accreditation and other standards customary for 
any other adult learner.  
These actions depend upon establishing partnerships with education providers. Thus, the 
network of actors in the aid arena could be augmented to include practitioners and organizations 
with relevant education expertise. University consortiums, international education institutes and 
global research networks may be relevant in this regard. 
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Interestingly, the researcher did not find IATI-wide accountability guidance documents in 
emergency education, particularly for adults. For instance, www.openaidsearch.org, - the Open 
Aid Search homepage - did not post any IATI-wide accountability reports in the data collection 
timeline of October 1-16, 2015. In addition, no IATI-wide accountability plans were included 
among the list of selected files and links in the Jordan portal. While the IATI itself, is a product 
of donors and organizations’ accountability responsibilities (IATI, 2011a), there was no set of 
IATI-wide education standards for adults in the Open Aid Search homepage or reports based 
upon members’ compliance. Thus IATI members’ accountability commitments and activities are 
dispersed, which limits access to comparable data. Therefore, it is integral to enhance access to 
data about INGO and donor upward and downward accountability commitments, particularly in 
adult emergency education. 
A regular system of IATI-wide reporting, in relation to the accountability achievements 
that were planned and ongoing, could also augment the data disclosed in the Open Aid Search. 
Reporting could be based upon IATI members’ own views, policies, commitments and progress, 
along with the perspectives of their beneficiaries and any third party monitors. A Special 
Rapporteur for Accountability or related scholar could be considered, in order to administer 
ongoing and comparative content analysis of IATI data. The findings of these studies could be 
added to the IATI libraries, in order to promote the disclosure of accountability actions and 
impact in the public domain. There are also many recommendations in adult learning, 
particularly with respect to evaluation, certification and accreditation (London 2016 Conference 
Members, 2015; Kirk, 2009). A document review of the relevant recommendations could be 
performed, in order to identify if and to what degree they can be implemented in the context of 
the Iraqi and Syrian crisis in Jordan.  
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In sum, research customary in other adult learning settings, can inform the standards by 
which adult education in emergencies is performed and measured, in order to increase downward 
accountability achievements and reporting. It is through relevant adult education standards that 
refugees may find a setting oriented to their recovery needs and significantly, this setting could 
be more suitable to refugees who are skilled professionals, rather than environments centered 
upon compliance.  
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